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Abstract 
 
The 2011 election results showed that most opposition parties are becoming less popular 
among the South African electorate. This study explores the motivations of voters who chose 
to switch their vote or support from the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the 
Congress of the People (COPE) to another opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) in the 
2011 local government election. 
 
The study was informed by a qualitative research approach. Accordingly, an interview 
schedule was utilized as a research tool. This schedule contained questions prepared in order 
to acquire the necessary insight of voters who previously supported the ACDP and COPE (in 
the 2009 general elections) and moved to the DA in the 2011 local government election. In 
addition, interviews were conducted with party representatives from the ACDP and COPE in 
order to gain further insights into their perceptions of the key reasons for their party’s poor 
performance in this election.  
 
Popkin’s integrated theory is used as a basis to make sense of the behaviour and movement of 
voters during the 2011 local government election. Popkin (1991) argues that voters utilise 
low-information rationality or “gut-reasoning” when evaluating political parties, their 
candidates and the issues they present. As will be shown throughout this thesis, Popkin’s 
approach, where voters combine various sets of information obtained through daily life, the 
media and political campaigns, best explains the dynamics in the research findings. Based on 
the research findings, it appears that Popkin’s approach is the most useful for understanding 
the reasons for the voter migration to the DA in the 2011 election.  
 
The research findings indicate that the majority of opposition voters who switched over to the 
DA were mainly dissatisfied with the (poor) leadership and (bad) governance of the ruling 
party, the ANC. With the realisation that their own parties (ACDP and COPE) were 
electorally too weak to unseat the ANC, they decided to withdraw their support and vote for 
the strongest opposition party, the DA. Ultimately, these opposition voters developed very 
negative perceptions and views about the ACDP and COPE as a possible ‘government in 
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waiting’. The research findings further reveal that the DA’s leadership and governance 
(specifically in the City of Cape Town) seemed more attractive than other opposition parties 
in this election. In addition, the findings reveal that the DA had a strong electoral presence in 
most provinces and had sufficient access to the media to influence vote choices. 
 
Moreover, the study found that opposition voters were more mobile and flexible in terms of 
their voting behaviour and political choices in the 2011 election. Those who previously 
supported the ACDP and COPE in 2009 found themselves switching off their traditional 
partisan predispositions (for example Christian ideology) and shifted to a rational voting 
behaviour. They paid attention to party leadership, party images, governance and service 
delivery, and election campaigns. The findings further show that some voters also took into 
account the media’s responses to the parties’ election strategies.    
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
South Africa is a country that is deeply divided by ethnic, class, social, race, linguistics and 
religious cleavages. Due to the country’s diverse population, it is important that voters feel 
adequately represented by available political parties. However, since the inception of the new 
democratic dispensation, the majority of political parties have performed relatively poorly at 
the polls. Despite the significant increase in the number of parties contesting elections at 
national, provincial and local level, the African National Congress (ANC) has remained 
undefeated since the democratic elections of 1994 and support for opposition parties has 
progressively diminished. The 2011 local government election was a clear example. In this 
election, the majority of electoral support went to the ANC while the remainder of votes were 
shared among the opposition parties. However, none of these opposition parties, with the 
exception of the Democratic Alliance (DA), were able to win more than 4 percent of the local 
votes (Taderera, 2011; Booysen, 2012). The smaller opposition parties either saw a sharp 
decline in their support or stagnated below 1 percent in 2011. One of the problems of South 
Africa’s democracy is, therefore, the inability of opposition parties to provide a viable 
challenge to the ANC. Since adequate choice of political parties is an important component 
of a multi-party democracy, the primary purpose of this research is to investigate the 
underlying reasons for the inter-party movement of voters (supporters) from one opposition 
party to another and in particular, from the ‘smaller’ parties to the DA. In order to accomplish 
this, I chose to focus on two parties namely, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 
and the Congress of the People (COPE) in relation to the DA.  
 
1.2 Background 
   
South Africa is well-known for its apartheid history of segregation and oppression along 
racial lines. Prior to the country’s democratic dispensation, the political system was 
exclusionary; non-whites
1
 were prohibited from participating in elections (Hendricks, 2005, 
                                                            
1 Under the apartheid government non-whites were classified as Blacks, Coloureds and Indians 
(Henrard, 2002, p. 19).  
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
p. 67). Nevertheless, following the fall of the apartheid system of governance, a new 
democratically elected government was established in April 1994. Since then, many attempts 
have been made by the government to encourage political representation and participation for 
all racial groups in order to enhance and promote South Africa’s democracy. Accordingly, 
the constitution adopted in 1996 established the equality of all citizens and grants them the 
freedom to make political choices (Hendriks, 2005, p. 66). All citizens thus have the right to 
form a political party that represent the interests or aspirations of a particular constituency or 
group. Alternatively, voters have the constitutional right to feel adequately represented by 
available political parties during elections. Without a multitude of political parties, voters 
will have less choice at the polls. Given South Africa’s diverse society and unique context 
many political parties are required to represent a country as diverse as South Africa.  
 
Indeed, at the Multiparty Negotiations Forum (MNF) and Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) held in 1991, it was decided that a proportional representation (PR) 
electoral system should be implemented.
2
 Decision makers at the time felt that the PR system 
would allow for diverse candidates, and facilitate a proliferation of political parties that 
would in theory foster electoral competition (Hendricks, 2005, p. 67). South Africa’s choice 
of the PR system was partially based on the need for an electoral system that did not appear 
to advantage one particular party or group of voters. The PR system was also more likely 
(than alternative electoral systems) to encourage reconciliation and cooperation between 
competing political parties (Mattes, 2003, p. 52). Importantly, parties such as the National 
Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were in favour of the PR system. These two 
parties were worried that if the country adopted the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system 
(winner takes all) the ANC was likely to annihilate them (National Party, 1999; Johnson, 
1993; Pottie, 2001).  
 
In South Africa, citizens have an opportunity to elect their government every five years. Due 
to the country’s (closed list) PR system, citizens vote for a political party and not an 
individual to represent them. The political party chooses the people that will become public 
                                                            
2 The PR system is considered to give expression to, and be accommodative of, the voters’ wishes. 
This is due to the fact that there are no ‘wasted’ votes; the number of seats allocated to parties in the 
national and provincial legislatures is proportional to the number of votes each party wins in the 
election (Mottiar, 2005, p. 2).   
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representatives in Parliament. Hence political parties hold seats in the national and provincial 
legislatures and not individuals. This electoral system is suitable to accommodate the 
diversity of South Africa’s citizenry and is based on the values of representiveness, 
inclusiveness and fairness.
3
 More importantly, because South Africa was, and remains, a 
society characterised by its historical racial divide and apartheid experience, the adoption of 
the PR system offered the best chance for addressing ethnic and racial exclusivity. It allows 
social groups to gain some degree of parliamentary representation even with only a tiny share 
of the national vote. Additionally, under this electoral system many smaller parties that were 
unable to earn sufficient votes to win any geographical constituency, have managed to 
maintain a modest presence in Parliament (Moses, 2012, p. 1).   
 
The PR system allowed for several types of political parties to be formed (but not necessarily 
to flourish) in the country. Typical examples of such parties include religious oriented 
political parties that promote either Christian
4
 or Muslim
5
 identities. Similarly, there are 
parties that represent specific ethnic (identity) groups such as the IFP which support base is 
predominately confined to Zulu-speakers living in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal and the 
Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus) that specifically appeals to the Afrikaner group.
6
 The Minority 
Front (MF) has a history of representing the Indian population (which consist approximately 
2.5 percent of South African’s population).7 
 
 
South Africa has three spheres of governance: national, provincial and municipal. Elections 
are contested at all three spheres although attention is often focused on national elections. 
Since its political transition, South Africa has held four successful national and provincial 
elections in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009. The fifth national and provincial elections were held 
in May 2014. Local government elections are held separately with four successive elections 
                                                            
3 The PR system is viewed as very democratic in the sense that Parliament was not only representative 
of major political parties, but also included small parties. Smaller parties are thus dependent for their 
survival on the PR system (Bosman and Du Toit, 2012).  
4 The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the United Christian Democratic Party 
(UCDP) are examples of parties that represent a Christian ideology. 
5 The African Muslim Party (AMP) is one of the parties that promote Islamic values. 
6 The IFP started as a Zulu cultural organisation that evolved into a political organisation in the early 
1980’s (Hendricks, 2005, p. 77).  
7 However many of the political parties have names that provide no cues to their ideological, religious 
or programmatic sentiment (Africa and van Rooyen, 2012, p. 193).   
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in 1995, 2000, 2006 and 2011. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced that 
121 parties contested the local government election in 2011 compared to 97 parties in 2006 
and 79 in 2000. The 2011 election also saw an increase in small community based parties and 
independents. Independent candidates increased from 663 in 2006 to 754 in 2011 which 
represent a 14 percent increase since the 2006 local elections (Africa and van Rooyen, 2012, 
p. 192). The significant growth in the number of parties and independents is, some would 
argue, good for political representation and participation. It certainly indicates that South 
Africa has a multitude of platforms for citizens to express themselves politically. 
 
Nonetheless, the prospects for adequate political representation appear to have progressively 
diminished since 1994 due to the relative weakness of opposition parties to make an impact at 
the ballot box. As Hendricks (2005, p. 66) argues, South Africa has a wide array of 
opposition parties but very few viable alternatives to the incumbent ruling party. In theory, 
democracy relates to the existence and viability of opposition parties as vehicles for people to 
express themselves politically. However, the reality is that the continued dominance of a 
single party and the poor performance of opposition parties in South African elections 
continue to pose various challenges for democracy in the country. In the section that follows, 
a discussion of the significance of opposition parties is made. 
 
1.3 Overview of the importance of opposition parties  
 
Opposition parties are regarded by many as being critical to democracy (Dahl, 1971; 
Doorenspleet, 2003; Scheiner, 2006). They provide a meaningful link between the interests 
and needs of the public and the government. Hence they have a continuous engagement with 
government in all matters of public concern (Makara, 2009 p. 51). In some instances, 
opposition parties are the only political voice of marginalised, minority or excluded groups in 
society.
8
  More importantly, they can act as a contact point with the public, making them the 
most practical forum for political representation and participation. In this regard, Dahl 
contends that:  
 
                                                            
8 However, it should not be assumed that a governing party cannot represent the electorate. While 
opposition parties must be a check on government, it is not always natural that governments are out to 
marginalise, exclude and supress parts of the population.  
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In any given country, the greater the opportunities for expressing, organising and 
representing political preferences, the greater the number and variety of preferences 
and interests represented in policy-making in democracy (Dahl, 1971, p. 26).  
 
From this perspective, opposition parties are considered as key representative institutions that 
can enhance the democratic experience of citizens. Bule (2011, n.p.), argued that opposition 
parties are fundamental because they are the “living expression of the concept of choice”. 
The concept of choice is one of the key features of democratic elections; citizens have the 
political right to select a political party or candidate of their choice to represent them in 
public affairs. Moreover, opposition parties are a vehicle and source of information.
9
 They 
provide voters with information about the voting process in general, and more specifically, 
about the election management process (Molomo, 2003, p. 302).
10
  
 
 
1.4 The basis for the study: weak opposition parties in South Africa  
 
The basis of this study is that despite the increase in the number of opposition parties 
contesting elections, their support base has steadily been eroded. The African National 
Congress (ANC) has remained the most dominant political party since 1994. Given the 
continued dominance of one political party, meaningful electoral competition is often 
unrealised because opposition parties are unable to widen their appeal among South African 
voters. For example, after the 2004 election, Naidu and Manqele (2005, p. 207) state that “the 
smallest parties on the South African political landscape seem trapped in what has become a 
fish bowl of opposition politics”. Other scholars have also expressed their concerns about the 
bleak performance of opposition parties. After the 2009 elections, for example, Schulz-
Herzenberg (2009a, p. 27) reported that “the size of the opposition bloc vote contracted from 
32.1 percent of the electorate in 1994 to 17.2 percent in 2004, rising again to 20.1 percent in 
2009”.  Hence only a small percentage of voters opted for an opposition party between the 
1994 and 2009 elections while the majority supported the ruling party (ANC). This is what 
                                                            
9 It is however important to note that it is not only opposition parties that provide the above mentioned 
services. All parties, even governing ones, can provide the services mentioned.  
10 The significance of opposition parties in democracy is explored in greater detail in Chapter Two of 
this dissertation. 
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makes Booysen (2009, p. 85) lament that the 2009 elections were a “mirror image” of non-
performing opposition parties.   
 
The 2011 local government election was no exception. In this election the majority of 
electoral support went to the ANC. However, a number of voter trends in relation to voting 
behaviour and opposition parties emerged in this election. For instance, none of the 
opposition parties, with the exception of the Democratic Alliance (DA), were able to increase 
their support base. The DA was the only opposition party that saw an increase from 14.8 
percent in 2006 to 23.9 percent in the 2011 election. The other opposition parties either saw a 
decline in their votes or stagnated below 1 percent.  
 
Thus, the main competition was around the ANC and the DA in 2011. Many political 
commentators felt that this election was mainly a two horse race, with only two real players 
among the 121 parties that contested (Alexander, 2011; Böhler, 2011; Sithole, 2014). Sithole 
(2014, p. 1) argues that the South African electoral space is often expressed as a contest 
between two parties with a sprinkling of a number of smaller parties as a sideshow. 
Therefore, it would appear that most of the smaller opposition parties are on the downward 
trend. To illustrate this point, out of the 121 parties that contested, only five of them earned 
more than 1 percent of the votes in 2011.
11
  Most importantly, only two of the five parties 
won more than 4 percent of the municipal votes, that is, the ANC and DA. This election 
showed that the majority of opposition parties received a far lower percentage than in the 
2006 and the 2009 elections. Consequently, Hendricks (2006, p. 83) and Matlosa (2010, p. 2) 
have argued that elections in South Africa will remain characterised by the domination of one 
party and the proliferation of smaller fragmented (and weakened) opposition parties.  
 
The domination of a single party could imply shrinkage of political choice for voters and a 
lessening of opportunities for voters to be represented by a political party that adequately 
advocates their interests. As stated above, South Africa is underlined by a racially and 
ethnically diverse society and thus a multitude of political parties is necessary to 
                                                            
11 The five parties which won more than one percent of the votes in 2011 are ANC, DA, IFP, COPE 
and NNP. Their electoral results will be further explored in Chapter Three.  
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accommodate this kind of diversity. It would therefore seem that more than one political 
party is needed to adequately represent differing interests of the electorate.  
 
Interestingly though, the 2011 elections witnessed voter migration, particularly from the 
‘smaller’ opposition parties to the DA. A large percentage of opposition voters chose to 
switch to the DA as they could see engagement between a stronger consolidated opposition 
party as an asset rather than a liability. Two parties that were significantly affected by the 
migration of opposition voters to the DA include the African Christian Democratic Party 
(ACDP) and the Congress of the People (COPE). The ACDP and COPE lost most of their 
2009 supporters to the DA during this election (Greben, 2012, p. 346).
12
  
 
COPE performed relatively well in its first election in 2009. Support for the party however 
plummeted in the 2011 election; the party only managed to receive a meagre 2.33 percent of 
the vote compared to the 7.42 percent in 2009. The ACDP, on the other hand, has suffered 
many electoral losses since 1994. Although the ACDP has obtained seats in some 
municipalities, it has been unable to make inroads into the larger voting bloc. It is therefore 
clear that these two opposition parties are facing an electoral crisis. Consequently, if the 
ACDP and COPE wish to survive or increase their support base, they may need to come up 
with new political ideas and programmes that would appeal to the broader South African 
population.  
 
1.5 Research aims 
 
The 2011 local election results showed that most opposition parties are becoming less 
popular among the South African electorate. Therefore, the primary aim of this research is to 
investigate the underlying reasons that opposition voters decided to move their support away 
from “smaller” opposition parties in the 2011 election. In order to realise the aim, the study 
focuses on two political parties namely, the ACDP and COPE and their dwindling voter-base. 
                                                            
12 The estimated percentages of voters that crossed over to the DA are discussed in Chapter Three of 
this dissertation.  
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This study simultaneously explores the reasons why the DA managed to attract support away 
from the ACDP and COPE in the 2011 election. Ultimately, the key focus is to examine how 
these parties are currently perceived by voters.   
 
1.6 Research question  
 
Keeping the above in mind, the study aims to address the following question: Why did voters 
who previously voted for the ACDP and COPE decide to move their support from these 
parties in the 2011 local government election?  
 
The sub-questions that will assist in answering the overarching research question include: 
 What is the significance of opposition parties in democracy? 
 What are the underlying problems and challenges opposition parties face in terms of 
maintaining and increasing their electoral support?  
 Do voting behaviour theories explain the voter behaviour and movement between parties?  
 What are the key reasons for poor performing opposition parties in South Africa?  
 Looking at the ACDP and COPE in particular, why were they unable to attract support in 
the 2011 elections? 
 What were the key reasons that made the DA more attractive than other opposition parties 
in the 2011 elections? 
 Based on the poor electoral performance of opposition parties (excluding the DA), is 
South Africa moving towards a two-party system? 
 What is the future for smaller opposition parties such the ACDP and COPE?  
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1.7 Research design  
 
According to Durrheim (1999, p. 32), a research design is a framework and plan that guides 
the research activity to ensure that conclusions are reached. In this vein, a research design 
addresses the key question of what type of study will be undertaken by the researcher in order 
to provide accurate and acceptable answers to the research problem. Moreover, a research 
design is a plan used by researchers to obtain or select research participants and collect 
information from them (Burger, 2005, p. 11). Since the main concern was to have an in-depth 
understanding of the voter exodus from the ACDP and COPE in the 2011 election, this 
dissertation adopted a qualitative interpretative approach.  
 
1.8 Methodological approach 
 
1.8.1 Qualitative approach 
 
A qualitative approach was adopted for this study. Qualitative research refers to research 
which produces descriptive data that generally comprise people’s own written or spoken 
words. The purpose of a qualitative analysis is to discover the underlying, deeper meanings of 
human experience (Buso, 2002, p. 16). In support of the choice of this design, reference is 
made to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 271) who argue that qualitative studies involve 
describing the actions of the research participants in great detail, and to understand the social 
phenomenon in terms of the participants’ own beliefs, history and context. In addition, 
Neuman (1997, p. 329) argues that qualitative research is primarily interested in recording 
what people say (with words, gestures and tones), observing specific behaviours, and 
studying written documents or examining visual images. 
 
Correspondingly, Fink (2003, p. 16) states that a qualitative survey collects information on 
the meanings that people attach to their experience and on the ways they express themselves. 
Fink (2003, p.16) further states that, “qualitative surveys provide data to answer questions 
such as: ‘what is X, and how do different people, communities and cultures think and feel 
about X, and why’”. The researcher therefore opted for a qualitative design because it was 
found suitable to address the subject of why voters decided to move away from smaller 
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opposition parties to the DA in the 2011 election. A qualitative research design allowed the 
researcher to gain deeper insights into the reasons why some opposition voters moved their 
support away from the ACDP and COPE. This is ideally what this research wanted to 
achieve. It wanted to understand how opposition voters currently perceive parties such as the 
ACDP and COPE.  
 
The type of qualitative design used for this study is the interpretive research approach. Many 
scholars have argued that qualitative research is called interpretive method (see Newman, 
1997; Burns, 2003; Gorski, 2005). Interpretive research aims to explain the subjective 
reasons and meanings that lie behind social action (Durrheim and Terre Blance, 2002, p. 6). 
This particular model was adopted because the research consists of people’s personal 
experiences and insights in relation to the two opposition parties selected. Hence the 
researcher adopted an interactional epistemological stance towards their experiences (or 
reality) and used methodologies such as in-depth interviewing. An epistemological stance 
specifies the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the subject being 
researched (Durrheim and Terre Blance, 2002, p. 6). The researcher tried to understand their 
perceptions and evaluations about the ACDP and COPE and empathetically interpreted the 
meaning of what was said. 
 
1.8.2 Theoretical approach  
 
Reviewing the literature outlined different theories on the topic at hand and provides the 
theoretical background to the research namely, to make sense of the poor performance of 
opposition parties and the potential reasons for the voter migration from smaller opposition 
parties to the DA in the 2011 election. In this regard, I adopted the integrated theory of 
Samuel Popkin (1991) that recognises that voters do reason about parties, candidates, 
campaigns and issues. The central insight of Popkin’s theory is that voters observe who and 
what parties stand for and what the government can do and should do. Hence, voters’ 
perceptions of the government, parties and candidates affect their assessments and 
preferences in elections (Popkin, 1991, p. 7). As will be seen in my findings (see Chapter 
Four) the theoretical approach used by Popkin appears to be the most useful for 
understanding the behaviour and movement of voters in the 2011 local election.  
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1.8.3 Data collection methods 
 
To source primary data, I conducted a series of in-depth interviews. Interviews are extremely 
useful in qualitative research. According to Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2006, p. 116), 
“an interview involves direct personal contact with the participant who is asked to answer 
questions relating to the research problem”. As McMillan and Schumacher (2006, p. 350) 
indicate, in-depth interviews are open-response questions to obtain data of participants; how 
they conceive their world and how they explain or make sense of important events in their 
lives”.  
 
More specifically, a semi-structured interview was conducted. In the sense that, a list of 
questions were drawn up prior to the interviews. Bless et al (2006, p. 116) explain that often 
there is a need for more specific and detailed information. In this case, a semi-structured 
interview allowed the researcher to have a fixed list of questions to be answered by all 
interviewees. However, a semi-structured interview also allowed the researcher to formulate 
other questions depending on the responses of the participants. Hence although the questions 
were structured, the researcher could still discover new aspects of the research problem or 
question by exploring in detail the explanations provided by the participants. In that case, the 
researcher could probe for more information on important points raised in the interviews.
13
  
 
The interview process began with prior arrangements made with the participants in order to 
determine the date, time and place of the commencement of the interviews. As Gubrium and 
Holstein (2001, p. 90) state “once the researcher identifies a respondent, she or he must then 
ask them if they will agree to be interviewed, a process that usually accompanies obtaining 
informed consent”. The researcher presented the consent form to all participants (see 
Appendix B) and was only able to commence with the interview after the participant agreed 
to the terms of the form and signed it. All interviews were done individually which involved 
the researcher and the designated participant. The interview did not require more than sixty 
                                                            
13 Semi-structured interviews also allowed for more freedom and self-expression by the participants. 
They felt free to share additional information were restricted to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer.  It also enabled 
the researcher to raise additional information which could result in future research. 
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minutes of the participant’s time. However, some interviews took longer than the estimated 
time.  
 
1.8.4 Ethical issues 
 
Most importantly, in order to avoid unethical research practice, I paid careful attention to 
ethical guiding principles for research. In this regard, the interviews were informed by the 
following research principles: privacy; anonymity; confidentiality (Neuman, 1997, p. 452); 
truthfulness; and voluntary participation (Durrheim, 1999, p. 66). At the beginning of the 
interview process, I promised to protect all participants’ privacy, anonymity and 
confidentiality.
14
 The names of the participants were not recorded during the interviews. I 
also informed the participants that their contributions will be locked away at all times and 
will be destroyed after the research is completed. All the participants were informed that they 
have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without any consequences. A detailed 
discussion about the ethical considerations for this study is provided in Appendix C.  
 
1.8.5 Selection of participants  
 
In total seventeen interviews were conducted with voters who had either switched from the 
ACDP or COPE to the DA. Eight interviews were conducted with respondents who 
previously voted for the ACDP and nine interviews were conducted with voters that formerly 
supported COPE in the 2009 general elections. Interviews were conducted with party 
representatives from the ACDP and COPE in order to gain further insights into their 
perceptions of the key reasons for their party’s poor performance in this election. 
 
Given the difficulty of obtaining appropriate respondents, I decided to use the snowball 
sampling technique for the selection process of voters. Snowball sampling is most commonly 
used when the members of a special population are difficult to locate (Babbie and Mouton, 
2001, p. 16). I thus relied on the help of others to identify possible participants. Welsh & 
Corner (1988, p. 193) explain the snowball sampling technique as follows:  
                                                            
14 It should be noted that the researcher gave the participants the option whether they want their names 
to be revealed or not. Participants stated that their names should not be mentioned in this study.  
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…when one member of the target population is found, he/she is asked to name other 
members of the target group who are then interviewed and asked to supply additional 
names, and so forth. 
 
Likewise, Katz (2006, p. 4) states that snowball sampling is a nonprobability method for 
developing a research sample where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from 
among their acquaintances.  
 
I identified voters (who previously voted for ACDP and COPE) by contacting existing 
members of the DA to find out who are their newest members and if these members were 
previously either ACDP or COPE supporters. These DA members provided the researcher 
with names of people that moved to the DA from the ACDP and COPE in the period between 
the 2009 and the 2011 elections. Also, while conducting interviews with the party officials, 
the researcher asked them to identify voters that previously supported their party. However, 
the party officials were not obligated to give names.  
 
In terms of party representatives, I interviewed one political representative from each party. 
As previously indicated, the main aim was to gain insight into their perceptions of the key 
reasons for their party’s poor electoral performance in the 2011 local government elections. 
The respondents were as a result purposefully selected. According to McMillan and 
Schumacher (2006, p.126), purposeful sampling is when the researcher selects particular 
elements from the population that will be representative or informative about the topic of 
interest. MacMillan and Schumacher (2006, p. 126) further contend that, “on the basis of the 
researcher’s knowledge of the population, a judgement is made about which subjects should 
be selected to provide the best information to address the purpose of the research”. Hence 
preference was given to key informants who, on account of their position, had more 
information than any other people. I selected active party representatives from ACDP and 
COPE in Parliament or the provincial legislatures.  
 
For the ACDP, I contacted their parliamentary offices in Cape Town to find respondents for 
the interviews. The researcher managed to get a member from the Western Cape Provincial 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
Legislature. It should be noted that this party official is the only ACDP member in the 
Western Cape Legislature.  He was very open to the purpose of the research and was willing 
to conduct an interview with the researcher. This party official was easy to approach and 
shared the key problems and challenges South African opposition parties are currently facing. 
This interview extended far more than an hour initially intended as maximum.  
 
For COPE, the researcher contacted (by telephone and email) their parliamentary offices in 
Cape Town.  Party officials had demanding schedules and because of the unavailability of 
most COPE representatives in Parliament, responses from officials were delayed. The COPE 
representative, on the other hand, did not agree to an in-depth interview but felt more 
comfortable responding to a mailed questionnaire. In this vein, the researcher used semi-
structured interview questions (see Appendix F).  
 
1.8.6 Data analysis  
 
Field notes and recordings were used to collect data from the interview sessions. The 
researcher transcribed each interview on a word document verbatim in order to have 
complete and accurate information. The tape recorder (and written notes) allowed the 
researcher to capture the exact responses given by the participants. However, the problem 
with verbatim transcription is that it was very time consuming, but on the other hand, it 
prevented important information from getting lost.   
 
After the interviews were transcribed, I developed an organizing system of the data, 
involving segregation of information from the interviews into smaller pieces containing some 
descriptive meanings. These data parts were called data segments and contained one piece of 
relevant information each. Thereafter, in order to get a sense of the whole data, the researcher 
read each of the data segments and wrote ideas about the data. In addition, in order to 
generate the patterns and categories from the data, the researcher read each data set and asked 
herself these questions: “What is this about?”, “What were they talking about” and so on. 
During this process, data that were not relevant to the research were discarded and only 
relevant data were developed into patterns and categories. Moreover, the researcher 
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compared the patterns and categories generated from the data with the ones predicted from 
the theory and literature.    
 
1.9 Limitations of the study  
 
Many challenges and limitations were faced when the researcher conducted the fieldwork. 
Firstly, the researcher aimed to interview at least 20 voters who switched their vote to the DA 
in 2011 (10 voters who formerly supported the ACDP and 10 voters who previously 
supported COPE). Nevertheless, the researcher only managed to interview eight voters who 
had crossed over from the ACDP and nine voters were interviewed that had withdrawn their 
support from COPE. At the same time, the researcher found it difficult to get hold of party 
representatives for interviews. Initially, the researcher aimed to interview two party officials 
from each party. Unfortunately the researcher only managed to interview one party 
representative, each from the ACDP and COPE.  
 
Secondly, party representatives are very often times loyal members of their respective parties 
and this could have possibly influenced the quality of their answers to the interview 
questions. Hence, the second set of interviews that were conducted with the voters generated 
the most useful data for this study. This is so because these respondents felt no sense of 
loyalty to the political parties selected and thus provided a detailed data on their motivations 
for moving away from the ACDP and COPE, and why the DA was more attractive in the 
2011 local election.  
 
Thirdly, time and availability of respondents were a concern for the researcher. Owing to the 
fact that most respondents targeted had full-time jobs, they were not always available during 
the week for interviews. For this reason, the researcher had to conduct interviews over 
weekends or after hours in order to ensure that participants were at home. Besides, some 
participants lived far from the researcher and travelling for a long distance was often 
required. There were cases when some participants would cancel interview appointments at 
the last minute. Hence time and availability of the participants were a huge constraint for the 
research process.  
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The fact that the study only involved participants located in the Western Cape, more 
specifically who reside in the City of Cape Town, Worcester and Oudtshoorn participated in 
the fieldwork process, the findings of the study may not be generalised. This is compounded 
further by the fact that most of the participants targeted all reside in the Western Cape 
Province where the DA is very popular and the governing political party which in turn might 
easily influence voter shift. In this vein, this could have clouded voters’ evaluations and 
judgements of other opposition parties such as the ACDP and COPE.  
 
1.10 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter One, the introductory chapter, presents the 
overall research theme and articulates the main research question and aims. This chapter 
provides the rationale for the study and gives a brief overview of the importance of 
opposition political parties in a democratic dispensation. In particular, this chapter illustrates 
the weak and fragmented position of South African opposition parties and the implication this 
has for political representation and participation. In the sense, that weak opposition parties 
lessens the political choices of voters at the polls. This chapter also presents the research 
design and methodological methods used in this study.  
 
Chapter Two provides the theoretical and conceptual framework upon which the study is 
anchored and consequently provides an indication of the research scope. This chapter also 
locates the significance of political (opposition) parties and provides an understanding of 
their key roles and functions in democracy. The chapter further provides the underlying 
reasons why most opposition parties seem unattractive to voters. More importantly, in order 
to make sense of the voter migration to the DA in 2011, this chapter also looks at voting 
behaviour theories - party identification, sociological model, rational choice, dominant-
ideology and Popkin’s integrated theory. The aim is to see whether voting behaviour models 
can explain the voting behaviour and movement of voters between elections.  
 
Chapter Three provides an overview of the South African political context. In this chapter the 
dominance of the ANC and the positive and negative implications of a dominant party system 
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are explored. This chapter also includes a detailed discussion of South African opposition 
parties such as the DA, ACDP and COPE which are the key actors in this study. This is 
followed by the electoral trends from 1994 to 2011 that illustrate the weak and fragmented 
position of most opposition parties. Lastly, this chapter also analyses the poor performance of 
opposition parties since 1994. It investigates the underlying reasons for their dwindling 
ability to attract sufficient support from the electorate.  
 
Chapter Four contains all the relevant findings of the in-depth interviews. The aim of this 
chapter is to analyse and interpret the motivations of voters who switched from the ACDP 
and COPE to the DA in the 2011 local elections. This chapter also gained insight from the 
perspective party representatives for the poor electoral showing in 2011.  
 
Chapter Five concludes the study with a summary of the main findings and provides a 
response to the research question.  
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Chapter Two: Democracy, opposition parties and voting behaviour  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter gives a theoretical and conceptual understanding of the term democracy and 
more specifically, explains the key roles and functions that opposition parties perform in 
society. The chapter also explores different party types and different party regimes which 
include: one party system; two party systems; multiparty systems; and dominant party 
systems. Research has shown that party systems greatly influence the way parties operate and 
how effective they perform their functions in a democratic society (Matlosa, 2005; Reitzes; 
2011).
15
   
 
Moreover, this chapter discusses at the weakness of opposition
 
parties, particularly the 
reasons for their poor performance during elections. As previously mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, opposition parties are important vehicles for the functioning of the 
whole democratic process. Democracy needs strong and sustainable political (opposition) 
parties with the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate 
their ability to govern for the public good. Lastly, this chapter examines theories of voting 
behaviour that explain the manner in which a particular group of people vote for a specific 
political party. Voting theories also give detail to some of the motivations behind vote 
switching (the movement between parties during elections) which is the primary focus and 
aim of this study.  
 
2.2 Theorising democracy  
 
Democracy has its roots in the Greek term democratia which means “a political system where 
the majority of people, not aristocrats rule or govern” (Harrison, 1993, p. 3). Similarly, 
O’Neil (2007, p. 135) states that the word democracy comes from the Greek words demos 
(meaning ‘the common people’) and kratia (meaning ‘power’ or ‘rule’). Therefore, the basic 
                                                            
15 Even though the basic roles and functions can be applied to all political parties, various party types 
are formulated on the basic characteristics of parties. Consequently, the nature of the party system 
determines the roles and efficiency of parties. 
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definition of democracy places the people at the centre and focuses on the participation of 
people in state activities. In simple terms, democracy is the rule of the people, by the people, 
for the people (Birch, 1993; Kiiza, 2005). There is however no single definition of democracy 
once you move beyond the ‘rule by the people’ (Catt, 1999) because a number of scholars 
have presented different theoretical views and explanations for democracy.
16
 As Connolly 
(1983, n.p.) has argued, “conceptions of democracy have been and will likely always be 
debated; no single formulation will triumph”.  
 
It follows the above that, democracy may be one of the most contested and controversial 
concepts in political theory.
17
 However while democracy remains a contested concept, 
democracy is considered the best system of governance which is characterised by credible 
and fair competitive elections, freedom of expression, speech and association, as well as 
effective representation and responsiveness to citizens (Reitzes, Larsen and Fakir, 2011, p. 5). 
The four characteristics identified by Reitzes et al reflect some of the basic dimensions of 
democracy. Other scholars such as the political theorist Robert Dahl argues that there are a 
minimum of eight conditions for democracy and these include: elected officials; free, fair, 
and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; association 
autonomy; inclusive citizenship; political competition; and institutions that ensure a 
horizontal division of powers to hold government accountable (Dahl, 1971, p. 3).
18
  
 
Democracy is designed in such a way that ordinary citizens have the right to be part of the 
collective decision making of state affairs. This would entail a direct (participatory) 
democracy where the people govern themselves or an (indirect) representative form of 
democracy where a government is chosen by the people, and as such, deriving its legitimacy 
from the people. Catt (1999, p. 13) adds that a direct democracy involves all the people in 
deciding on individual issues through voting on specific questions that are posed for them, 
                                                            
16 Research has shown that philosophers, historians and political scientists have different views and 
opinions about the meaning of democracy and ambiguity arises when the concept democracy has to be 
defined. 
17 Democracy Development Programme (DDP), Research Unit for the Good Governance Africa 
Sector Network’ Conference: April 2008, Addis Abba.  
18 Political theorist Robert Dahl tried to introduce the term polyarchy in the hope of gaining a greater 
measure of conceptual precision for democracy (Schmitter and Karl, 1996; Saoana, 2011).  In his 
book Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, Dahl uses the concept polyarchy in an attempt to 
make a distinction between the ideal (democracy) and what in practice exist (polyarchy).  The term 
polyarchy is derived from the Greek words that mean ‘rule by many’. 
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most commonly a referendum. Thus, in a direct democracy every single member of the 
population has an equal say in every single decision. As Arblaster (1987, p. 18) argues, 
“direct personal participation of the citizen body in the government of the city” was the 
central feature of this kind of democracy. Likewise, Rousseau argues that citizens should be 
directly involved in the creation of laws of which are to govern their lives. However, 
Rousseau did not believe in a representative government, because he did not think that men’s 
wills could be represented by others. He viewed party organisations as “sinister interest” 
prone to undermining, perverting, or usurping the will of the majority (Rousseau, 1913, p. 
121).   
 
Scholars such as Rousseau (1913) considered direct democracy as a form of governance that 
properly represents the will of the people because citizens actively participate in governing 
their own political affairs. However, this type of democracy has some challenges as it may 
only work well in very small populations. The community must be small enough for its 
citizens to meet and make decisions directly, such as in community town-hall meetings. Also, 
a direct democracy requires time and a homogenous society that is willing to debate issues 
face-to-face and strive for a solution that is acceptable for everyone (Catt, 1999, p. 46). As 
the group gets bigger, individuals find it harder to speak and decision-making becomes 
difficult.  As a result, many modern states favour the use of representative democracy to deal 
with a larger electorate.  
 
South Africa is a representative democracy. This means that citizens do not govern the 
country themselves, they elect (vote for) other people to represent them in government. 
Representative democracy is thus characterised by people choosing representatives to make 
decisions for them, and those chosen are accountable to the people for those decisions. Catt 
(1999, p. 13) contends that this form of democracy relates to “the election of an elite group 
who are given the task of making decisions on behalf of the people”. Similarly, Manin (1997, 
p. 175) argues that representative democracy establishes a political regime in which elites are 
chosen to make decisions and those decisions are made subject to the verdict of the people.   
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
2.3 Party systems  
 
In Chapter One, it was pointed out that South Africa’s multiparty system has evolved into a 
‘dominant party system’ in which the majority of opposition parties are fragmented and 
unable to effectively compete for power. This section will thus focus on the relationship 
between party systems and political (opposition) parties.  
 
Firstly, the most common way of distinguishing between various types of party systems is by 
reference to the number of parties competing for power in a given country (Matlosa; 2008, p. 
9). As earlier noted, the four major party systems in today’s democracies are one-party 
systems; two party systems; dominant party systems; and multiparty systems. These systems 
are discussed below:  
 
With regards to one-party systems, only one political party exist and enjoy a monopoly of 
power.
19
 Other parties are thus banned and are not allowed to compete for governmental 
power. The ruling party becomes the permanent government; it dominates the political 
landscape and exercises hegemony over all organs of the state.   
 
In a two party system, as the term suggests, two parties are dominant and tend to take office 
alternatively in more or less a regular fashion (Mair, 1990; Sadie, 2006). Both parties are 
more or less of equivalent size and have a roughly equal prospect of winning state power and 
the political supremacy of two dominant parties is assured (Mair, 1990, pp. 420-422). 
However, it should be noted that in a two-party system there can be more than two parties but 
only the two major parties enjoy sufficient electoral strength to form the government. Smaller 
parties only have minor political strength and have no representation in legislatures. Matlosa 
(2008, p. 11) explains that under a two-party system, the larger party is able to rule alone (on 
                                                            
19 Most of the post-colonial leaders chose to rule in a similar style to that of colonial rulers by 
regulating the majority of the people and isolating the opposition groups. For example, Makara (2009) 
states that, on attaining independence, many of the ruling parties of the day either outlawed opposition 
parties, criminalised their activities, or their contribution to the national debate were belittled and 
disparaged. From the late 1960s until the early 1990s at least four-fifths of the African continent was 
ruled by authoritarian regimes. 
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the basis of legislative authority) and the other party provides checks and balances, as well as, 
serves as a “government in the wings”.  
 
Furthermore, a dominant party system is a system where one party is consistently elected (in 
at least three consecutive elections), and gains an absolute majority of legislative seats from a 
stabilised electorate (Sartori, 1976, p. 205). Sartori goes on to argue that “while opposition 
parties exist, elections are free and fair, and dissent is tolerated, party rotation in government 
does not occur” in a dominant party system. This is supported by Langeran (2010, p. 1) who 
points out that most dominant party systems hold fair but uncompetitive elections which 
result in only one party repeatedly and continuously winning national power. Thus, the 
important factor is not the number of parties that exist, but rather the distribution of power 
among parties.  
 
Many scholars like Southall (2005), Brooks (2004) and Lanegran (1991) have written about 
the negative implications of a dominant party system in a democracy. However, a few 
scholars point to the stabilizing effect that a dominant party system has on young 
democracies in the developing world (Carothers, 2002; Du Toit, 1999; Pempel, 1990). They 
argue that dominant party systems may be better in preserving stability and promoting socio-
economic development. For example, the ANC in South Africa and the Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) in Botswana have played a crucial stabilising role during the establishment of 
new democratic regimes in both countries. On the other hand, other scholars consider 
dominant party systems to be inimical to democratic consolidation. For example, 
Doorenspleet (2003, p. 185) argues that meaningful electoral competition in such a system is 
constrained. Doorenspleet (2003, p. 185) further notes, for a democracy to function well, 
competition needs to be stiff between two or more political parties. A multiparty system is 
therefore more desirable for democracy.   
 
Multiparty systems are characterised by competition between more than two political parties. 
As Sadie (2006, p. 216) explains, in multiparty systems popular support is divided among 
several political parties contesting for power. A classic example is Germany where two major 
parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), have 
ruled the country through political coalitions which also involved smaller parties. Mauritius 
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has also been familiar for its multiparty system where the alternation of state power has been 
a regular occurrence. In an ideal multiparty democracy, prospects for a one-party system, 
two-party system or a dominant party emerging are considered relatively small.
 
  
 
Nonetheless, in multiparty systems there are numerous cases where one political party 
dominates and stays in power for decades. South Africa, Namibia, Nigeria, Botswana and 
Zambia are well known for their multiparty democratic system. However these countries are 
characterized by one-party dominance and weak opposition parties. Opposition parties, 
especially in the aforementioned countries, have remained unsuccessful to break the electoral 
dominance of incumbent parties with the exception of Zambia in which the Patriotic Front 
(PF) party managed to unseat the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) after staying 
in power for 20 years. However, the trend has been that one party dominates for decades. For 
instance, despite the range of parties in Botswana, the BDP has ruled the country since 1966 
(Teshome, 2009; Lotshwao, 2011). Namibia’s democracy is also characterised by one-party 
domination; the South West African People’s Party (Swapo) has enjoyed uninterrupted 
control of political power since the country’s first election (Teshome, 2009; Moses, 2012). 
The ANC has won four consecutive elections since South Africa’s transition to democracy. 
Dominant parties have thus become popular phenomenon.  
 
From this perspective, party systems can ultimately impact the quality of democracy. For 
example, in Chapter One, it is argued that a dominant party system is not healthy for South 
Africa’s multiparty democracy. This is so because most opposition parties, especially parties 
operating in dominant party systems, find it difficult to grow electorally. Nevertheless, 
dominant party systems are not the only reason for fragmented and weak opposition parties. 
Other factors have also contributed to their poor performance. The potential reasons for the 
weak performance of parties will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
2.4 Understanding political parties and democracy 
 
Looking back in history, political parties have not always been with us. Their existence can 
be traced to the second half of the twentieth century to what is commonly referred to as the 
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“third wave” of democratization (Huntington, 1991; Matlosa, 2005; Silah, 2007). Parties in 
the organised modern sense first emerged in the United States as a consequence of specific 
constitutional arrangements and laws that provided for or encouraged competitive elections 
(Sadie, 2006, p. 203). In countries such as Britain, the suffrage was expended and groups 
were organised to contest elections. Similarly, political parties in Africa became a prominent 
feature of post-colonial political contestation in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s (Salih, 2003; 
Matlosa, 2005; Salih, 2006). However post-colonial rulers banned political parties for 
decades in the 1960’s and parties were only unbanned in the 1990’s with the independence of 
African states (Mozaffar, 2005; Carbone, 2007).  
 
The term political party has been defined by many. The ACE Encyclopaedia defines a 
political party as “an organised group of people with at least roughly similar political aims 
and opinions that seek to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected into public 
office”. Other sources have given fairly similar definitions in which political parties are seen 
as groups or organisations that are seeking to occupy decision-making positions of authority 
within the state in order to control the resources and personnel of government (Democracy 
Encyclopaedia; Sadie, 2006; Heywood, 2002).
 
Moreover, Maliyamkono and Kanyangolo 
(2003, p. 41) define a political party as “an organised association of people working together 
to compete for political office and promote agreed-upon policies”.  Scholars like Salih (2008, 
p. 20), point out that political parties are representative institutions that endow the regime 
with legitimacy. They provide ideologies that represent social, economic and political 
interests.  
 
Indeed, political scientists have long recognised the importance of political parties in 
democracy (Kelsen, 1929; Sartori, 1968; Rosenblum, 2000). Political parties create political 
environments for citizens to actively participate in the democratic process. For this reason,  
Schattsneider (1942, p. 1) notes that it is impossible to have democracy without political 
parties. He argues that political parties create representative democracy and for this reason, 
political parties are an important aspect of democracy. A similar position was adopted by 
Linz and Stephan (1996) about the relevance of political parties in modern democracies. They 
noted that political parties are fundamental in the democratic context mainly because in the 
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past no form of non-party representation was able to establish a democratic government (Linz 
and Stephan, 1996, p. 4).  
 
Other scholars have also emphasised that democracy cannot function without political parties. 
Makara (2009, p. 44), argues that “political parties are presumed to be central to the 
democratization of any state” and Matlosa (2007, p. 10) once stated: “a democracy is 
unthinkable without competing parties. Competing political parties are the agents of 
democracy”. This general conception of the significance of political parties in democracy is 
reiterated by public opinion. According to Dalton and Weldon (2005, p.  933), analysis of 
survey data from thirteen states revealed that three-quarters of respondents thought that 
political parties were necessary for a well-functioning democracy. This finding is not 
surprising as political parties are important representative channels that voters use to 
strengthen their voice in government. 
 
While political parties can also exist in non-democratic states (Weiner, 1967, pp. 1-2), it is 
impossible to have a representative democracy without parties contesting for state power 
(Matlosa, 2007, p. 2). Political parties are thus necessary organisations for a representative 
democracy to work effectively.  
 
From the above theoretical discussions, it is evident that political parties are among the most 
important organisations in modern democracies. Therefore, their value should not be 
underestimated. It is for this reason that Dahl (1798) views the existence of political parties as 
very nearly the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself.  Likewise, Reitzes et al 
(2011, pp. 11-19) stated that political parties are the foundation of democracy; they are the 
sole participants in elections and the exercise of majority rule. As such, parties are 
particularly known for being crucial actors in elections, for example, they nominate 
candidates for public office, run highly visible and organised election campaigns, and 
building support among broad coalitions of citizens and groups. They also integrate multiple 
conflicting demands into coherent policy programmes (Norris, 2005, p. 3). In this regard, 
parties have a very broad impact on the political system, government and decision-making. 
Therefore, the subsequent section introduces the classic roles and functions that parties 
perform in society.  
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2.5 Roles and functions of parties in democracy  
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, political parties perform many important tasks in 
society. Generally, they are expected to fulfil two fundamental roles in the political process 
namely, to form the government and secondly, to serve as an opposition. Matlosa (2008, p. 5) 
summarised the primary functions of political parties in the following table:   
 
   
 Interest articulation  Interest aggregation  Recruitment  
Government  Implement policies  Sustains electoral 
support for 
government 
Fills government 
positions 
Opposition  Develop alternatives  Gain electoral support 
for chance in 
government 
Builds pool of 
competent candidates  
Table 1: Primary functions of political parties in democracy 
 
2.5.1 Recruitment of political leaders  
 
A fundamental role of political parties is to seek control of the governing apparatus by 
proposing candidates for office. Both government and opposition parties are responsible to 
prepare, select and recruit candidates for governmental and parliamentary positions (Canton, 
2007; Teshome, 2009). Parties, especially those in government, are important for preparing 
the head of state (president), deputy president, ministers, assistant ministers and members of 
parliament. Many of the parties’ internal structures (such as youth groups, women movement, 
and internal party offices) are created to identify and nature future candidates for elections 
and political positions. This emphasizes the political leadership function of parties in 
government. At the same time, opposition parties are expected to select a pool of competent 
candidates to stand for the next election. Opposition parties also prepare and train party 
members that might take over leadership positions within the party or that might have been 
elected into national, provincial or local legislatures. Related to this is the training of political 
elites about the democratic process. It is crucial for political parties to produce democratic 
leaders, and in this way, enhance and build democratic governance within the country 
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(Matlosa, 2008, p. 5). Political elites should be educated on the norms of democracy and the 
principles of their party (Weissenbach, 2010, p. 11). This is the responsibility of both the 
incumbent party and opposition parties to provide the necessary political training for their 
members. The training may accompany a long career starting in party activism, followed by 
party office holding, and then finally elective holding (Weissenbach, 2010, p. 11).  
 
2.5.2 Articulation/aggregation of interests and policies  
 
One of the key functions of both the governing party and opposition is to articulate the 
interests of the electorate. Both have the duty to convert people’s demands into political ideas 
and programmes. They give voice to their supporters’ interests by taking a stand on political 
issues and by expressing the views of their supporters within the governing process 
(Weissenbach, 2010, p. 11). As Sachikonye (2005, p. 2) notes, “parties aggregate demands 
into coherent political programmes; they then translate these programmes into effective 
collection action through elections and legitimate control of political office”. Opposition 
parties, more specifically, have the responsibility to develop alternative ideas and policies for 
the electorate. Through developing alternative policies, opposition parties can become an 
‘alternative political voice’ for voters that are not satisfied with the policies and programmes 
implemented by the ruling party. However, in order for opposition parties to succeed in 
organising public demands, they must be effective articulators of their policies and ideas. 
Opposition parties need to strive to formulate coherent sets of policy options with the aim to 
gain sufficient support to change the government. Even if they fail to become the governing 
party, they must be able to ensure that their supporters’ demands are considered by the 
government of the day. 
 
2.5.3 Political representation and participation  
 
According to Hirst (1990, p. 25), political representation guarantees that the institutions of the 
state, such as parliament, express the will of the people. In this regard, political parties are 
seen as a “linkage mechanism” in passing public opinion from the electorate on to 
government officials (Lawson, 1988; Salih, 2007). Representation also entails the idea of 
accountability, whereby the political party is held accountable for the ways in which it acts in 
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the name of those it claims to speak for (Friedman, 2006, n.p.). This is what a representative 
democracy is all about. Without political parties, governments and legislatures have little 
chance of representing the wider society in a meaningful way. As Sartori (1976, p. 25) points 
out, parties are first and foremost channels of expression that “link people to a government”.  
Likewise, Sadie notes that no institution comes to mind that could better represent people 
more effectively than political parties.
20
 In government, political parties play the 
representation role by directing public policy-making in line with the interest of the 
electorate. In opposition, parties act like watchdogs over government policies to ensure that 
the interest of the electorate is fulfilled. Again, the fundamental function of the opposition is 
to ensure that the electorates’ views are taken into account by the government in terms of 
public policy formulation.  
 
Furthermore, one of the fundamental goals of all political parties is to provide citizens with 
opportunities to participate in the political system. They are constructed in such a way as to 
enhance and promote effective political participation of citizens in government institutions. 
Additionally, political parties provide citizens with opportunities to influence and share 
control over state decisions and resources that may personally affect them. In other words, in 
order for a democracy to work effectively, parties have to introduce mechanisms and make 
spaces available for political participation in state affairs. As Dahl (1986, p. 196) has argued, 
“for to deny any citizen adequate opportunities for effective participation means that their 
preferences cannot be known, or cannot be correctly known and hence cannot be taken into 
account”.   
 
2.5.4 Political education and mobilisation   
 
Political parties also provide people with important political information; they educate, 
inform and influence the public through information that they share. Sadie (2006, p. 204), for 
instance, argues that parties teach their members “how to play the political game in 
democracy”. They therefore educate their party members and potential voters about the 
                                                            
20 Sadie advocated that the principle of representation and participation in democracy hinges on the 
existence of political parties. She further claimed that “the representation of people, who are the 
source of government power, can only be effected by elections of representatives” (Sadie 2006, p, 
202).  
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electoral process, voter participation and party campaigning. Voter education also allows 
parties to mobilise support during an election period. There are two kinds of voter 
mobilisation namely, direct and indirect voter mobilisation. The direct process involves the 
party working actively in neighbourhoods to get them to vote. This includes public meetings, 
rallies, house-to-house visits and motivating citizens to become involved in the campaign 
itself. On the other hand, some parties use the indirect approach such as advertisements 
(posters, banners and billboards) and the use of the media to canvass sufficient support.   
 
2.5.5 Ensuring responsibility and accountability   
 
Parties controlling the government (whether alone or in a coalition) should provide 
mechanisms for ensuring political responsibility and accountability. This makes it easier for 
the public to decide who should get the credit or the blame for the governments’ policy 
choices and outcomes (Weissenbach, 2010, p.14). Ensuring political responsibility and 
accountability is a key responsibility of opposition parties. As previously indicated in Chapter 
One, opposition parties are channels for maintaining policy oversight and demanding 
accountability from the government. As Schrire (2001, p. 11) indicated, “one of the key 
values of democracy is the degree to which the government are held accountable to the 
citizenry” and “[a]n opposition is a necessary condition for democratic accountability”.  
Opposition parties also take on the role to monitor government performance and to expose 
the misuse of state resources and corruption. In this way, opposition parties have the 
responsibility to question the actions and outcomes of government decisions with the aim to 
promote responsiveness and accountability within the governing process.  
 
From the foregoing discussions, it is evident that political parties (in government and those 
serving as opposition) have valuable roles in fostering democratic governance and ensuring 
that they, as a group, are responsive to societal needs. If they fail to perform their roles, true 
democracy has little chance of surviving (Silah, 2004, p.10).  
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2.6 Problems and challenges facing opposition parties 
 
Despite their significance in the democratic process, opposition parties are confronted with a 
number of challenges and problems that hinder their electoral growth. These problems and 
challenges take various forms. For instance, people in many parts of the world hold 
opposition parties in low esteem, due to their weak capacity to address social demands 
(Burnell, 2006; Matlosa, 2008).  The lack of public trust and confidence in opposition parties 
also manifest itself in their poor electoral support at the polls. Numerous scholars have 
spoken about the different factors that might contribute to the weakness of opposition parties.  
These factors can be broadly classified as organisational or internal challenges and contextual 
or external challenges.  
 
2.6.1 Organisational factors  
 
Organisational factors speak to the problems and challenges which are encountered within the 
party as an organisation. In this section, I will focus on the following organisation challenges:  
 
 Top-Down organisation  
 Poor membership and recruitment 
 Poor party leadership and image  
 Personalistic party image 
 Failure to produce alternative policies 
 Lack of mass base 
 Forming coalitions and alliances  
 Lack of public trust in political parties 
 Lack of communication between parties and voters 
 
2.6.1.1 Top-Down organisation  
 
First, political parties are often constructed as top-down organisations, displaying little 
internal democracy. Internal party democracy, as understood in liberal democracies, 
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emphasizes the need for the participation of party membership and lower party structures in 
the decision-making processes of the party (Ware, 1979; Theorell, 1999). According to 
Scarrow (2005, p. 5), participation in decision-making allows for the selection of more 
capable leaders, the adoption of responsive policies, as well as, the development of a 
democratic culture. Internal democracy is particularly important to promote checks and 
balances against poor policies and leadership. Internal democracy thus ensures that party 
members and lower party structures can voice their opinion relating to the overall 
functionality and performance of the party. However, the concept of internal democracy has 
not been implemented by many parties, but rather exists in theory. Over the years, parties 
have become less tolerant of party debates and have imposed the party’s will on members and 
structures (Burnell, 2004. p. 17).  Burnell further notes that some parties are increasingly less 
participatory and more likely to be divorced from their members and society. He states the 
following:  
 
 
…efforts should be made to encourage participatory organisational structures that 
engender greater responsiveness by those at the centre of the party, and which provide 
people at the grass roots with more incentives to get involved and give their support 
(Burnell, 2004, p. 17-18).  
 
In this sense, parties should pay adequate attention to their party structures in order to 
maintain a good relationship with existing members. Adequate mechanisms and measures 
need to be in place for members to fully participate in the decision-making process of the 
party as opposed to imposing decisions on them.  
 
Linked to the above, is the lack of participation and representation of women and the youth in 
party structures.
21
 In this regard, Burnell (2004) argues that most parties show little 
awareness of equitable participation of women alongside men in decision-making. He argues 
                                                            
21 This is despite the fact that globally, regionally and nationally it has been accepted that women’s 
access to, and participation in, decision making is a fundamental right (Sadie, 2006, p. 213).  The UN 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against women (CEDAC) states that 
parties shall ensure that women, on equal terms with men, have the right to participate in the 
formulation and implementation of government policy. Moreover, women have the right to hold 
public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government.  
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that the under-representation of women in parties, to some extent, helps perpetuate the 
decline in party support.  In most democracies, there are no legal barriers to women standing 
in elections. However, very often not enough resources are made available for female 
candidates to participate in candidate selection (Burnell, 2004, p. 18). Similarly, other 
scholars have spoken to the underrepresentation of the youth and how this trend may impact 
party support. Teshome (2009, p. 292), for example, contends that women and the youth are 
widely underrepresented in many African opposition parties. This is supported by Matlosa 
(2008, p. 24) who points out that: “just as there is a failure in gender representation, parties 
fail to integrate the youth into the larger political direction of parties”. Poor representation of 
women and the youth can negatively impact their participation in party politics.
22
 Opposition 
parties, in particular, fielded fewer women candidates compared to the ruling party. Realising 
this as a weakness, most political parties had a regulated quota system for women. The ANC 
supported a 50 percent quota, while opposition parties like UCDP have ensured that women 
make at least 30 percent of election candidates (Association of Finnish Local and Regional 
Authorities, 2009; Hassim and Smith, 2012). One could argue that allowing more women 
candidates could help opposition parties to appeal to a larger portion of women voters. 
However, it has been reported that most South African opposition parties have fallen short of 
achieving gender parity in terms of candidates, especially in local government elections 
(Morna and Mbadlanyana, 2009, p. 19).  
 
2.6.1.2 Poor membership and recruitment 
 
It has been observed that some parties do not place enough emphasis on retaining existing 
members and recruiting new members. In terms of recruitment, Matlosa (2008, p. 24) argues 
that “there is a sense of laxity” within the parties, especially in-between elections. Matlosa 
further notes that recruitment drives are crucial for party support. He notes that recruitment 
activities should be undertaken in order to renew the general public trust and public image of 
parties. Parties should not simply just rely on their reputation to attract new members. 
However, parties should continually mobilise membership and keep the party machine active 
during and in-between elections (Matlosa, 2008, p. 24).     
 
                                                            
22 In South Africa, for instance, the number of women in party leadership position was very low in the 
early 1990’s. Women leadership was not given much consideration under apartheid. 
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Parties also tend to hibernate. Many parties appear or become active during an election, and 
disappear when the election is over (Teshome, 2009, p.  287). In this regard, it is difficult for 
voters to hold parties accountable for poor performance if parties appear and disappear from 
one election to the next.  In addition, parties have been criticized for not having reliable, up-
to-date records of existing members.  Magolowondo (n.d., p. 5) argues, while parties have 
supporters, it is difficult to identify actual party members beyond those who hold positions 
within the party. She further explains that data on membership hardly exists in many 
instances or, where it does exist, it is not reliable. Therefore, parties lose touch with many 
existing members.   
 
 
2.6.1.3 Poor party leadership and image  
 
Party leadership and image play a key role in the party’s success or failure in elections. 
Undoubtedly, voters judge parties based on their leaders. This is supported by Matlosa (2007) 
who argues that a party’s performance during and in-between general and local elections is 
determined, among other things, on how visionary the leadership is. Matlosa (2007, p. 17) 
further notes, “a party can rise or fall on the basis of the nature and character of its leadership 
cadre”. Likewise, Africa (2008, p. 47) notes that “perceptions of parties are integrally linked 
to perceptions of the party leader”. This means that voter perceptions of the party leader can 
affect the voter’s view of how well the party will represent him or her as a person. According 
to Schulz-Herzenberg (2009a, pp. 35-36), people move to and from parties in response to the 
party leadership. This means that, if voters have a poor perception about the leader they will 
not vote for that party. Related to this are voters’ perceptions of the inclusiveness of parties. 
Feree (2004) argues that people often seek to find political parties who will look after the 
interest of all groups and are not likely to vote for a party they perceive as being exclusively 
concerned about the interest of another group. Voters thus look at the overall image of the 
party and ask themselves whether the party is inclusive to all groups in society. Schulz-
Herzenberg (2009a, p. 35) states that: “since inclusivity shapes the creditability and 
trustworthiness of a party, these images are important information cues for voters”. 
Unfortunately, some parties often portray themselves to be exclusively concerned about the 
needs of one particular group, for example, based on race, ethnicity, religion, and so on. This 
‘exclusive style’ of some parties can be one of the many reasons that opposition parties have 
failed to attract a significant amount of votes at the polls. For example, Sylvester (2009, p. 7) 
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has argued that simply representing a minority group, ethnic or otherwise, does not win 
elections. 
 
2.6.1.4 Personalistic party image  
 
Many of the opposition parties in Africa are established around individual personalities. This 
means that the party revolves entirely around the national leader(s) who are either the 
founders or financiers or both. Magolowondo (n.d., pp. 5-6) argues that it may be difficult to 
conceive of a possibility of followers to demand accountability of such leaders, because these 
leaders are seen as the patrons of their followers for the latter depend on the former for 
favours or even the actual sustenance of the party itself. In other words, according to 
Magolowondo, such parties do not have members but rather they have ‘subjects’ that are not 
likely to demand accountability of their leaders. Moreover, LeBas (2004, p. 29) argues that 
‘personalistic’ opposition parties, which usually rally on the ‘charismatic appeal of a single 
individual’, lack structures extending beyond the national executive. LeBas further notes that, 
parties that are established around individual personalities may face a spilt whenever another 
rising star challenges the founder or the leader of the party.   
 
2.6.1.5  Failure to produce alternative policies  
 
As previously outlined, opposition parties are entrusted with offering policy alternatives to 
the electorate. Policy formulation and development can determine the effectiveness of 
opposition parties, especially when it comes to mobilising electoral support. In this regard, 
what is crucial is how opposition parties develop their policy positions by way of 
programmes and manifestos (Matlosa, 2008, p. 25). By offering policy alternatives, 
opposition parties have the opportunity to explain and motivate how they would do things 
differently from the incumbent party. They should explain their policy alternatives on issues 
such as education, healthcare, unemployment, poverty, agriculture, and so on (Isakpa, 2008).  
For example, Isakpa (2008) argues that if the ruling politicians are failing the people, it is the 
responsibility of the opposition to step in and provide alternative policy options on how to 
deal with the challenges that confront the country and people.   
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On the contrary, Teshome (2009, p. 291) and Matlosa (2008, p. 25) have argued that 
opposition parties by and large experience difficulties developing policies and programmes.  
Their failure to provide policy alternatives is seen as one of the most chronic problems of the 
opposition. Alternatively, most opposition parties display commonalities in ideological 
outlook (which affects their policy positions) and this situation presents the electorate with a 
restricted political menu from which to make their choice during elections (Matlosa, 2008, p. 
25).  The ruling party thus seems to do better than opposition parties in developing policies 
and programmes. This is probably so because ruling parties have better access to state 
resources and policy experts within and outside the country. Nevertheless, scholars like 
Edigheji in Brooks (2004, p. 11) argue that some opposition parties provide alternative 
policies to the electorate. However, and in most cases, their policies only appeal to narrow 
and specific interests and fail to transcend identity politics. 
 
2.6.1.6 Lack of mass base 
 
Many opposition parties lack proper contact with trade unions and labour unions which 
ultimately may affect their support base (Teshome, 2009, p. 292). In countries where labour 
unions are autonomous they can play a very important role in opposition politics (LeBas, 
2003, p.  24).  For instance, in South Africa the ruling party has a good relationship with the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). The ANC’s alliance with COSATU and the SACP has secured a large 
majority of votes for the party. This shows that support from trade unions and other mass 
organisations are crucial for parties to win elections (Teshome, 2009, p. 292). On the other 
hand, opposition parties’ relation with trade and labour unions are very weak, especially in 
countries where there is a dominant party such as in South Africa and Botswana. According 
to Matlosa (2008) this problem highlights the phenomenon of one-party dominance; one 
party that has the support of most unions and civil society organisations at the polls.   
 
2.6.1.7 Forming coalitions and alliances  
 
Coalitions and alliances are usually formed between parties in order to maximise their 
chances to achieve a desired goal or more commonly, to increase their electoral support. 
Ideally, opposition parties form coalitions with the aim to exploit the electoral dominance of 
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the incumbent party. Coalitions thus provide parties with an opportunity to form an 
alternative leadership. Matlosa (2008, p. 23), for instance, states that “coalitions serve to 
strengthen opposition parties, and with the predominance of dominant party systems, 
coalitions have something to offer”. On the other hand, it has been noted that opposition 
parties, especially the ones operating in dominant party systems, have neglected to form 
alliances with other parties. This could be due to several reasons. For instance, Matlosa 
(2008, p. 46) retorts that party ideologies might be different which in effect might be a 
difficult for one party to compromise. For example, the parties may not hold similar political 
interests and views on policy issues.  Therefore, organising coalitions between parties can be 
difficult. Other factors such as race and ethnicity may also be a problem as some parties 
prefer certain ethnic groups to work with (Matlosa, 2008, p. 47).   
 
2.6.1.8 Public trust in political parties 
 
As earlier indicated, lack of public trust and confidence in some opposition parties has 
contributed to their declining support. Many scholars such as Matlosa (2008) and Burnell 
(2004) have examined this problem. They argue that there is a decline in public trust in 
parties. Matlosa argues that opposition parties are suffering a severe crises of public 
legitimacy/trust compared to ruling parties. It has also been acknowledged in a conference 
statement: ‘Sustaining Africa’s Momentum’ that there is a “crisis of trust in parties” which 
must be reversed.
23
 Consequently, voters are increasingly becoming disenchanted from 
politics and political parties due to their lack of confidence in politicians. This problem 
manifests itself when political parties make promises during election campaigns but once in 
power, they fail to deliver on the promises made to the electorate. Moreover, corruption 
scandals of politicians have contributed to the hostility towards some parties. This has created 
a perception among voters that politicians are using their political status to maximise their 
personal interest. Linked to this is the internal fighting and inter-party conflicts which create 
an image that parties are too consumed by the scramble for party and state power and less 
concerned about the welfare of the people (Matlosa, 2008). Lack of trust and confidence in 
parties can lead to voter apathy which can hinder the democratic experience of citizens. 
 
                                                            
23 International Conference on Sustaining Africa’s Momentum in Johannesburg, 5- 7 March 2007.   
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2.6.1.9  Lack of communication between parties and voters 
 
Communication between parties and the electorate is very important. Parties are expected to 
start a ‘national conversation’ with the electorate about their policies and programmes. In 
order for parties to be useful, they must ensure that information flow in both the horizontal 
and vertical directions within the organisation so that all members and structures are well 
informed about the party’s goals and objectives.  In this vein, Matlosa (2008, p. 55) states that 
parties should have the necessary communication skills to ensure that the right information is 
conveyed to the public. 
 
2.6.2 Contextual factors 
 
Contextual factors explain the political environment in which political parties have to 
operate. In the following sections, two contextual factors will be discussed namely, the 
funding of political parties and the role of the media.  
 
2.6.2.1 Party funding context  
 
Political parties are faced with the task of raising money to finance their electoral activities. 
According to Butler (2010, p. 1) parties are complex organisations that need financial 
resources to maintain their political offices, deliberate with citizens, develop alternative 
policy programmes, and set out their values and objectives during electoral campaigns. 
Furthermore, with sufficient funding, political parties are able to maintain a certain level of 
visibility, provide training, and educate people about the electoral process (Molomo, 2003, p. 
312). In addition, political parties need funding to operate in a meaningful and effective way.  
Matlosa (2008, p. 27) states that financial resources enable opposition parties to become 
effective challengers to the ruling party. However, one big disadvantage of opposition parties 
is their weak financial position (Johnston, 2005; Mathisen and Sväsand, 2002; Ewing, 2001, 
Faull, 2007).   
 
Several scholars have argued that political parties will not be able to function effectively 
without sufficient financial support. Norris and Kotze, for instance, argue that insufficient 
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funding is one of the key reasons why political parties fail to perform during elections. 
Moreover, Norris (2004, p. 12) states that access to money is one of the most important 
factors that help parties in conveying their message and mobilising potential supporters. 
Kotze (2004, p. 43) also claims that access to financial resources will always be considered 
by competing parties as the crux of their success or failure. In this regard, insufficient party 
funding is said to undermine the link between parties and their mass membership (Molomo, 
2003, p. 312). One could thus argue that parties’ electoral performance is then, to some 
extent, dependent on their financial position. Parties that cannot raise money risk losing 
support during and in-between elections.  
 
Additionally, it has been noted that opposition parties find it difficult to compete with civil 
society organisations for financial assistance from international organisations. As Burnell 
(2004, p. 7) argues, the population tends to see civil society organisations as ‘where the 
action is’ and ‘clean’ by comparison with political parties. In this regard, aid donors have 
contributed to the poor financial position of parties by concentrating their support on civil 
society organisations over the years. Hence, opposition parties do not always have the 
financial means to fulfil their specific roles and functions in society. This could negatively 
affect parties in terms of meeting the costs of campaigns and more importantly, mobilisation 
of support at the polls. The lack of funding can also hinder the overall functionality of the 
party. For instance, some parties do not have the financial capacity to hire staff such as 
assistants, researchers, campaign managers, media liaison offers and so on. Poorly financed 
parties also struggle to draft policies and implement political programmes which may affect 
their relevance in society. In South Africa, for instance, most opposition parties bemoan the 
lack of financial resources as the primary reason for their declining level of support (Africa 
and van Rooyen, 2012, p. 203). Party funding in South Africa is discussed in more detail 
Chapter Three of this dissertation.  
 
2.6.2.2 The role of the media  
 
The role of the media is another contextual factor crucial to elections. The media as a channel 
of communication has at least three critical roles in elections. These are namely, information, 
analysis, debate, and discussion. By playing the role of information, analysis, and open forum 
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for debate and discussion, the media act as an institutional aid and guide to citizens in making 
electoral choices (Kupe, 2007, p. 31). First, the media must inform citizens accurately about 
the electoral processes. Secondly, it is the civic duty of the media to critically analyze 
candidates, parties and their manifestoes. Thirdly, the media should allow for open debate 
and discussion about the candidates, parties and manifestoes. In this regard, the media should 
expose to citizens different or alternative and opposing ideas, viewpoints, opinions and 
beliefs. Therefore, the media allow citizens to make more informed choices at elections rather 
than blind loyalties to a specific party. It would therefore be unethical for the media to cover 
manifestoes of some political parties rather than others. The media needs to be ethical and 
professional and serve the public interest (Kupe, 2007, p. 31).  
 
However, the media has been criticized for providing more coverage to larger parties than 
smaller ones, especially during election periods. The resulting outcome is that the opposition 
parties do not get the same amount of media attention as the ruling party which is critical for 
their success (De Vos, 1998; Bird, 2010). Hence large proportions of the electorate either 
perceive the opposition as insignificant or are unable to offer opinions about their policies 
and programmes. According to De Vos (1998, p. 265), in a country like South Africa where 
one party has overwhelmingly support, it is important to level the political playing field to 
give opposition parties a fair chance at challenging the hegemony of the majority party. In 
Chapter Three, an overview of the media’s influence in party performance in South Africa’s 
elections is given.  
 
2.7 Voting behaviour theories  
 
In this section, I review theories of voting behaviour in order to make sense of the voter 
migration to the DA in 2011. The reasons for choosing one party over another are complex. 
While numerous authors have examined the underlying factors for why voters vote as they 
do, it can be safely assumed that less has been written on the reasons that voters decide to 
switch from one party to another. Voting theories can be broadly classified into the party-
identification approach, the sociological model, rational choice theory and dominant ideology 
theory. One author who draws on many elements of these theories is Samuel Popkin. Popkin 
sees “gut-reasoning” as being critically important to their voting choices (Popkin, 1991).  
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Popkin also sees campaigns as being crucial but not ultimate in the voter’s decision-making 
process. Popkin (1991, p. 70) argues “if voters had full information and no uncertainty, they 
would not be open to influence from others and hence there would be no campaigns”. This 
section therefore reviews the party-identification approach, the sociological model, rational 
choice theory, dominant ideology theory, Popkin’s integrated theory, as well as, theoretical 
explanations for vote switching between different elections.  
 
As pointed out earlier, elections are a central and important feature of democracy. It is 
through this process that citizens are given the opportunity to make individual choices as to 
who must have the power to govern a country. Many political theorists thus ask themselves 
how do citizens decide who to vote for in elections? In order to answer this question, theorists 
have developed different models of voting behaviour which seek to explore voting behaviour 
and how well it should be understood.   
 
Voting behaviour theories or models refers to factors that determine the manner in which a 
particular group of people vote for a specific political party. Nnadika (2007, p. 33) explains 
voting behaviour as “…determent by the political attitudes, assumptions, policy preferences 
and partisan loyalties of individuals and the political and institutional context within which 
they cast their votes in an election”.  In simpler terms, Oversloot et al (2002, p. 32) refers to 
voting behaviour as the political preference from one party to another. Scholars such as Ball 
and Peters (2005, p. 172) argue that the decision to vote or not to vote is influenced by 
tangible and intangible considerations. In addition, Heywood (2002, p. 241) suggest that 
voting behaviour is shaped by short term and long term influences. He states that short term 
influences are specific to a particular election, for instance, the state of economy, 
government’s popularity and material circumstances. Heywood further suggests that the 
personality and public standing of party leaders are a particularly crucial (Heywood, 2002, p. 
241). This is supported by Ebke (2005, pp. 1-2) who argues that positive or negative feelings 
about party candidates may influence the way electorates may vote. Another important factor 
that influences voting behaviour is the style and effectiveness of the party’s electoral 
campaign (Popkin, 1991, Heywood, 2002). Popkin (1991, p. 40), argues that the style and 
effectiveness of campaigns do affect vote choices, and that campaigns generally make voters 
more accurate in their perceptions of candidates and issues.  
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A final short-term influence is the mass media. Ball and Peters (2005, p. 180), for example, 
state that the role of mass media, particularly that of television, is a factor of increasing 
importance in the influence of elections results. Popkin (1991) also recognise the important 
role of the media in voting choices. He adds that campaigns reach most people through the 
media. The media, especially television, is the prime information medium. Popkin (1991, p. 
9) explains this further:  
 
…the media play a critical role in shaping voters’ limited information about the 
world, their limited knowledge about the links between issues and offices, their 
limited understanding of the connections between public policy and its immediate 
consequences for themselves, and their views about what kind of person a president 
should be.  
 
The media, in other words, influence the voter’s frame of reference and can thereby change 
his or her vote (Popkin, 1991, p. 9). This view is supported by Heywood (2002, p. 244) who 
relates the influence of mass media to a model he calls dominant ideology.  
 
All the above stated considerations operate within a context of psychological, sociological, 
economical and ideological influences upon voting. As previously mentioned, the different 
models of voting behaviour identified in this research study thus comprise the party-
identification model, rational choice model, sociological model and dominant-ideology 
model. Aside from the Western developed models of voting behaviour, there is also the racial 
census model that has been explored within the South African context. The racial census 
approach is based on the premise that vote choice is determined by racial and ethnic identity.  
As pointed out in the introductory chapter, South Africa is a diverse society where social 
cleavages may affect electoral outcomes.  
 
2.7.1 Party-identification model   
 
Partisanship or party-identification, as it is more commonly known, is the earliest theory of 
voting behaviour. Party-identification is best described as a continuing psychological 
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attachment that people have to a political party.
24
  Electors are seen as people who identify 
with a party, in the sense of being long-term supporters who regard the party as their own 
(Heywood, 2002, p. 242). Hence, voters with a strong party-identification are likely to 
participate in elections and are more likely to vote for their preferred party. Because of their 
strong psychological affinity, partisan voters are less open to criticize their preferred party’s 
policies and performance in government. They tend to appreciate that which is favourable to 
the orientation of their party and ignore or devalue that which is unfavourable (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960). It is therefore difficult to motivate strong partisan voters 
to vote for another party. They are not easily persuaded to withdraw their support from their 
preferred party or candidate and to transfer their vote to another. As Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice (1985, p. 123) argue: “people remain attached to their previous parties even if they 
moved out of line with them on major political principles”. In this vein, party-identification is 
considered a very stable political predisposition and determinant of voting behaviour 
(Goldberg, 1966; Friedman: 2004). This belief is reinforced by Dalton (2000, p. 20) who 
argues that “a strong case can be made that the concept of party-identification is the most 
important development in modern electoral behaviour research”.  
 
Furthermore, the party-identification model places great emphasis on early socialization 
which ultimately shapes political behaviour and attitudes. According to Elcock (1976), 
Goldberg (1966) and Achen (2002), partisan identities are transmitted from one generation to 
the next through the socialising effects of families, peer groups, and social networks. Thus, 
the social location of voters is regarded as a determining factor for who voters will interact 
with and which political party they will support (Catt, 1996, p.  5). A partisan self-image is 
inherited; the values and political attitudes of social groups, especially close relatives, are 
considered most influential in voting behaviour. In most cases, the knowledge and 
information that citizens have comes from their immediate social context. On the basis of 
this, partisanship is an information shortcut that provides “cues” about the principles and 
policy orientations of parties and candidates running for office (Popkin, 1999; Roberts, 2005, 
p. 23).  
 
                                                            
24 Campbell et al (1960, pp. 121-122), for instance, define party-identification as a ‘’psychological 
identification which can persist without formal membership and even without a consistent record of 
party support”.    
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According to Wolf (2010, n.p.), most partisans are mobilised by both their hearts and minds. 
Wolf explains that while partisans make up their minds regarding issues and decisions, their 
emotions (hearts) play a key role in mobilising them. Most partisans voting behaviour thus 
entails that they will support their own party regardless of factors such as underperformance 
and changing national circumstances, etc. In this case, parties (for example the ANC in South 
Africa) that have secured strong partisan support are thus less likely to care about their 
performance because of voters’ emotional attachment to the party. This is particularly true in 
dominant party regimes where one party may have secured a large majority of partisan 
support.   
 
 
Conversely, partisan support is not unbreakable. Popkin (1991, p. 54) is of the view that 
partisan support is also a changeable orientation in the sense that people move to and from 
their respective parties in response to their evolving evaluations of the parties and candidates. 
In other words, partisanship plays a decisive role in evaluating candidates, election 
campaigns, political and economic situations, and the overall party performance. Research 
has shown that partisan support has declined in recent times due to voters de-aligning 
themselves from a particular party and becoming  independent voters at elections (Lanegran, 
2001; Ball and Peters, 2005; Kersting, 2009).   
 
2.7.2 Sociological model  
 
According to Catt (1996, p. 8), the sociological model is based on social determinants rather 
than attitudes as the main influence for voting. This model suggests that the type of 
education, housing, transport and health care will affect the voters’ evaluation of the 
government (Catt, 1996). Moreover, this voting behaviour approach stresses the group 
membership of the voter, suggesting that electors tend to adopt a voting pattern that reflects 
the economic and social position to which they belong (Heywood, 2002, p. 243).  
Accordingly, Feree (2006, p. 45) outlines  the sociological factors that affect voting as being 
social class, income, occupation, education, religion, ethnic background, sex and age. In 
essence, this model highlights the importance of social alignment. Once this social alignment 
has been established, it provides a basis for “political conflict expressed at the ballot box” 
(Brooks et al, 2006, p. 89).  In short, this model holds that one’s social position and economic 
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circumstances will ultimately determine one’s voting choice at elections. However, this 
model has been under attack. In this regard, Heywood (2002, p. 243) reveals that there is 
growing empirical evidence that the correlation between sociological factors and party 
support has drastically weakened in modern societies. For example, there has been a 
reduction on the impact of religious identity on voting behaviour (Brooks et al 2006, p. 92). 
In that sense, electors increasingly make their political choices independent of social group 
identities or membership affiliation to a given entity. Nonetheless, claims about the 
significance of social cleavages declining in voting behaviour have been challenged. 
Heywood (2002) and Evans (1999) are of the view that social class still remain an important 
factor influencing electoral choice. Similarly, Brooks et al (2006, pp. 89, 90, 113) claim that 
no evidence has been found for a universal decline in the relevance of the sociological model. 
 
2.7.3 Rational - choice approach  
 
The third model of voting behaviour is the “rational voter” choice. This model is based on an 
economic view of vote choice that was commonly introduced by Anthony Downs in his book 
An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). This theory suggests that voters behave rationally 
when making their vote choices. They consider and reflect on their evaluations of party 
promises, party performance, preferences of party policy and candidate evaluations. In view 
of this, individuals are believed to decide their party preference on the basis of personal 
interest. Their reason for choosing a specific party is based on material benefits and not so 
much based on expressing their psychological attachment or ideological views (as with the 
party-identification and ideological approach). The idea that voters have rationality gives rise 
to the idea that their voting behaviour will respond to the cost and benefit of voting (Franklin, 
2002, p. 12). The benefits of voting can vary considerably from one election to the next, 
depending on economic or social policy change.    
 
Moreover, for the rational-choice approach, voting for a party based on intangible 
considerations such as race, ideology, identity or religion are somehow ‘irrational’ or ‘not 
normal’. This voting behaviour approach holds that voters make political decisions based on 
practical thinking about political issues that affect them personally. As indicated above, 
Popkin (1991) proposes that voters indeed “reason” during an election. He assumes that 
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voters reason about political parties, leaders, government performance and politics in general 
before making a choice. As Popkin (1991, p. 7) notes, the rational-choice approach 
recognises that the act of voting is shaped by voters ability to reason about political parties, 
what they stand for and their candidates. In this regard, voters are considered as ‘rational’ and 
well informed about the party, its policies, candidates, and the leader’s competence or 
integrity.  
 
Popkin’s integrated theory argues that voters pay attention to the competence of candidates 
and incumbents. Voters care about the character of the candidate, about his or her sincerity, 
and whether the candidate can deliver on election promises (Popkin, 1991, pp. 61-62). In 
other words, voters evaluate a candidate or presidential incumbent based on a pre-existing 
stereotype of how certain people should act. For instance, voters may compare a presidential 
candidate to their image of what a president should be like, or compare a candidate to their 
stereotype of how someone who “does the right thing” would act (Popkin, 1991). Voters 
often use the media as a reasoning shortcut to evaluate candidates and incumbents. For 
example, media coverage of economic problems might lead voters to not only update their 
evaluation of the president’s handling of the economy, but also to weight this issue-specific 
evaluation more heavily when making a broader evaluation of the president’s overall 
performance (Popkin, 1991). In addition, Popkin’s theory has shown that voters formulate 
their voting choices in terms of what they thought the president would be doing or what they 
wanted him to be doing. The image and competence of the president do matter to voters 
(Popkin, 1991, p. 84).  
 
Related to this, is Popkin’s argument that voters do learn from election campaigns; they 
‘reason’ about what they see and hear. According to Popkin’s integrated theory, most voters 
have a limited amount of information about politics, limited knowledge how government 
works, and a limited understanding of how governmental actions are connected to the 
consequences of immediate concern to them. Popkin argues that campaigns increase the 
importance of (some) issues, strengthens the connections between issues and the office, and 
increases the perceived differences between candidates. Campaigns thus give voters much of 
the information they reason from as they deal with their uncertainty about political matters 
(Popkin, 1991, p. 8). Indeed, campaign communications heighten voters’ awareness of how 
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government affect their lives. Campaigns therefore influence voting choices, and make voters 
more, not less, accurate in their perceptions about party candidates, incumbents and public 
issues (Popkin, 1991, p. 40).  
 
2.7.4 Dominant - ideology model 
 
Radical theorists of voting behaviour tend to highlight the degree to which individuals 
choices are shaped by a process of ideological manipulation and control (Heywood, 2002, p. 
244).  According to Heywood (2002, p. 244) the media is capable of distorting the flow of 
political communications, by setting the agenda for debate and also structuring or 
manipulating preferences as well as sympathies. Thus, the media often form voters’ views on 
parties, leaders and their candidates. In addition, Strömberg (2004, p. 265) reveals that the 
media provides most of the information used by the electorate to make political choices. In 
this way, the media forms certain political images in the minds of the electorate which leads 
to certain political opinions. This is supported by Jankowski and State (1995, p. 91) who 
argue that political knowledge about parties and the government increases through mass 
media. Accordingly, the electorate use the information to decide and express their political 
support. However, some scholars are of the considered view that the popularity of the press 
has increasingly decreased over the years (Ladd, 2010, n.p.). For instance, Ball and Peters 
(2005, p. 180) have noted that there is little agreement on how important the effects of the 
media are on individual electoral behaviour. 
 
2.7.5 Racial census approach  
 
Another explanatory model is the racial census model, according to which voting behaviour 
is based on racial and ethnic affiliation. Hulterström (2007, p.10) argues that there is a “very 
strong relationship between ethnic belonging and voter support”. For Hulterström (2007, p. 
21) ethnicity is a problematic and undesirable element, because it undermines issue-based 
politics. Likewise, according to Hoeane (2004, p. 1) race and ethnicity are regarded as 
primary analytical variables in explaining voting behaviour. Hoeane goes on to refute the 
racial census analytical framework which has been used to interpret South African elections 
according to racial and ethnic categories. The racial census theory thus focuses on the central 
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role played by race and ethnicity in voting behaviour and the performance of political parties. 
As the racial census theory assumes that there is a direct link between a voter’s race and 
ethnicity and the political party he or she will vote for. Voting loyalties are often related to 
race and ethnicity. The distinction between race and ethnicity is made on the basis of skin 
colour and cultured language. Hence, skin colour defines a racial group while language and 
cultural behaviour define an ethnic group (Prudhomme, 2004, p. 55). Many voters find it 
difficult to escape racial and ethnic identifications and attachments when voting for parties.
25
  
Political parties are also not immune to this racial and ethnic interpretation of politics. This is 
despite the declining trends in racial and ethnic voting behaviour reported by some scholars 
referred to above. The role of identity in voting behaviour remains widely debated and a 
contentious issue.  
 
2.8 Vote switching 
 
Many individuals frequently vote for different parties in different elections. This is 
commonly known as the ‘vote switching’ or ‘voter realignment’ theory. A central component 
of this theory is the change in behaviour of voting groups. More specifically, vote switching 
or voter realignment means the switching of voter preferences from one party to another; in 
contrast to voter dealignment where a voter abandons a party to become independent or 
nonvoting. According to Warren, (2008, p. 695), voter realignment starts with a national 
election where the balance of power between two parties is altered significantly. In essence, it 
is argued that vote switching can be defined as deviation from a true nationalised voting 
pattern in different types of elections (Lyons and Linek, 2010, p. 283). A variety of views on 
vote switching between different elections have been proposed. For instance in the European 
context, some scholars have focused on the idea that individuals may vote for different 
parties in different types of elections because some elections are less important than others. 
Hence some scholars argue that voters are likely to switch political allegiances from national 
(and provincial) elections to local elections because voters understand that the purpose of 
these elections is different (Franck and Tavares, 2008, p. 1).  
 
                                                            
25 All races (white, coloured and Indians) are said to face the same problem in relation to racial and 
ethnic attachments to certain political parties.  
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Western scholars like Van Aelst and Lefevere (2011, p. 4) indicate that the ‘second order 
theory’ might explain the motivations for vote switching in different types of elections. The 
second order theory or hypothesis stipulates that local elections are considered to be less 
important to voters than national and provincial elections. This perspective was presented by 
Reif and Schmitt (1980, p. 8) who asserted that the national arena is the most important one, 
and hence, elections for national public office are normally the most salient in the eyes of the 
public and political parties. National elections are thus ‘first order elections’ while other 
elections, such as those for local offices are ‘second order elections’ and are considered less 
important to the electorate. As Marsh (1998, p. 592) states, the most important distinction 
between the two types is that in second order elections “there are less at stake as in first order 
elections”.  
 
According to this theory then, in local elections, voter turnout will be lower; parties that are 
in government will lose votes; and small parties will do better than in national elections (Van 
Aelst and Lefevere, 2011, p. 4). Ultimately, the second order theory argues that voters most 
often use local elections to punish or reward the current governing parties. Voters are thus 
more prone to switch between parties at the local level to express feelings of dissatisfaction. 
In this way, voters try to exert pressure on their preferred parties by withdrawing support 
from them.  
 
Thus, in a local election we might see voters moving in the opposite direction. It is argued 
that government parties would be particularly vulnerable to vote switching between different 
types of elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh, 1998). This is because governments 
normally tend to disappoint voters and would thus suffer losses in local elections. Marsh 
(1998, p. 594) points out that government popularity among voters tend to reach its lowest 
point around mid-term, usually coinciding with the time when local elections take place. 
Additionally, it is argued that local elections are mostly driven by strategic protest voting and 
that strategic protest voting is a reaction to the performance deficits of the government 
(Weber, 2007, p. 512).   
 
However, there are other mechanisms that underpin vote switching between elections. First, 
Weber (2007, p. 513) indicates that vote choices in local elections are usually influenced by 
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national issues. As Weber (2007, p. 513) explains, being ‘second order’ level means that an 
election is dominated by forces emanating from another, ‘higher order’ level. Reif and 
Schmitt (1980) hold the same view that local elections cannot be separated from national or 
provincial elections because it is conducted in the same political system. They argue that 
concerns which are appropriate to the first order (national) arena will affect behaviour in 
second order elections, even though the second order elections are ostensibly about 
something different (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In this regard, voters most often consider the 
political situation at national level when casting their votes in a local election.  
 
The key question that still remains relates to what motivations underlie voter behaviour and 
voter movement between elections? Reif and Schmitt (1980) attempted to answer this 
question by suggesting that voters often choose to support other parties in protest against their 
own or against the performance of government. In addition, studies have shown that vote 
switching from national to local elections might be motivated by party candidates. According 
to Van Aelst and Lefevere (2011, p. 7), particular candidates might also cause people to vote 
differently at the national and local level. Voting choices are thus also shaped by party 
leadership and candidates. Hence party candidates and leaders can motivate voters to cross 
over from one party to another.  
 
Scholars like Van Aelst and Lefevere (2011, p. 5) build on the vote switching theory by 
proposing that another dimension of vote switching between elections is issue voting. 
Although there is different conceptions of this notion, issue voting basically means that 
people vote for a party because of its “outspoken attention to specific issues” or that they 
agree with related policy proposals (Aardal and Van Wijnen, 2005; Macdonald et al., 1991). 
In the context of a local election, citizens may be casting a different vote as in a national 
election because they want a specific issue to be dealt with. For instance, their motivations to 
support a party might be influenced by service delivery issues such as water and sanitation. 
However, at national level, voters might support parties for their policies because at this level 
parties have the power to enact policies in parliament once they have the majority of the 
votes. It is thus assumed that at this level voters would have independently formulated issue 
positions or perceptions of where parties stand on particular political issues (Evans and 
Andersen, 2004, p. 2). 
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2.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter made reference to the roles and functions of political opposition parties in 
democracy. It also discussed some of the weaknesses and challenges opposition parties are 
currently facing. Furthermore, this chapter discussed voting behaviour theories which 
demonstrate how citizens choose a candidate or political party. Voting behaviour theories are 
precisely important to this study as they give detail to why some voters might decide to move 
between parties at elections. However, it must be pointed out that most of the above 
conceptual and theoretical discussions made are mainly based on Western literature. 
Nevertheless, these theoretical reflections are applicable to the political developments in 
South Africa and to Africa more generally. South Africa’s democracy has been considered as 
weak, precisely because it has been characterised by one-party dominance and weak 
opposition parties. Opposition parties are regarded as crucial to democracy, their existence 
and relevance has been questioned. At the same time, this chapter gave an overview of 
possible reasons for the declining support for opposition parties in democracies. It 
highlighted that most opposition parties around the world are faced with problems and 
challenges which may affect their electoral support. Hence, South Africa is no exception as 
weak opposition parties is a common trend in most African democracies. Alternatively, this 
chapter argued that electoral performance of any party is determined by vote choices. The 
literature studied showed that vote choices are ultimately affected by psychological, 
sociological, economical and ideological influences. As will be seen in my findings the 
approach used by Popkin appears to be the most useful for understanding the responses given 
by the participants interviewed for this research. The next chapter will focus on the South 
African context and determine if there is a definite correlation between the literature studied 
in this chapter and what is currently happening in South Africa in terms of electoral choices 
and party performance at the polls.  
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Chapter Three: The South African Political Context  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a brief political history and the electoral performance of the ANC, DA, 
ACDP and COPE since the inception of democracy in 1994. The ANC is examined because 
of the critical role it has played in South Africa’s political landscape while the other three 
political parties are explored as they are an integral part of the study. The chapter also 
explores the implications (positive and negative) of one-party domination for South Africa’s 
democracy. In addition, the chapter presents the electoral trends of the 2011 election vis-á-vis 
the performance of opposition parties that participated in this election but failed to make 
significant electoral gains. Last but not the least; the chapter explores the 2011 voter 
migration from small parties to the DA. In particular, the chapter focuses on the election 
campaign rhetoric and strategies that the DA used to attract votes from small opposition 
parties. 
 
3.2 Political parties in South Africa  
 
3.2.1 The African National Congress  
 
The ANC which was initially named the South African Native National Congress was formed 
as a liberation movement in 1912. It led the resistance to apartheid and was a key player in 
the transition from apartheid to a democracy (Hendricks, 2005, p. 70). In the pre-democratic 
era the ANC’s goal was to liberate South Africans from apartheid rule. According to Deegan 
(1999, p. 40) the ANC perceived itself as a liberation movement with a historical mission to 
“unite all the people of South Africa, Africans in particular, for the complete liberation of the 
country from all forms of discrimination and national oppression”. Therefore, the party is the 
only party that represents the black majority in South Africa since 1994. According to 
Lijphart, the party’s most loyal and emotionally committed voters are poor, rural and black. 
The ANC also enjoys overwhelming support from black people in townships around the 
country (Lijphart, 1998, p. 148). Lijphart argues that opposition parties find it hard to 
compete with the ANC’s long history of existence. Most opposition parties have also failed to 
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fashion policies that resonate with the view of the majority of black citizens. Hence the ANC 
has become increasingly popular among South African voters at the expense of the 
opposition parties. 
 
The ANC won all four national democratic elections by overwhelming majorities. It received 
63 percent of the votes in 1994 while in 1999 the party increased its majority to 66 percent; 
and in 2004 the ANC secured 70 percent of the national vote (Southall, 2005, p. 62). Despite 
the drop to 65.9 percent in the 2009 elections, the ANC still holds a dominant position in 
South African politics. Much of the ANC’s electoral successes are due to the party’s long 
history as a liberation movement and also the party’s historical alliance with the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).
26
  
These two organisations are instrumental in delivering worker support to the ANC 
(Hendricks, 2005, p. 70) and have been a strong electoral support base for the ANC since 
1994.  
 
3.2.1.1 The ANC and internal opposition 
 
Both COSATU and the SACP have been centres of ‘internal opposition’ between elections, 
serving almost as a ‘non-electoral’ opposition to the ANC (Booysen, 1999; 2009). These 
alliance partners have openly demonstrated their refusal to conform to the ANC’s neo-liberal 
economic policies since 1996 (Brooks, 2004; Lodge, 1999). COSATU and the SACP have 
articulated alternative views on government policies, and have to some extent ensured public 
accountability. In this vein, internal opposition within the broad alliance does create political 
spaces for dissenting voters to government policies and programmes (Prudhomme, 2004, p. 
32). Furthermore, there are strong civil society organisations in South Africa that also present 
alternative views and ensure public accountability. As Friedman (in Prudhomme, 2004, p. 33) 
                                                            
26 The ‘tripartite’ alliance between the ANC, SACP and Cosatu was formally constituted in 1990, 
though, of course, the SACP’s association with the ANC was much older, and Cosatu had aligned 
itself politically with the ANC at the time of its adoption of the Freedom Charter 1986 (Lodge , 1999, 
p. 7).  
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argues, these organisations act as an alternative form of opposition, providing oversight at the 
state relations level.
27
  
 
The foregoing begs the question whether South Africa needs viable alternatives to the 
governing party if internal opposition exists within its ranks. However, as stated in Chapter 
One, political (opposition) parties are needed to effectively represent and advocate the 
diverse political views of citizens. Hence, strong and viable opposition parties are an 
important and crucial feature of any democracy. Furthermore, internal opposition is not 
always sufficient for sustaining multiparty democracy. In a democratic system such as South 
Africa, citizens vote for a political party and not civil society organisations at the polls. 
COSATU is not a political party and, hence it cannot be perceived as an ‘opposition party’ or 
‘alternative government’. 
 
The SACP, on the other hand, benefits from its alliance with the ruling party and its leading 
members occupy their parliamentary seats thanks to this alliance. As Daniel, Habib and 
Southall (2007, p. 61) have indicated, although the Alliance is formally a partnership, the 
ANC is the leading element. They explain that the SACP remains a separate political party, 
yet it has no autonomous public representation; those of its members who sit in parliament do 
so as ANC members of parliament (Daniel et al, 2003). Likewise, a significant number of 
COSATU federation and union officials have been elected into parliament under the ANC 
auspices, at the cost of withdrawing from full-time trade union work. This also explains why 
COSATU, SACP and their followers unite behind the ANC against opposition parties during 
election times.   
 
Hence, the SACP and COSATU cannot play an effective oppositional role in general. The 
SACP, for instance, will not do so unless and until it withdraws from the Alliance and starts 
campaigning for votes on its own (Moses, 2012, p. 4). A possible break-up between the 
alliance partners, some argue, is the most likely way that South Africa will move away from a 
dominant party system. COSATU and SACP members would no longer feel ‘obliged’ to vote 
                                                            
27 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs such as the Landless Peoples Movement and Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC) are only two examples of organisations that have been an alternative voice 
in public debates. 
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for the ANC and a new party might even emerge from the split. As Hendricks (2005, p. 73) 
states: “political pundits argue that a viable opposition can only emerge from within the ranks 
of the ANC”. Similarly, Butler expresses the opinion that “a split in the ruling alliance, and 
the desertion of its followers in large numbers, appeared to be necessary conditions for an 
alternative government” (Butler, 2009, p. 2).   
 
Although there have been tensions between the Alliance partners, for the moment the 
Alliance remains in place and there is every indication that it will do so for the forthcoming 
elections (Daniel et al, 2003; Hendricks, 2005; Southall, 2009). The break-up thus is very 
unlikely. This means that the ANC’s political dominance is set to continue for some time, 
unless opposition parties significantly make electoral inroads in traditional ANC 
constituencies. The following subsection discusses the concept of one-party dominance in 
South Africa’s democracy. 
 
3.2.1.2 The ANC and one-party dominance  
 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the notion of a dominant party refers to a political 
party that has successively won elections and whose electoral defeat cannot be envisaged or 
is unlikely for the foreseeable future. The debate whether the ANC should be characterized as 
a ‘dominant party’ became a major focus to the lead up to the 2004 general elections. By 
2004, the ANC had won three successive elections with a large majority of the votes. 
Opposition parties, on the other hand, had been struggling to maintain or increase their 
support at the polls. After the 1994 election, opposition parties represented in the National 
Assembly had combined strength of 37 percent. In 1999, this fell to 34 percent and in 2004 it 
was at 30 percent (Prudhomme, 2004, p. 41). It is for this reason that Matlosa (2010, p. 2) 
claims that the South African political system has evolved into a dominant party system in 
which the ANC has emerged as the ruling party under conditions of an “enfeebled and 
fragmented opposition”.  
 
The following table illustrates how dominant the ANC has been over other well-established 
parties contesting national elections.  
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Table 2: Political parties' performance in four elections at national level 
Data retrieved from: www.elections.org 
 
The figures clearly show that the ANC is a dominant party nationally given the trends in 
voting patterns since. The same pattern occurs at the local level. Since the first local election 
that was held in 1995, the ANC has performed strongly at the polls. The IEC reported that 
“[t]he African National Congress achieved a comfortable victory, winning 63.65 percent of 
the votes and 5633 council seats nationally”. Due to the election outcome, the ANC governs 
198 municipalities and eight of the nine provinces in South Africa (Keegan, 2011, p.5).   
 
In view of the above, numerous scholars have expressed their concerns about the implications 
of one-party dominance in a democracy such as South Africa. Prominent exponents of the 
‘party dominance theory’ in South Africa, Giliomee and Simkins state that the very essence 
of democracy is at risk (Giliomee, 2004; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999).
28
 In their analysis, 
Giliomee and Simkins observe that fundamental tension exists between a dominant party rule 
and democracy and argue that one-party domination is likely to close down opposition parties 
and, in effect, transform democracy into an elective dictatorship. This was also the view of 
Przeworski and Limongi (1999, pp. 155-183) who argued that the absence of a change in 
government in democracies can lead to authoritarianism.  
 
                                                            
28 Giliomee and Simkins have been critical writers about dominant party systems in a democracy. 
They have examined dominant party regimes in new democracies in the developing world such as 
Mexico, Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Africa. 
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In addition, it has been observed that one-party dominance can hold long term challenges for 
the democratic health of any country. As Southall argues, the absence of powerful opposition 
specifies the hollowness of South Africa’s democracy (2003, pp. 53-78) while Sylvester 
(2009, p. 1) states that “democracy cannot be said to be strong until there has been a change 
in the ruling party”. Consequently, both scholars have questioned how the South African 
electorate can hold the government accountable without a strong opposition. They point to 
the fact that if there is no credible threat to the government at the polls, it makes it easier for 
the incumbent to abuse their political power. Additionally, Suttner (2004, n.p.) argues that 
democracy without turnover is at best fragile and untested, and at worst, it is not really a 
democracy at all (see also Ferim, 2013). This is also the viewpoint of Huntington (1991), a 
democratic theorist, who claims that the necessity of a potential changeover in power in the 
foreseeable future is the ultimate test of democracy (see also Southall, 2005; 2009). Other 
critical voices of the dominant party system such as Murphy and Blair put forward a similar 
argument:  
 
If one group or party maintains a hold on power for a long time, the quality of 
democracy may be in question, and if one group maintains this hold 
permanently, the system cannot be called democratic (Murphy and Blair, 
2006).  
 
Furthermore, some dominant parties find it increasingly difficult to distinguish between party 
interest and state interest. Without rotation in political office, some dominant parties can 
become ideologically entrenched which can result in political instability over time. Butler 
(2009, p. 6) adds that  a dominant party such as the ANC can successfully ‘deploy’ party 
members to key institutions and call upon their loyalty to ensure that those institutions are not 
used to damage the interest of the party.
29
 A dominant party can therefore hold many negative 
implications for democracy and democratic accountability.   
 
                                                            
29 Butler specifically made reference to the South African Broadcast Commission, the Public Protector 
and a range of parastatals that have all been accused of adopting partisan positions that favour the 
ANC (Butler, 2009, p. 6). The ANC’s strategy cadre deployment has thus raised concerns that the 
ANC could use state institutions as a means of patronage and control. 
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Nevertheless, not all scholars share the pessimistic view that one-party dominance is bad for 
democracy. For instance, Matlosa and Karume (2004, p. 14) argue that political dominance, 
in most African countries, is won through democratic means such as competitive elections. In 
this regard, the ANC’s dominance may not be viewed in the same way as authoritarianism as 
it has achieved its electoral victories based on voting consensus (Butler, 2004; Brooks, 2004). 
Moreover, Cachalia (1999) observes that the ANC is in power because of its ability to 
convince the majority of the electorate to vote for the party rather than inheriting it. She 
further claims that “the ANC’s dominance is the result of successful contestation, not the 
absence of it” (Cachalia, 1999, n.p.). Therefore, one-party domination cannot be viewed as 
‘undemocratic’ or ‘illegitimate’ if the incumbent party won elections through a democratic 
process of free and fair elections.  
 
Besides, Butler argues that the dominance of the ANC might be a necessary, temporary 
condition for state stability and reconstruction considering the legacy left by the Apartheid 
regime. Butler adds that the ANC has helped to contain conflict and to defuse racial or ethnic 
polarisation in South Africa (Butler, 2009 p. 4). This fact has also been observed by Kurame 
who indicate that one-party dominance serves well when there is a need to promote national 
reconciliation after oppressive systems such as Apartheid (Kurame, 2004, p.  8).
30
 It is also 
suggested that one-party dominance can offer political, economic and social stability to a 
country. A dominant party is a much better stabilizing source than fragmented opposition 
parties (Arian and Barnes, 1974, p. 593). 
  
Consequently, this dissertation does not assume that one-party dominance is necessarily bad 
for South Africa’s democracy, but does recognise the fact that it can be dangerous for the 
sustainability of a multiparty democracy in many ways. As previously indicated, under a 
dominant party rule political representation is usually concentrated in the hands of a narrow 
majority. Members of the government can pass legislation and make policy choices that they 
like and think is necessary without the consent of opposition parties. Hence supporters of 
opposition parties, especially the smaller ones, might feel “ruled out” of the policy process 
under a dominant party system (Matshiqi, 2009, p. 4). For example, most South African 
                                                            
30 Many view the dominance of the ANC as positive as it is an indication that the black majority is 
actively participating elections and not alienated from political processes (Prudhomme, 2004, pp. 35 - 
36).  
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opposition parties, as well as civil society groups, were against the Protection of State 
Information Bill (POSIB). However, the governing party voted in favour of this Bill 
regardless of public outcries.
31
  
 
Therefore, the key argument is that a dominant party system may progressively close down 
opposition politics in South Africa. Multipartyism would be negatively affected as most 
political parties would not see the need to participate in the political system. Also, poor 
performance of opposition parties can lead to the incumbent government being irresponsive 
to the needs of citizens, less accountable, and more importantly, prone to misusing and 
abusing government resources. Thus, and like most multiparty democracies, South Africa 
cannot afford to further entrench and deepen the domination of one party.
32
 It is evident that 
strong and highly competitive opposition parties are essential to check transgression towards 
authoritarian tendencies and the abuse of power by the incumbency.  
 
3.2.2 The Democratic Alliance  
 
The DA has been the second largest party in the National Assembly from 1999. The party 
belongs to the liberal tradition in South African politics represented during the apartheid era 
by the Progressive Party (PP)
33
 which later became the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in 
1977 (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005; Southern, 2011). Following the amalgamation with 
other liberal parties and splinter groups,
34
 the PFP changed its name to Democratic Party 
(DP) in 1989. In 1999 the DP announced that they would form an alliance with the New 
National Party (NNP) and changed its name to the Democratic Alliance (DA) with the aim of 
building a political party that would effectively challenge the ANC for political power. 
Southern (2011, p. 282) noted that “the NNP was the National Party (NP) of the apartheid 
                                                            
31 The Bill has given rise to the Right2Know campaign, an array of civil society organisations, 
supported by Cosatu and opposition parties, who have joined forces in opposition this legislation (De 
Jager and Meintjies, 2013, p. 16).   
32 Over the years, the governing party has received much criticism for failing to deliver for the poor, 
over-spending state resources and for corrupt activities. In local elections, poor communities have 
demonstrated their anger towards the incumbent party for not addressing economic and social 
inequalities.   
33 The Progressive Party (PP) was found in 1959 which for many years had Helen Suzman as its sole 
representative in Parliament.  
34 The DP was an amalgamation of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP),  Independent Party, the 
National Democratic Movement, and a so-called ‘fourth force’ of disillusioned Afrikaners (Kotze,   
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era, which added the word ‘New’ in 1997 in attempt to dispense with its racist history”. 
However, the NNP later ended its alliance with the DA and formed a new alliance with the 
ANC in 2004.
35
 The DA decided to retain their name even though the original alliance 
partner shifted allegiance (Hendricks, 2005, p. 74). The break-up between the DA and NNP 
was expected to harm the electoral support of the DA in future elections. It was assumed that 
when the NNP leaders defected from the DA that NNP supporters would also leave the DA. 
Yet, the split was not disadvantageous to the DA whose support has steadily increased among 
voters.  
 
Over the subsequent decade the DA has gained support across all racial groups. It won over 
many African, Indian and Coloured (mixed-race) votes. These racial groups constitute almost 
half of the DA’s support base (Johnson, 2012, p. 13). The DA is also favourable among the 
white electorate over its main rival, the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus). According to Southern 
(2011, p. 284), Afrikaner voters shifted to the DA rather than the FF Plus because of the 
realisation that in order to have a real stake in South Africa they would need to be part of a 
potential majority. Additionally, the DA has increased its support in the Western Cape and 
Northern Cape Province, especially in the Coloured communities which many other parties 
have failed to achieve (Southern, 2011, pp. 284 -285).  
 
The electoral support of the DA has risen considerably since the first democratic election. 
From a staggeringly poor 1.7 percent in 1994 election, the party improved its position to 12.4 
percent and 50 seats in the National Assembly in 2004. The DA took 16.7 percent of the 
national vote in the 2009 elections and obtained 67 representative seats in the National 
Assembly. At the provincial level, the DA grew in eight of the nine provinces, increasing its 
total numbers of provincial seats from 51 in 2004 to 65 in 2009. From the 65 seats in 2009, 
the DA secured 22 (51.5 percent) of the provincial seats in the Western Cape; 16 seats (21.9 
percent) in the Gauteng province; 7 seats (9.2 percent) in the KwaZulu Natal province; and 6 
seats (9.9 percent) in the Eastern Cape. The DA benefited provincially from “split voting” in 
the Western Cape. Considerable numbers of voters who voted for other parties nationally, 
voted for the DA provincially (Daniel and Southall, 2009, p. 268). The principal victims of 
                                                            
35 According to Lodge (2002), the merger between the NNP and DP was never institutionalized and 
by November 2001 the alliance had sprung apart primarily due to former NNP office holders’ 
dissatisfaction with the leadership of Tony Leon. 
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this phenomenon were COPE and the ACDP whose provincial votes were 17 and 12 percent 
lower than their national hauls from the Western Cape, respectively.  
 
There were many factors that contributed to the electoral growth of the DA. A critical phase 
which actually propelled the party into the national limelight was when the party became the 
official opposition in 1999 during its “Fight Back Campaign. This election campaign was 
spearheaded by Tony Leon. Another key factor that contributed to the DA’s electoral gains 
was their revamping of the party’s corporate image in 2008. According to Jolobe, the DA 
realised they needed a new energy, a new vision and more importantly, a new outlook that 
would attract African voters (Jolobe, 2009, p. 135). The goal was to market itself as a 
modern, forward looking party that had no reservations about being non-racial. According to 
Southern (2011, p. 287), the timing was important for the DA; launching the image a year 
before the 2009 elections allowed it time to sink into the imaginations of South Africans.
36
  
 
 
During the reinvention of the party, Helen Zille was elected as party leader to transform the 
party’s image as a white minority party and recreate a non-racial, centralist alternative to the 
ANC (Jolobe, 2009, p. 138). Under the leadership of Helen Zille, the DA seemed to have 
convinced some voters of the party’s message of non-racialism. In terms of language policy, 
the party gives recognition to the eleven official languages in South Africa (Southern, 2011, 
p. 287). This inclusive image of the DA has helped the party to represent itself as a party that 
is committed to racial representation.  Secondly, Schulz-Herzenberg (SABC Online, May 16, 
2011) talks about the DA’s merger with the Independent Democrats (ID) in August 2010. 
This merger not only attracted potential new supporters, but it also provided the DA with a 
viable mayoral candidate in Patricia De Lille for the 2011 election. As a former trade unionist 
and a long standing national politician, De Lille has built credibility among the electorate. De 
Lille is predominantly known for her role against corruption and in the investigation into the 
arms deal in 1999. Given this fact, there was a general perception that the DA’s electoral 
advances were a result of the merger. Indeed, this perception was not entirely incorrect. For 
example, of the 12 wards the ID lost in by-elections after the 2011 local election, nine were 
won by the DA in the 2011 local election (Dhawraj, 2012, p. 325).  
                                                            
36 The year also saw the launch of COPE, which was expected to be a major challenger for the votes 
of disillusioned ANC supporters (Southern, 2011, p.  287). Hence, the reinvention of the party was the 
central pillar going into the 2009 general elections (Jolobe, 2012, p. 136).   
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3.2.3 African Christian Democratic Party  
 
The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) was formed in December 1993 in the run-
up to the 1994 elections. The ACDP embraces a Christian oriented democracy and is socially 
conservative. The party stands for what it calls ‘godly principles’ (Sithole, 2014, p. 2). The 
party’s aim is to infuse Christian principles and values into the state decision-making process.  
For instance, the ACDP is woven around calls for the reintroduction of the death penalty, 
opposition to abortion, and wants to get rid of homosexual acts and gay marriages. The 
ACDP was the only South African party that voted against the final Constitution of 1996, on 
the basis that the document embraced too many anti-Christian values. Consequently, the 
party’s appeal is strongly grounded in Christianity as the ACDP’s messages are mainly aimed 
at voters who want to preserve morality and protect the integrity of the family structure. 
Thus, the party displays a political agenda that emphasises the need of moral restoration, 
especially in terms of crimes such as murder, violence and rape. Despite having a potentially 
large constituency (almost 80 percent of South Africa’s population follows the Christian 
faith), the ACDP has been unable to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the South African 
electorate.  
 
Like other small parties, the ACDP’s share of the vote has declined dramatically since 1994. 
For instance, in 1994, the ACDP won 0.45 percent of the national vote and secured two 
representative seats in the National Assembly. Many critics believed that the party would lose 
one of the two seats in Parliament in the 1999 general elections. Despite such belief, the 
ACDP managed to double its support to 1.43 percent in 1999 and secured 6 seats in the 
National Assembly. Provincially, the ACDP won 4 seats in 1999 (1 in Gauteng; 1 in 
KwaZulu Natal; 1 in Limpopo; and 1 seat in the Western Cape) which equates to 1.38 percent 
of the provincial vote. In the 2004 elections, the ACDP won 1.60 percent of the national 
votes and obtained seven seats. The ACDP thus became one of the largest parties in 
Parliament. The ACDP also did well at the provincial level, increasing its total number of 
provincial seats from 4 to 8 in this election. Two seats were captured in both the Western 
Cape Province and in the KwaZulu Natal Province. The ACDP also captured one seat each in 
the Free State, Gauteng, Limpopo and Northern Cape. However, the 2009 elections witnessed 
a sharp decline in support, nationally and provincially. The ACDP only managed to receive 
0.81 percent of the vote and the number of seats dropped to 3 in the National Assembly. At 
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provincial level, the ACDP’s performance looked very bleak in the year 2009. This was 
evidenced by the party only securing 2 representative seats; one seat in the KwaZulu Natal 
Province and one seat in the Western Cape Legislature. 
 
At the local level the ACDP has also seen a steady decline. For example, in the first local 
government elections in 1995, the ACDP only contested in a few of the municipalities and 
won three seats. From 1995 to 1999, four councillors from other political parties crossed the 
floor to join the ACDP and the party saw an increase from seven councillors to more than 70 
nationally in the 2000 local elections. 
 
3.2.4 Congress of the People  
 
One of the most significant political occurrences in post-apartheid South African politics has 
been the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE). After Mbeki’s resignation as state 
president, Mosiuoa Lekota and other Mbeki allies formed a new opposition party, which was 
registered as the Congress of the People in December 2008.
37
 COPE was formed by 
breakaway ANC members who were dissatisfied with the organisation’s decision to ‘recall’ 
the then-President Thabo Mbeki in September 2008 and replace him with Kgalema Motlanthe 
(Freedom House Report, 2010, p. 2).
38
 COPE is the third party to emerge from the ANC over 
the years. Arguably, the dominant interpretation of the party’s origin is that it is a fragment of 
the ANC in the same tradition as the previous split or breakaway such as the Pan African 
Congress (PAC).  According to Booysen (2009, p. 85), the formation of COPE was an 
externalization of internal political differences in the ANC in the multi-party domain. 
Prominent founding members of the party included the former Gauteng Premier Mbhazima 
Shilowa, former Congress of South African Trade Unions president Willie Madisha, and 
Barney Pityana, the vice-chancellor and principal of the University of South Africa. During 
the run-up to the 2009 elections, it was expected that the emergence of COPE would erode 
the political dominance of the ANC (Southall, 2009; Booysen, 2009). In this vein, Southall 
                                                            
37 It can be argued that Lekota was the “driving force” behind the formation COPE. For example, 
Lekota was the first ANC leader who made the famous public statement that “they were going to 
serve divorce papers on the ANC” (Hamlyn, 2008).  
38 For many, COPE is primarily an anti-Zuma formation and the potential political home for 40 
percent in the ANC who had supported Mbeki at the 52th National Conference in Polokwane. 
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(2009, p. 45) notes that newcomers like COPE, which may be perceived as more inclusive, 
are likely to benefit from the failures of government.  
 
COPE performed significantly well in its first election and won 7.42 percent of the national 
vote and obtained 30 representative seats in the National Assembly. At the provincial level, 
the party received 7.3 percent and thus obtained 36 seats. The ultimate goal for COPE was to 
peg back the ANC’s majority and to replace the DA as the official opposition party in the 
2009 election (Daniel et al, 2009, p. 262). Although the party was unable to beat the DA for 
official opposition status in the National Assembly, COPE managed to attain official 
opposition status in several provinces like the Free State (4 seats), Eastern Cape (9 seats), 
North West Province (3 seats), Northern Cape Province (5 seats) and Limpopo (4 seats). The 
DA obtained fewer seats than COPE in these provinces in 2009.  
 
According to Kotze many of COPE’s support came from former DA, UDM and ID 
supporters, while other supporters had their origin in the ANC (Kotze, 2012, p. 176). This 
was quite significant for a party that was formed five months prior to the 2009 elections. 
Before the 2009 elections, Ndletyana (2009, p. 2) described COPE as a centre-right 
movement, implying that its support base would be Mbeki supporters, middle class 
professionals, and business people that are inclined towards a free market economic 
approach. Likewise, Southall had the view that COPE had a greater appeal amongst “the 
relatively well-off than amongst the poor” (Southall, (2009, p. 183). However, it was found 
that most of COPE’s supporters in the 2009 elections came from urban and metropolitan 
communities that were unemployed, poor and socio-economically marginalised, and who felt 
neglected by the ANC government (Booysen, 2009; Booysen; 2010).  
 
In 2011, COPE contested in its first local government election. The party’s election manifesto 
became electronically available in the middle of March 2011 (Kotze, 2012, p. 178). The 
manifesto focussed on service delivery, crime, combating corruption, and better job creation. 
However, the manifesto received little attention during the party’s election campaign. In 
support of this, Kotze writes, “in the absence of an efficiently managed election campaign 
and use of the public media most of the messages in the manifesto never reached the 
electorate” (Kotze, 2012, p. 179). The party relied mainly on door-to-door campaigning to 
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communicate with voters (Kalipa, 2011) and hence each campaigner used his or her own 
understanding of COPE’s political message.  
 
More seriously, several controversies have blown up in COPE’s face since its establishment. 
A few months before the 2011 elections, the party struggled with infighting and power 
struggles.
 References were made in public to the ‘COPE’s Shilowa faction’ and the ‘COPE’s 
Lekota faction’.39 The two factions and the ongoing internal turmoil resulted in a significant 
drop in the party’s support base. According to Kotze, COPE lost five percent of votes since 
the 2009 elections and the electoral support losses were split between the ANC and DA 
(Kotze, 2012, p. 184).  
 
3.3 Electoral Trends: the case of Local Government Elections of 2011 
 
On 18 May 2011, the fourth local government election took place in South Africa. As 
previously indicated, there has been a significant increase in the number of opposition parties 
participating at the local level. However, none of them (with the exception of the DA) made 
significant inroads into the larger voting bloc. The final results of the 2011 election indicated 
that the ANC and the DA are the two leading parties with the IFP in third place followed by 
the COPE in a distant fourth. In this election, most of the opposition parties’ support 
drastically declined. None of the smaller opposition parties such as the ACDP, UDM, PAC 
and MF won more that 1 percent of the ballot. Other parties such as the FF Plus, African 
People’s Convention (APC), Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and the United 
Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) also obtained less than 1 percent of the municipal votes.  
 
The most significant outcome for the opposition in the 2011 elections was the increasing 
popularity of the DA. For the first time since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the 
ANC faced a serious challenge in more than one major metropolitan area. The DA, which has 
governed the City of Cape Town for the past five years, challenged the ANC in Johannesburg 
and Nelson Mandela Bay. The DA projected itself as the main alternative to the ANC, 
emphasising that the party has been in power since 2006 (coalition government in City of 
                                                            
39 Timeslive, 29 March 2011. Shilowa’s COPE faction won’t contest local elections.  
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Cape Town) and won the Western Cape Province in 2009. In the same way, the DA 
encouraged voters to compare the delivery of services in the areas controlled by the DA to 
areas where the ANC were in majority (Böhler, 2011, p. 60). The DA had the advantage this 
time because four surveys have confirmed that the City of Cape Town is the best city in the 
country in terms of service delivery (Böhler, 2012, pp. 59-60). The DA used the results of the 
surveys conducted to show voters that they are ready to govern more municipalities across 
the country. The primary theme used by the DA was “We deliver for all”. This theme 
communicated the message to voters that the party’s top priority was about providing basic 
services for all, especially the poor. This campaign was largely nationally driven and received 
a higher level of media coverage compared to previous elections. According to Schulz-
Herzenberg (SABC News Online, May 16, 2011), the DA showcased their capacity for 
service delivery by emphasising their accomplishments in the Cape Town Metro. The DA’s 
campaign was launched at a time were many voters were disappointed with the lack of 
service delivery by the ruling party. As a result, the DA used its 2011 campaign to profit from 
citizens who were, and maybe still are, frustrated with the performance and governance of the 
ANC.   
 
 
It was also noted that the party’s election campaign included tactics (once the exclusive 
preserve of the ruling party), such as rallies, songs and toyi-toying. Matshiqi (Business Day, 
16 May 2011) wrote that Helen Zille led her supporters in the toyi-toyi and singing of 
struggle songs, followed by shouts of viva!  
 
The DA has remained weak to attract black-African voters from traditional ANC 
constituencies.  For instance Jolobe (2012, p. 136) states:  
  
…while the party was able to increase its share of the vote in coloured 
majority communities, making inroads into ANC constituencies in these areas, 
it was not able to attract the black-African vote.  
 
The DA’s challenge in the 2011 elections was to break this pattern, in other words, their task 
was to increase the party’s levels of support in black-African communities that had been loyal 
to the ANC (Jolobe, 2012, p. 137). During this period, the party continued to work hard to 
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create a new image for itself. In an attempt to attract more African votes, Zille spoke isiXhosa 
fluently during her campaign speeches (Matshiqi, 2011). The party used Helen Zille, Patricia 
De Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko as the party’s public faces; the idea being to create an image 
of the DA as a political home for all races.
40
  
 
The DA’s election campaign for this particular election was reasonably successful. In 
previous years, the DA was criticized for concentrating too much of their efforts on negative 
campaigning. Sylvester (2009) states, “the content of the DA’s previous election campaigns 
has often been characterized by negative tones and personalized attacks”. However, the 
content of the 2011 campaign was more positive and the party refrained from direct attacks 
on its rivals, concentrating instead on issues that would be of most concern to the voting 
public. The DA specifically concentrated on the African communities to increase the party’s 
share of African votes.  
 
Moreover, the party also campaigned using the legacy of struggle stalwarts such as former 
president Nelson Mandela. For instance, at their final rally at the OR Tambo Hall in 
Khayelitsha, Zille claimed that the DA were the real guardians of Mandela’s legacy; namely 
reconciliation between races (Zille, 2011; Böhler, 2011; Jolobe, 2012). Other parties, 
especially the ANC, were taken by surprise by the DA’s local government election campaign. 
Newspapers such as the Cape Argus reported that the DA’s 2011 election campaign 
“outflanked” the ruling party. COSATU stated that “[t]he movement simply did not know 
how to respond to the DA’s campaign. The ANC did not come up with a co-ordinated 
offensive response against the Democratic Alliance’s campaign” (Du Plessis, 2011).41 For 
this reason, the DA won 21.97 percent compared to the 16.32 percent that they won in 2009 
and the 14.7 percent in 2006. As pointed out in the introductory chapter, the party’s support 
increased with more than 7 percent in this particular election. Overall, the DA won control of 
eighteen municipalities against the five it controlled prior to the 2011 elections.  
 
                                                            
40 Based on the principles outlined in the strategy paper “Becoming a party for All the People: A new 
Approach for the DA”.  
41 Du Plessis reported in the Cape Argus that “for the first time in recent years the ANC attracted less 
than two-thirds of the vote, with 63 percent” (Cape Argus, June 28, 2011).  
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In the meantime, other political parties experienced the worst of results in the 2011 election. 
For example, the IFP won only 3.94 percent of the votes compared to the 7.56 percent in 
2006. The IFP lost many of its supporters to the newly formed National Freedom Party 
(NFP). The NFP primarily arose because many people were unhappy with the style of 
leadership that had dominated the IFP since its establishment (Scherer, 2012). Former IFP 
supporters felt that the IFP leadership was out of touch with the changes materialising on the 
grassroots level of the party. This motivated the realignment of voters to the NFP. Despite 
being only three months old at the time of the 2011 elections, the NFP managed to receive 
2.58 percent of the votes cast. The high competition between both parties has led to political 
rivalries between members of both parties which has not always been peaceful (Scherer, 
2013). This potentially disadvantages both parties in the future which might impact on their 
support base.   
 
 
It is clear that the 2011 local election was the worst for most opposition parties as they all had 
lost some support across the board. For example, the ACDP and PAC lost more than 50 000 
votes since the 2006 local government elections (see table below). They only managed to win 
0.63 and 0.44 percent of the votes in 2011. Due to the ACDP’s decline in the votes cast in its 
favour, the party lost 46 municipal council seats in this election (Keegan, 2011, p. 3). Apart 
from the IFP, COPE, ACDP and PAC, other opposition parties either saw a decline in their 
votes or stagnated below 1 percent. The UDM, led by former ANC member Bantu Holomisa, 
received 0.68 percent of the total vote compared to 1.3 percent in 2006. The UDM thus lost 
44 424 votes and lost 40 of its 97 councillors in this election (Keegan, 2011, p. 3).  
 
Also, the UCDP which was founded by Lucas Mangope, the president of the former 
Bophuthatswana homeland, took 0.7 percent of the vote in 2006 but only managed to receive 
0.2 percent of the vote in 2011. According to Keegan (2011, p. 3), the UCDP’s support 
declined with 36 488 votes. FF Plus faced the same fate as it went from 1 percent (94 140 
votes) in 2006 to 0.40 percent (53 931 votes) in 2011. 
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Table 3: Change in party support between 2006 and 2011 local elections on PR ballot 
 
Against this background, it is evident that most opposition parties have been experiencing 
dwindling electoral support since 2006. Therefore, after the 2011 elections, questions have 
asked whether such results mark the end of small opposition parties. Some have argued that 
despite significant losses, small opposition parties still play an important role in a democracy 
as they provide legitimate political representation for some minority groups. Consequently, 
several reasons have been formulated to explain the loss in support for opposition parties.  
 
3.4 Underlying reasons for the poor performance of South African opposition parties  
 
The fate of opposition parties hinges on their capacity to attract and reproduce electoral 
support. Support for parties can be extended, withdrawn or even transferred. In this regard, 
the continuity of parties is not always assured. This section focuses on the potential reasons 
for the dwindling ability of opposition parties to attract support. It highlights some of the 
reasons emerging from the study that explain South African opposition parties’ failure to win 
political power. These include: insufficient funding from the state and private donors, failure 
to propose policy alternatives, lack of media coverage, racial and ethnic voting loyalties as 
well as having no track record in government.  
 
Party 2006 2011 Increase/Decrease 
 Total Votes % Total Votes % Total Votes % points 
ACDP 128 990 1.31% 78 737 0.59% -50 253 -0.72% 
AZAPO 30 321 0.31% 26 300 0.20% - 4 021 -0.11% 
PAC 109 816 1.11% 54 846 0.41% - 54 970 -0.70% 
MF 42 530 0.43% 53 042 0.40% 10 512 -0.03% 
UDM 129 047 1.31% 84 623 0.63% - 44 424 -0.68% 
UCDP 62 459 0.63% 25 971 0.19% -36 488 -0.44% 
FF+ 94 140 0.96% 53 931 0.40% -40 209 -0.56% 
Source: Keegan (2011, p. 3) 
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3.4.1 Political party funding  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, funding for political parties is critical for the functioning of 
democracy. As a commitment to furthering multiparty democracy, the South African 
Constitution of 1996 (section 236) makes provision for funding by the state for political 
parties that participate in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures. The Constitution 
reads in part: “[t]o enhance multiparty democracy, national legislation must provide for the 
funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable 
and proportional basis”. The Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 103 of 1997 
was enacted by Parliament to regulate state funding of political parties. The Act determines 
that funds are to be allocated according to a formula that takes into account the proportion of 
members a party has in the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures and a minimum 
threshold amount to ensure equity. The Regulations (1998, 3) explains this as follows: 90 
percent of the allocation of the financial year is paid in proportion to each party’s aggregate 
seat representation in the sum of the seats of the National Assembly and provincial 
legislatures. The remaining 10 percent is divided among the provinces proportionately to the 
number of seats in each province, and the provincial allocations are divided equally among 
the parties in each legislature (Regulations (1998, 4). In simple terms, this means that the 
bigger share of the public funding goes to the parties with the larger representation in the 
National Assembly and the provincial legislatures.  
 
The aforementioned formula (90 percent proportional and 10 percent equitable) has remained 
a challenge for political parties, especially for the smaller ones. This is particularly so 
because parties that are not represented in the National Assembly or in the provincial 
legislatures do not qualify for public funding.
42
  As Matlosa notes: “no allocations are made 
from the fund to political parties which are represented in municipal councils only and, nor to 
those which have no public representatives at all” (2008, p. 28). In this regard, some parties 
have argued that the current public funding arrangement is unfair towards newly established 
parties that wish to contest elections but do not have the money to do so. According to Pottie 
(2004, p. 163), in March 1999, several of these parties voiced their objections and called for 
the implementation of a public funding system to all political parties without a binding 
                                                            
42 This means that a newly formed party such as the Congress of the People (COPE) was excluded 
from receiving public funds in 2009. In order to qualify for state funding a party must have already 
had to be occupying seats in one of the legislatures.  
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
condition of representation in Parliament. Interestingly though, despite the absence of public 
funding, six previously non-represented political parties gained seats in Parliament in 2004 
and thus qualified for a share of the public funding in the next financial year (Pottie, 2004, p. 
163). 
 
In addition, concerns have been raised that the current formula benefits larger parties as 
larger parties receive the lion’s share of the state’s money. For example, because parties 
receive public funding in a strictly proportional manner, the ANC could receive up to R60 
million and the DA R15 million, while smaller opposition parties stand to get only R2 million 
or less.
43
 For Booysen and Masterson (2009, p. 415), public funding has, therefore, helped to 
consolidate the dominance of the ANC at the expense of other political parties. They further 
point to the huge difference between the amounts of public money allocated to the ANC by 
comparison with the two largest opposition parties which in effect advantages one party over 
the other. For example, they state that “of the R88 million that the IEC distributed to parties 
in the 2009 financial year, R61 million went to the ANC, R10.5 million to the DA and R5.4 
million to the IFP” (Booysen and Masterson, 2009, p. 415). In other words, the ANC received 
about 5 and a half times as much of the taxpayer's money in 2009 as the next two parties 
combined (Booysen and Masterson, 2009, p. 415).
44
  
 
To further illustrate how this allocation might perpetuate the dominance of larger parties, 
amounts from previous financial years were looked at. In 2005 the Political Parties Fund 
stood R74.1 million, with the ANC getting R49.3 million, the DA R9.3 million and the 
balance was divided between the 16 smaller parties represented in parliament and the 
provincial legislatures. According to Seedat (2009, p. 8) some argue that the current funding 
arrangement is perfectly fair and appropriate, since it has the effect of rewarding parties 
according to their legislative strength and therefore reinforces the democratically expressed 
will of the electorate.  
 
                                                            
43 These amounts are reflected in the Represented Political Parties’ Fund Annual Report 2010/2011 
44 Booysen and Masterson (2009, p. 415) thus maintain that “[t]he ANC had become extremely well-
resourced, also reaping benefits from beneficiaries of its period in government and investment and 
direct business interests, and other political parties found it hard to compete”. The authors however 
have not given an alternative method for public funding to parties.  
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Similarly, Moses (2012, p. 3) felt that it is difficult to envisage a fairer method of allocating 
parties funds to parties, as South Africa already has numerous ‘one-person’ parties at national 
and provincial level.
45
   
 
Table 4: Amounts allocated to political parties in 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections
47
 
 
In addition, Faull (2007, p. 68) explains that political parties with representation across a 
range of provinces receive a larger sum of the equitable component of the fund than parties 
with regional representation. In his analysis, Faull noted that in 2004, the ACDP received 30 
percent more of the equity transfer than the Independent Democrats (ID). This is despite the 
fact that the ID won more votes than the ACDP in the national component of the election. 
Also, under this formula, parties with representation in the National Assembly but without 
any representation in the provinces (for example AZAPO after the 2004 elections) receive no 
money through the equity transfer.  
 
Moreover, parties wishing to contest elections for the National Assembly and provincial 
legislatures have to pay a deposit in order to participate. For the 1994 election, this deposit 
was set at R25 000 for the National Assembly and R5 000 for each provincial legislature a 
party wished to contest. For the 1999 elections, the deposits were raised to R100 000 for the 
                                                            
45 Moses further wrote “It is alleged that many of these parties only exist so that their one or two 
representatives can enjoy a healthy income as a Member of Parliament or Member of Provincial 
Legislature. If a minimum amount of public funds were allocated to all registered parties, regardless 
of their electoral success, how many more one-person parties might emerge?”  
46 Funding was suspended for the PAC during 2009/2010 due to failure to submit the audited financial 
statements.  
47 The table does not include all parties but merely provides examples. 
Party  1999 2004 2009 
ANC  R 30 897 681 R42 573 853 R 61 160 804 
IFP  R   5 142 284 R  5 050 841 R  5 403 084 
DP/DA R   2 151 086 R  7 087 153 R 10 538 737 
PAC
46
 R       887 938 R     610 995             - 
ACDP R       661 158 R  1 404 821 R  2 117 425 
ID N/A R     270 276 R  1 249 562 
MF R       192 428 R     371 829 R     617 921 
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National Assembly and R20 000 for each provincial election (Lodge, 1999, p. 27). The 2004 
election saw an increase to R140 000 for the national elections and a deposit of R30 000 per 
province (EISA, 2004, p. 12). For the 2009 elections, parties contesting for the National 
Assembly had to pay a deposit of R180 000 while parties contesting for provincial 
legislatures paid R40 000 per province. From the aforementioned, it is clear that public 
funding alone is not sufficient for parties with low levels of representation in the National 
Assembly and provincial legislatures.   
 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, many opposition parties rely on membership fees to carry out 
the party activities. However, membership fees are not sufficient enough to sustain the 
operations of a party. Matlosa (2008, p. 21) argues that membership subscriptions play an 
insignificant role as a source for funds. Likewise, Sadie (2006, p. 211) adds that the majority 
of South African parties do not have a broad based card-carrying membership which can 
serve as a source of financial income. She further notes that “approximately three to five 
percent of party supporters are card-carrying members (Sadie, 2006, p. 211). Additionally, in 
order to attract a large number of members possible, membership fees are kept low. Hence, 
membership fees cannot guarantee the survival of the party. For this reason parties tend to 
rely on funding from elsewhere especially the private sources.  
 
Political parties can receive money from private donations. In this vein, political parties have 
often benefited from private sources of funding. According to Matlosa (2008, p. 30) 
individual political parties get financial support from companies mainly in the run-up to the 
elections to enable them to carry out their election campaigns. Hence, private funding allows 
parties to travel the country and get in touch with the electorate. Research conducted by 
Teshome further argues that private funding is necessary to counter the domination of the 
incumbents. In that sense, private funding enables opposition parties to become effective 
challengers to the ruling parties in their running of the country (Teshome, 2009, p. 293). 
Likewise, ruling parties need financing in order to effectively function in communities so as 
to consolidate their positions with the electorate. For both opposition and ruling parties 
private financing is, therefore, crucial for their day-to-day party activities, especially during 
their election campaigns.  
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However, it has been suggested that private donors are more likely to give financial support 
to larger parties than smaller ones for obvious reasons. For instance, they assume that smaller 
parties have limited power to influence government decision-making. UDM leader, Bantu 
Holomisa, indicated that the ruling party and the DA have access to big amounts of private 
funding compared to smaller parties. Holomisa noted that smaller parties do approach private 
companies and businesses for funding. Nevertheless, and in most cases, private companies 
fear that they may lose tenders and future government business deals if they give financial 
assistance to opposition parties. Holomisa further notes that the lack of financial resources 
makes it difficult for small parties to market their programmes, influence public discourse, 
and to ensure active participation of the citizenry in government programmes, and politics in 
general. The UDM president argues that “inadequate funds make it hard, if not impossible, 
for small parties to achieve their objectives” (Holomisa, 2012).48  
 
Although funding may be skewed in favour of the incumbent party, a lack of financial 
resources cannot be the sole reason why some opposition parties perform poorly during 
elections. Further analysis of opposition parties’ financial standing, reveals that it is not only 
funding that undermines their electoral performance (Makara, 2009, p. 59). Other factors are 
also influential. Africa and Van Rooyen have indicated that many opposition parties perform 
their best at the time when they have the least amount of resources. They state: “parties such 
as the UDM, ID and COPE performed their best in the election after they were formed, but 
received reduced support at the polls thereafter” (Africa and Van Rooyen, 2012, p. 203).  
Hence electoral success does not always depend on money but ultimately depends on the trust 
and hope of the electorate. Additionally, it can be argued that in most cases parties do have 
financial resources, but do not have the ability to deploy and distribute their finances 
successfully to achieve their electoral goals.  
 
3.4.2 Failure to propose policy alternatives  
 
South Africa’s national and local elections have involved highly-contested party campaigns 
and may have prompted a greater interest in opposition parties. However, it has been 
                                                            
48 The UDM thus proposes a reform in the party funding model; 50% of the public funds should be 
distributed proportionally and 50% should be allocated equitably (CPLO roundtable discussion 
“Future of Smaller Opposition Parties” on 29 June 2012).  
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observed that many opposition parties are weak in terms of proposing alternative policies and 
developing a long term political vision for the country. For instance, Lanegran (2001, p. 83) 
claims that during the first five years after apartheid, South African opposition parties have 
failed to propose appealing policies as alternatives to the political agenda of the ANC.
49
 
Likewise, Sadie (2006, p. 217) argues that the ANC occupies the centre of the ideological 
spectrum and therefore, opposition parties find it difficult to present policies that are 
substantially different from those of the ruling party. Opposition parties therefore tend to 
adopt “a vague populism during elections, and pitch their campaigns around their opposition 
to corruption, services for the population in general, if vague, promises of a better future (van 
der Walle, 2003, p. 304).  
 
A second observation made relates to the fact that opposition parties often campaign around 
the same issues, with little or no difference in their campaigns to distinguish their messages 
from one another. For instance, Olaleye (2003, p. 4) highlighted a growing trend among 
parties towards convergence in policies and ideologies. Olaleye argues that political parties 
sound similar and have very little substance beyond slogans and stated comments. As a result, 
political parties become less differentiated from each other and competition between parties 
is based on ethnic cleavages and personalities, instead of clear distinguishable policy 
platforms (Olaleye, 2003). This has made it somewhat difficult for voters to make informed 
choices as to who has the best public policies and programmes to address issues such as 
unemployment, education, housing, water, infrastructure, and so on. In this regard, opposition 
parties’ campaigns have not been very successful in assisting voters to discern which party 
would best represent their interests.  
 
Most opposition parties seldom offer alternative policies to voters, but rather emphasize their 
ability to run the government ‘better’ than the incumbent party. As Africa and Van Rooyen 
(2012, p. 203) argue: “opposition parties tend to position a critique of the ANC as the centre 
of their campaign strategy… and this… permeates their campaigns”.  Hence, a critique of 
government performance is unpersuasive to an electorate already cognisant of what the policy 
                                                            
49 Most of the South African ideological spectrum is covered by the ANC and its alliance with Cosatu 
and the SACP. Opposition parties have been struggling to differentiate their policy preference from 
each other and from the ruling party (Langfield, 2010). 
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problems are (Africa and Van Rooyen, 2012). Opposition parties thus contribute to their own 
weakness in terms of presentation of alternative policies to the public. 
 
3.4.3 The role of the media  
 
The role of the media came under scrutiny with opposition parties calling for the regulation 
of the media during elections.
50
 Many parties such as the ACDP, FF Plus and the UDM 
complained that they usually struggle to get media attention, especially during elections. For 
instance, ACDP’s Western Cape Provincial Leader argued that during the 2011 local 
elections the media excluded smaller parties and bigger parties (such as ANC and DA) 
dominated the discussion (Haskin, 2012).
51
 Haskin further noted that ‘sound bites’ on the 
radio or television had time restrictions and hence, the work done by smaller parties was not 
adequately covered. Small parties do not necessarily have the time to reflect on their policies, 
their position on social problems and their overall vision. For Haskin, voters are not well 
informed about the work of smaller parties in politics in general, and government in 
particular (Haskin, 2012).  
 
On the issue of print media, Pieter Mulder from the FF Plus asked the following question: 
“should the government (ANC) be allowed to spend millions of taxpayers’ rands on 
publishing weekly reports on its successes, with full-page advertisements in the media, while 
opposition parties must buy advertising space with their own funds?” In this regard, Mulder 
notes that small parties are disadvantaged because they do not have money for paid media 
platforms and this could be a serious threat to democracy. Ultimately then, many would argue 
that media coverage, especially public media such as the SABC, should be equally divided 
among all political parties taking part in the election regardless of their potential strength.  
However, De Vos (1998, p. 267) notes that an allocation on equal basis would clash with the 
basic principles set out in South Africa’s Constitution regarding the financing of political 
parties during an election; 90 percent proportional and 10 percent equitable.  
 
                                                            
50 Previous analyses of the media’s role in South Africa’s elections have focused on the extent to 
which the coverage is fair to the spectrum of parties (Krüger, 2012. p. 235). 
51 Haskin is a member of the ACDP and spoke at a presentation on the Future of Smaller Political 
Parties hosted by the Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office, 29 June 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Another side to this argument is that the extensive coverage given to the ANC and DA was 
not the result of media bias. To illustrate this point, Davis (2005, p. 247) argued that 
“disparities in public and private funding gave the ANC and DA an unrivalled ability to 
ensure a strong media presence in the run up to the elections”. Also, although the ANC and 
DA tend to receive most attention, this is explained by their position as main ruling party and 
opposition, respectively (Krüger, 2012, p. 235). However, the Media Monitoring Africa 
(MMA) highlighted that there was cause of for concern around the extremely low coverage 
afforded to smaller parties. Hence, they argued, there is a need for equal participation and 
accessibility in the media environment for small parties (Bird, 2010, pp. 5-6).  
 
 
Similarly, De Vos argue that in an ideal world (or democracy) special provision should be 
made for newly formed parties or small parties to obtain free access to media that might be 
disproportionate to its strength (De Vos, 1998, p. 265). This will in turn improve small 
parties’ profile and support among the electorate. However, this could be problematic if 
parties who have no serious chance of success at the polls inundate the media with political 
propaganda which may confuse voters. This might also dilute the effectiveness of the 
political speech of more serious contenders (De Vos, 1998, p. 276).  
 
 
3.4.4 Racial and ethnic voting loyalties 
 
Apartheid fostered strong racial identities in South Africa. Given this fact, it is often 
presumed that race determines and or explains voting and social behaviour. The argument is 
that black Africans vote for ‘black parties’ and white Africans vote for ‘white parties’. 
Consequently, some voters use race and ethnicity as a shortcut or as an ‘informational cue’ to 
decide whom to vote for (Mattes, Taylor and Africa, 1999; Piombo, 2001). In that sense, 
voters look for a party that best provide a vehicle for who they are in terms of race, ethnicity 
and religion, and so on. There are several explanations for the correlation between race and 
voting behaviour since 1994. Brooks (2004, p. 5) argues that “in a deeply divided and 
unequal society, historically contracted along racial lines, it is no surprise that voting patterns 
were a stark indication of voting along racial lines”.   
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In as much as racial identity is important component in South Africa’s elections, it is a 
complex matter. Despite the fact that race and ethnicity serve as some of the major 
explanations for voting behaviour (see Chapter Two) it has been revealed that the racial 
census argument remains contested. For instance, Friedman (2005) contends that voters do 
not base their electoral choice on their racial or ethnic identity. He further argues that “if they 
were, Zulu speaking voters would not divide their support between the ANC and the IFP, and 
‘coloured’ voters would not divide theirs between several parties” (Friedman, 2005, p. 5). 
The work of Hoeane (2004) concurs with that of Friedman; arguing that South African 
politics have shifted towards politics based on material interests rather than on racial and 
ethnic divides. Many other South African scholars have expressed similar viewpoints about 
race and voting choice. For example, Kotze mentions that race and ethnicity merely explain 
one aspect of the current voter behaviour in South Africa’s elections. There has been a 
definite shift in the focus of the voter towards service delivery, especially at the local level 
(Kotze, 2006, p. 207).  
 
Nevertheless, many scholars have indicated that historical voting loyalties still exist in South 
Africa. This has tended to entrench the dominance of the ANC, which continues to be 
perceived as the party representing the ‘black’ majority, as well as the party of liberation 
(Brooks, 2004, p. 2). These perceptions seem likely to generate permanent majorities for the 
ANC for the foreseeable future. For example, Steven Friedman argues that identity loyalties 
to the ANC will ensure that the party will secure a majority regardless of its performance in 
government (Friedman, 2005).
 
 As long as voters consider it a betrayal to change their voting 
choices, the smaller parties will have a difficult time winning over supporters of the major 
parties (Moses, 2012, p. 4).  
 
3.4.5 The racially exclusive style of opposition parties  
 
Parties also use race and ethnicity to establish their support base. For example, most 
opposition parties are identified with a particular racial and ethnic group. Habib states “rather 
than developing an electoral programme that attracts the support of diverse communities, the 
election strategies of opposition parties have concentrated on narrow sections of the 
electorate (Habib, 2006, p. 86). Reference was made to the IFP that projected itself as the 
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defender of and representative of the Zulu people. In doing so, the party reduced its appeal to 
non-Zulu independents (Habib, 2006, p. 86). The NNP and DP have historically been seen as 
serving the interest of the Afrikaner and English whites respectively (Habib, 2006).
52
 Hence 
both parties denied themselves the opportunity to appeal to the African voters, who constitute 
the largest portion of voters (Habib, 2006, p. 86). The same could be said about other parties 
such as the UDM, UCDP and MF that have exploited race and ethnic divides to appeal to a 
certain group for support.  
  
Based on the exclusive nature of the opposition, Southall and Daniel (2009, p. 6) argued that 
none of the opposition is able match the ruling party’s (ANC) claim to non-racialism and 
inclusiveness. It is believed that many in the electorate do not exercise their right to vote 
because there is no other political alternative (Nduru, 2004, p. 1). A general perception is that 
opposition parties do not represent the politics of the majority of South Africans. This 
adequately explains why the ANC was able to obtain an overwhelmingly majority in general 
and local elections since 1994 (Kotze, 2006; Davies, 2003). Opposition parties thus have to 
break down the perception that it only caters for a certain minority group. Yet, according to 
Lanegran (2001), some opposition parties have tried to craft wide representative identities 
and policies to attract a larger audience. However, most of them have remained unsuccessful 
to make significant in-roads into the larger voting bloc (Langeran, 2001). It would thus seem 
that a shift from racial rhetoric is not enough for the opposition to appear more inclusive to 
all citizens. According to Kotze (2006, p. 213), the opposition as a whole need to focus 
improving material conditions through service delivery. Indeed, and inevitably, the focus of 
the electorate has been on issues such as service delivery rather than racial politics. Hence, 
parties need to pay attention to their electioneering strategies in order to ensure that they are 
in touch with the majority of South Africans.  
 
3.4.6 No track record of governance  
 
South African opposition parties rarely have the opportunity to create a track record of 
governance due to the ANC’s dominance that extends to provincial and local offices. Voters 
                                                            
52 An argument is also made that the DA and especially the NNP have explicitly expressed their 
interest as representing the English and Afrikaner groups respectively, and were not merely seen as 
such.  
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have only campaign statements as evidence of the opposition’s position and reputation 
(Langfield, 2010, pp. 35-36).  It is therefore difficult for an opposition party that has not held 
public office to convince voters to vote for the party. Many voters would rather continue 
voting for the ruling party than to take a chance on an unknown, especially if choosing an 
opposition party may well be a “wasted vote” as the dominant party is likely to continue in 
office (Langfield, 2010, p. 36).  
 
3.5 The 2011 voter migration to the DA 
 
As pointed out above, several reasons have been advanced for the poor performance of some 
opposition parties. In particular, some reasons have been formulated to explain why the 
ACDP and COPE in the 2011 local government elections experienced poor results. In this 
regard, Greben (2012, p. 331) observes that the DA managed to increase its support by the 
absorption of small opposition parties. This means that many voters that formally supported a 
small opposition party had crossed over to the DA in the 2011 election. This observation was 
supported by Africa and van Rooyen (2012, p. 192) who argue the DA mainly benefited from 
a large percentage of voters that defected from small opposition parties in the 2011 elections. 
Other scholars such as Taderera (2011, p. 1) note that switching over to the DA was 
potentially influenced by ineffectual leadership and infighting in some of the smaller parties.  
 
 
In order to understand the nature of vote switching from small political parties to the DA, 
Greben (2012) divides the DA into two clusters namely, DA1 (this cluster constitute mainly 
of whites) and DA 2 (that is representative of the coloured population in the Western Cape). 
The aim was to illustrate how the DA was the primary beneficiary from the movement away 
from small parties in the 2011 election. Greben (2012, p. 346) shows that in DA1, 65 percent 
of COPE voters crossed over to the DA in 2011. Similarly, the DA managed to obtain a 
significant number of votes from the ACDP supporters in this cluster. Greben further 
illustrates that 78 percent of the 2009 ACDP supporters voted for the DA in 2011 (Greben, 
2012, p. 346).  At the same time, the DA 2 cluster had steadily increased from 64.5 in 2009 to 
77.8 percent in 2011 (Greben, 2012, p. 347). This was mainly because of a decrease of 
coloured votes for smaller parties such as the ACDP. The ACDP lost nearly 77 percent of its 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
supporters to the DA 2 cluster in 2011 election. Similarly, COPE lost 56 percent of its 2009 
supporters to this cluster (Greben, 2012, p. 348).  
 
For the DA, this exodus from smaller parties was a culmination of ongoing campaign 
messages since 2004 (Kotze, 2006; Africa and van Rooyen, 2012). The DA projects itself as 
the only party that can effectively challenge the dominance of the ANC. For this reason, the 
DA issued statements that small opposition parties ‘fragment the opposition’ and a vote for 
such parties is a ‘wasted vote’. Thus, Kotze (2006, p. 213) notes such statements from the DA 
led the electorate to believe that smaller parties are insignificant. As expected, such negative 
statements were not well-received by small opposition parties. The ACDP had on several 
occasions argued that irresponsible statements about small parties create a perception that 
small parties have nothing to offer to the electorate. The ACDP further argued that the goal of 
the DA is to have a two-party system similar to the United States (US) and United Kingdom 
(UK) which could ultimately mean the end of smaller parties.  
 
 
The fact that the DA’s campaign rhetoric was followed by voting patterns which improved its 
electoral position is especially problematic for small opposition parties because their image is 
further damaged. This in turn, limits the possibility of recovering the lost support. This 
further creates a negative cycle for small opposition parties. Ultimately the apparent exodus 
from small opposition parties to the DA means that the choices of voters become more 
limited at the polls.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have given an overview of the history and electoral performance of the ANC 
since 1994. I have also explored the implications (positive and negative) of one-party 
domination for South Africa’s democracy. This is followed by the party history and 
performance of the DA, ACDP and COPE. The ANC is also explored in this study since one 
cannot discuss South Africa’s political landscape without discussing the party and its political 
dominance. The other three political parties were explored since they are an integral part of 
study. Most importantly, I also presented the electoral trends of the 2011 election as well as a 
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number of other opposition parties that participated in this election but failed to make 
significant electoral gains. Lastly, the chapter explored the 2011 voter migration to the DA. It 
particularly focused on the election campaign rhetoric and strategies of the DA that were used 
to attract votes away from small opposition parties.  
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Chapter Four: Discussion, analysis and presentation of research findings  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the research findings. The findings are 
presented and discussed in line with the general aim of the study which is to gain insight into 
the motivations of voters who switched from the ACDP and COPE to the DA in the 2011 
local government election. Therefore, this chapter particularly focuses on the voter perception 
and evaluation of the ACDP and COPE. It simultaneously explores the key motivations for 
the voter migration away from the two parties to the DA. This is followed by a discussion on 
the reasons why the DA managed to attract a large percentage of votes from the ACDP and 
COPE in the 2011 local election. Lastly, the chapter presents the findings from the interviews 
with the party representatives.  
 
4.2 Party leadership and image  
 
In Chapter Two, an argument was made to the effect that voters do reason about parties, 
candidates and representatives. Popkin’s integrated theory argues that voters with limited 
information use reasoning shortcuts to make political choices.
53
 As Popkin argues that voters 
evaluate and form images of candidates by the information they receive through the media 
and other communication channels. Popkin demonstrate that both political evaluations and 
votes depend on the voters’ views whether they can identify with the party candidate. He 
further argues that party images are important to voters. Voters reason about party images to 
evaluate whether the party has the ability to deal with different issues (Popkin, 1991, p. 56).   
 
Hence, a good party leadership and image is crucial for the survival of any political party. In 
support of this, Letsholo (2005, p. 5), contends that effective leadership is critical in 
                                                            
53 Voters do this by using information shortcuts that they receive during campaigns, usually using 
something like a “drunkard’s search” (Popkin, 1991). Voters use small amounts of personal 
information to construct a narrative about candidates. Voters use information gained in their daily 
lives, through the media and through personal interactions, to evaluate candidates and facilitate 
electoral choices. 
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determining voting patterns in any given society. In most cases, voters look at the 
characteristics and competence of party leaders in making important political choices (Africa, 
2008; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009a). It is for this reason that scholars such as Africa and 
Schulz-Herzenberg argue that if a voter is uncertain about the party’s leadership and image, 
he or she tends not to support it. It is even worse with uncertain voters who are more likely to 
either abstain from voting or to consider an alternative political party at the polls. Another 
argument was made that voters do not respond positively to leaders that they perceive as 
untrustworthy, autocratic, and only concerned about the needs of a specific group (Feree, 
2004; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009a). Conversely, voters are more likely to respond positively to 
parties that they perceive as inclusive to all social groups. In other words, leadership and 
overall public image of parties are important information cues that enable voters to decide 
which candidate and party to vote for (Popkin, 1991).   
 
The subsequent section discusses the voter perception and evaluation of the leadership and 
image of the ACDP and COPE which has implications on their voter support base.  
 
4.2.1 ACDP’s leadership  
 
To start with, the leadership of the ACDP has been relatively stable since 1994. The ACDP is 
one of a few parties that have not changed its national leader since its formation. Reverend 
Kenneth Meshoe, the ACDP president, has remained uncontested in party congresses while 
the party’s deputy president’s position has changed more than twice since 1994. The ACDP 
is also one of the few parties that have maintained a ‘clean’ party image and reputation. This 
is, however, expected for a party that places Christian values high on their political agenda. 
As previously indicated, the ACDP is known for its conservative Christian beliefs and 
biblical principles (Egan, 2007, p. 460). While other Christian parties such as United 
Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) support base are mainly Tswana speakers in the North 
West (Hoeane, 2004, p.  9), the ACDP’s support is not defined to any particular racial, ethnic 
or language group. Rather, the party has been quite diverse with a black leader at the helm 
while coloured and white leaders are present at both provincial and local levels.  
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With regards to leadership, only one interviewee (1 out of 8) had a positive perception of the 
ACDP’s leadership. He mentioned “unlike other parties, the (ACDP) leader never came 
under fire for any misconduct or for bringing the party’s name in disrepute” (ACDP 
respondent 4). This respondent decided to move away from the ACDP because of the 
ACDP’s “weak” opposition status. He motivated that a single strong opposition party like the 
DA would be more beneficial than a multiple of small ones that have no real political 
influence.  
 
Eight of the nine participants that previously voted for the ACDP had a negative perception 
and evaluation about the party. Their reason being that under the current leadership, the party 
had failed to make their political voice heard on important political issues. Thus, the party’s 
failure to effectively advocate the political interests of its supporters has been blamed on the 
party’s poor electoral growth since 1994. The participants argued that the poor performance 
of the ACDP has minimised the party’s relevance in the political realm and consequently, the 
party’s political opinions are hardly recognised. The eight participants observed that the 
party’s leadership played a critical role in the party’s electoral failures. They further stated 
that despite the party’s long existence, the party leader’s charismatic personality and 
popularity has done very little in shifting voting patterns in the ACDP’s favour. They agreed 
that while Rev. Meshoe is a good politician and is greatly respected among his peers, the 
president lacks the ability to make the ACDP a strong and viable political alternative to other 
opposition parties.  In this vein, one of the participants in the study suggested that the leader 
of the ACDP should change in order for the party to increase its votes (ACDP respondent 2). 
However, this participant could not say what type of leader would bring electoral fortunes for 
the party. The following quotes demonstrate the point above:  
 
“The party has minimal influence in government decision-making, especially on 
issues that affect me personally. The ACDP is known for upholding good Christian 
values, but as a citizen, I need a party that can deliver on its promises after elections” 
(ACDP respondent 4).      
 
“They (ACDP) do not present themselves well. They (ACDP) only raise their voice 
few months before elections and they come across very weak” (ACDP respondent 6).  
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“I felt that the ACDP was not strong enough and was not doing enough to make our 
political voices heard in government” (ACDP respondent 7).  
 
   
“Rev Meshoe is a well-respected leader. However, under the current leadership, the 
ACDP has minimal political impact. I need a party with strong political direction” 
(ACDP respondent 8).  
   
 
Additionally, all the participants interviewed linked their poor perception of the ACDP’s 
leadership with the lack of visibility and poor engagement of the party’s leader and 
candidates with the electorate. The interviews revealed that the presence and visibility of the 
party for the 2011 local election was minimal, if not, non-existent. For example, participants 
indicated that there was no real engagement between the voter and the party during this 
election. The participants argued that the party’s failure to visit their communities was a clear 
indication that the ACDP was not serious about maintaining their support base intact for 
future elections. This substantiates Matlosa’s (2008, p. 24) argument that voters become 
disillusioned with parties that neglect to keep their membership active during and in-between 
elections. It also substantiates Popkin’s (1991, p. 65) view that a voter wonders about 
whether a party or candidate really cares about people and their concerns. Due to the lack of 
contact between voters and the ACDP representatives, the opportunity to express their views 
was not given to them in the 2011 election. This is a cause for concern for the ACDP, as 
parties mobilise most of their support through direct contact with their constituencies. The 
following quotes demonstrate the point above:  
 
“I moved away from the ACDP because the party representatives were not visible in 
my community. The only time I saw party representatives was at church events closer 
to the 2011 local election. That was not good enough” (ACDP respondent 3). 
 
“I switched votes because of the poor visibility of party leaders. They (ACDP) only 
made themselves known to the public a short period before the election date (ACDP 
respondent 6).  
 
“The ACDP did not do their campaigning well in the 2011 election. The party did not 
come to our church to encourage people to vote for them. Maybe they (ACDP) 
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thought because we are Christians we will automatically vote for them as we did in 
previous elections” (ACDP respondent 7).  
 
 
“The ACDP’s presence in my community was very poor. It was not as visible like 
previous years” (ACDP respondent 8).  
 
 
It is well documented in the literature that engagement between political parties and voters is 
important, especially closer to the election date. As previously indicated, parties are expected 
to start a conversation with the electorate about their objectives and their strategies to address 
pertinent political, social and economic issues. Political engagement is therefore an important 
aspect in creating an open dialogue for voter participation in the electoral process. Another 
benefit is that political engagement establishes public trust and confidence in the party and in 
the democratic process. Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the party leader to ensure that 
party representatives and party candidates have regular consultations with voters during and 
in-between elections. All the participants who previously supported the ACDP claimed that 
the ACDP proved to be disappointing in this regard. 
 
Moreover, five of the participants claimed that the ACDP did not have a strong leadership 
orientation in the 2011 election. For instance, they complained that the ACDP mayoral 
candidate for the City of Cape Town, Ferlon Christians, was not a strong political contender 
against Patricia De Lille from the DA and Tony Ehrenreich from the ANC.  Their argument 
was that the mayoral candidate for the ACDP lacked the necessary political experience and 
credentials compared to other mayoral candidates from other parties such as the ANC and 
DA. The majority of the participants thus suggested that the ACDP must recruit stronger 
political leaders at the local level as this level is the closest to the people.  
 
In the 2011 election, the party used Helen Zille, Patricia De Lille and Lindiwe Mazibuko as 
the party’s public faces. The idea was to create an image of the DA as a political home for all 
races. Participants indicated that Patricia De Lille has been a long standing politician who has 
spoken out against corrupt activities in government. Thus, she has built some credibility 
among the electorate. This was also the view of Schulz-Herzenberg (2011) and Dhawraj 
(2012, p. 325) who argued that the merger with the ID provided the DA with a viable 
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mayoral candidate for the 2011 election. Most of the participants that were interviewed noted 
that Helen Zille and Lindiwe Mazibuko appear to be trustworthy and competent compared to 
the public figures of the ANC and other parties. 
 
In terms of party leadership then, the responses showed that voters make political choices, 
whether at national or local level, in accordance with their perception of the quality and more 
importantly, the character of candidates contesting the election. These findings are thus in 
consonance with the rational choice model and Popkin’s theory (discussed in Chapter Two) 
which stipulate that voters often have powerful opinions about party leaders and candidates. 
The rational choice model and Popkin (1991) argue that voters care about the competence of 
the candidate they are voting for. Voters thus tend to assess a given candidate’s capability in 
delivering on the party’s election promises. Indeed, the findings show that leadership was an 
important issue for most opposition voters in the 2011 election. To a certain extent then, one 
could argue that rational decision-making formed part of the decisions of these participants to 
migrate to the DA in the 2011 local election. Hence, their perception and evaluation of the 
party leadership and candidates formed part of their reason to withdraw their support from the 
ACDP and to look for an alternative party in 2011.  
 
4.2.2 ACDP’s party image  
 
As previously mentioned, the party’s support base is not limited to any racial or ethnic group. 
In this regard, the ACDP has been seen to be relatively inclusive to all social groups in South 
Africa. Lodge and Scheidegger (2004, p. 15) indicate that the ACDP’s electoral support is 
predominantly concentrated in KwaZulu Natal and the Western Cape. The party has 
constituencies in other provinces like Limpopo and Mpumalanga. Although the ACDP has 
benefited from middle class white and coloured voters, the party’s support base is 60 percent 
black (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2004, p. 15).  
 
Perhaps, a counter argument to their inclusiveness is the fact that the ACDP’s support is 
strongly concentrated in the Christian religion. As referred to in Chapter Two, religion has 
been identified as an important “social-structural source of voter-alignments” (Brooks et al., 
2006, p. 92) and thus, on one hand, strong religious individuals are more inclined to vote for 
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a party that share their religious or ideological preferences. On the other hand, non-religious 
voters are less likely to vote for a religious party like the ACDP because they might struggle 
to identify with the party’s divine image and political message. This is the dominant view of 
the sociological model which explains that voter choices most often reflect the social or 
religious identity of individuals. These identities become important political cleavages when 
individuals vote for parties and develop perceptions about these parties.  
 
South Africa is a deeply religious society with approximately 85 percent of the population 
declaring some religious affiliation (Struwig and Roberts, 2009, p. 18). However, the 
Christian religion is said to be the most dominant in the country. Given this, it can be argued 
that political space does exist for Christian parties like the ACDP in South Africa. Support for 
the ACDP may be influenced by the party’s vision for an ideal Christian democratic society 
and the party’s position against political issues that might go against Christianity. For 
instance, some voters may identify with the ACDP for its position against abortion, 
homosexuality and same sex marriages. The ACDP has also advocated for the death penalty 
to come back to South Africa (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2004, p. 15) which may not auger 
well with some members of society, for example, many black conservative people 
passionately oppose it because of its association with apartheid.   
 
Therefore, voters who do not identify with the ACDP’s values may not see the party as a 
viable alternative to adequately represent their interests. For example, the political 
commentator, Eusebius McKaiser, criticized the ACDP’s position on abortion and accused 
the party for undermining women’s rights. McKaiser argued that the ACDP’s anti-abortion 
stance perpetuates male dominance over female bodies, making reference to a historical 
context of male-run states whose laws regarding reproductive decisions deprioritise the 
interests of women (The Star Online, March, 3, 2014).  Accordingly, the ACDP may find it 
difficult to mobilise support from voters that support rights of homosexuals, are pro-abortion, 
and do not support the death penalty.
54
  
                                                            
54 This view was not supported by the ACDP party official during the interview.  He stated that the 
party does not discriminate against any societal group – the ACDP has an open-door policy for gays 
and lesbians. He further argued that the ACDP is moving away from its “churchy image” in order to 
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The findings reveal that all the research participants who previously voted for the ACDP 
initially supported the party because of the party’s strong religious identity in South African 
politics. The majority of participants noted that the ACDP has maintained a respectable 
public image as the party upholds strong Christian morals which they all can relate with. For 
example, one participant stated, “as a strong Christian believer I felt that the ACDP would 
best represent my interest and promote the word of God in government” (ACDP respondent 
3). Other participants gave similar responses that their Christian identity primarily informed 
their voting choice at the polls. Four of the participants voted for the ACDP since 2004; three 
voted for the party since the 1994 and 1999 elections; and one participant voted for the 
ACDP since the 2006 local election. For these former ACDP voters, their voting choice was a 
reflection or manifestation of their religious identity and their support for the ACDP’s 
Christian morality in politics.  
 
In the 2011 local election, participants indicated that there voting choices changed. Although 
their religion still played an important component in their lives, it did not inform their vote 
choice in this election. In this vein, participants indicated that the Christian image of the 
ACDP became ‘less important’ to them because other issues such as leadership, governance 
and service delivery were more crucial. It is important to note that the 2011 elections 
happened during a time when most citizens expressed their dissatisfaction with the leadership 
and governance of the ANC. Not long after the April 2009 general elections, service delivery 
protests and other public demonstrations (which were not related to service delivery) took 
place in most of the provinces. For service delivery alone, there were 111 demonstrations 
throughout all nine provinces in 2010. It was also reported that a few weeks before the 2011 
local election took place, 23 demonstrations took place over poor or totally non-existent 
public services such as water, electricity and good sanitation in many townships (Böhler, 
2011, p. 58). During this particular period, wage strikes also increased nationally and this had 
implications on voter choices.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
appeal to a broad cross-section of South African voters. Yet, it was reported that the leader of the 
party told the media that “gays are sinners” and “they should ask forgiveness from their sins”.  
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Throughout the study, it was evident that those who previously voted for the ACDP in 2009 
had strong negative views about the overall performance of the governing party at all spheres 
of government. They expressed their concerns about the unfulfilled election promises by the 
governing party since 1994. Participants especially expressed their frustrations with the 
corruption scandals surrounding many public officials and the ANC in general.  
 
Most of the ACDP participants interviewed were of the view that South Africa needed a 
strong opposition party to effectively challenge the electoral dominance of the ANC. 
However, these former ACDP supporters noted that the ACDP was electorally too weak to 
unseat the ANC in future elections. In this regard, the ACDP was not considered a strong 
opposition party against the ANC. Nevertheless, the DA was seen as the only opposition 
party that could be pose a real threat to the power of the ANC. Because of its significant 
improvement at the polls since 1994, the DA was viewed as a party that was capable of 
eroding the political dominance of the ANC. Some of the participants shared the following:  
 
“The current ANC leadership is morally corrupt. A strong opposition is necessary to 
effectively challenge the ANC in future elections” (ACDP respondent 2). 
 
“A strong opposition party like the DA can expose the corruption of the ANC and be 
the next party in government (ACDP respondent 7). 
 
Subconsciously then, these former ACDP supporters (and maybe other previous ACDP 
supporters that moved to the DA in the 2011 election) were voting against the ANC 
government, and not so much against the ACDP in this election. One could argue that the 
voter exodus from smaller opposition parties like the ACDP was mainly motivated by 
perceptions and views about the negative aspects of the ruling party. More specifically, a key 
reason for their movement was the negative feelings towards the current leadership of the 
ANC and how it has affected the quality of governance and service delivery across the 
country. In this way, the movement away from the ACDP in the 2011 election was less 
influenced by the election shortcomings of the ACDP itself.  
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4.2.3 COPE’s leadership and image 
 
On the question why participants previously supported COPE in 2009, all nine participants 
interviewed noted that COPE presented itself as a powerful new party that could be a political 
home for South Africans who had either become disillusioned or alienated from the ANC. 
These participants stated that they saw COPE as a credible opposition party that could 
successfully challenge the political hegemony of the ANC.  
 
All the research participants that previously supported COPE expressed their fear for the 
continuation of the dominance of the ANC as the ruling party. Many of their frustrations were 
towards to the leadership and governance of the ANC. There is little doubt that these 
participants were afraid that Jacob Zuma would see a second term as president of the country. 
In Chapter Three, reference was made to the public protests that were spread throughout the 
nine provinces; citizens expressed their grievances against continued deficiency of basic 
services such as water and electricity in local communities. On the other hand, most voters 
have expressed their dissatisfaction with President Jacob Zuma’s style of leadership. The 
research participants interviewed clearly expressed their concerns and fears about the manner 
in which the governing party had dealt with leadership and governance issues. The party 
received serious criticism about the manner in which it had allowed individuals within their 
own ranks to misuse their political position to divert government resources into their own 
coffers. These findings about President Zuma are in consonance with Popkin’s theory which 
argues that political evaluations and choices will depend on, among other things, the 
presidential candidate’s character, personality and performance record.   
 
More importantly, the notion was that the arrival of COPE in the political arena would 
strengthen South Africa’s democracy and the party would provide voters with opportunities 
for adequate political representation at the polls. These voters thus saw COPE as a party that 
is inclusive to all citizens. However, the optimism about the arrival of COPE did not last 
long. Soon after its establishment, COPE received much criticism regarding its own 
leadership. The party lacked clarity and transparency on how COPE’s leaders were to be 
elected and this uncertainty led to frustrations among its members which soon became public. 
This ultimately had an impact on the credibility of the party to the run up to the 2011 
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election. This also reinforced the belief that no party can come out of the ANC and perform 
well.  
 
As previously mentioned, the leadership conflict was mainly between two factions namely, 
those aligned to Lekota and Shilowa, respectively (Twala, 2011, p. 124). There was also the 
“Reverend Mvume Dandala” factor that contributed to the party’s leadership problems. For 
example, this “politically” unknown priest was the electoral face of COPE in the 2009 
elections. According to Twala (2011, p. 129), parachuting Dandala into this position was an 
attempt to quell the leadership squabbles between Lekota and Shilowa. However there were 
mixed feelings about the presidential candidacy of Dandala. Dandala was viewed as an 
imposed leader who had no background of the founding principles of COPE (Twala, 2011). 
In addition, Lekota was not enthusiastic about Dandala’s selection (Ndletyana, 2010, p. 40).55  
Many of Lekota’s supporters saw this as a “motion of no confidence” in Lekota’s leadership 
(Twala, 2011, p. 130).  It may be argued that COPE’s leadership squabbles started when 
Lekota disapproved of Dandala’s selection and announced that the ballot papers would carry 
his face instead of Dandala’s (Mangcu, 2009).   
 
The leadership duel at the national level played out at provincial and local level. Most of the 
research participants interviewed were aware that between 2008 and early 2012 it was 
impossible for COPE to successfully constitute its national congress. As a result, the party’s 
national leaders could not be elected and factions were formed. However, in February 2011, 
Lekota obtained an interim court order recognising him as the president of the party. This was 
followed by the dismissal of Shilowa from the party after an internal disciplinary hearing was 
conducted. It was claimed that Shilowa refused to participate in this hearing and, more 
importantly, that he was found guilty for mismanaging the party’s parliamentary funds. Given 
this, Shilowa’s chances for claiming the title of COPE’s party leader were gone. Those 
aligned to Shilowa decided to withdraw from the 2011 election process, and the Lekota group 
managed to gradually consolidate its hold on COPE.   
 
                                                            
55 The Shilowa faction approved Dandala’s selection and seemed happy to rub Lekota’s nose in the 
defeat (Ndletyana, 2010).  
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Without doubt, the leadership dispute had a serious impact on the party’s image. The party’s 
commitment to internal democracy (the democratic process within a single party to elect 
party leaders at different levels of government) was already in question. Additionally, the 
party looked incompetent as it was unable to resolve the internal leadership squabbles which 
created two factions at the end. Given this, it was useful to ask the participants about their 
perception and evaluation of the leadership and image of COPE in the 2011 election.  
 
The participants interviewed noted that they had a negative perception and evaluation about 
the leadership and image of COPE. This was primarily linked to the internal fighting among 
party leaders, Lekota and Shilowa. Several participants stated that they were disappointed in 
the leadership of COPE as they initially thought that COPE would be a strong political 
contender that would bring an end to the ‘poor leadership and governance’ of the ANC.  
However, after the party’s internal power struggles were out in the open, none of the 
participants felt that COPE was able to give political direction to the country. For these 
former COPE supporters, COPE was too focused on their leadership clashes and court cases 
pending and overlooked the needs and concerns of voters. For example, one of the 
participants stated that the poor leadership, internal division, and the party’s failure to hold an 
elective congress made him question COPE’s commitment and ability to be an effective party 
in government (COPE respondent 5). This respondent further argued that the constant 
leadership mayhem tarnished the entire image of COPE and hence the party failed to 
consolidate its position in 2011 local elections.  Other interviewees shared similar viewpoints 
as follows:  
 
“I was disappointed in COPE. COPE did not have the impact that we hoped it would 
have in Parliament and in politics, in general. Other problems such as factionalism 
and power struggles made me move my support to the DA” (COPE respondent 4).  
 
“COPE was falling apart. The party focused all their attention on the power struggles 
within the party. Their political vision was not clear anymore” (COPE respondent 8).  
 
To a large extent, it seemed that factionalism and leadership problems were some of the key 
motivations for former COPE supporters to move their vote to another opposition party. Very 
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similar to the ACDP respondents, previous COPE supporters were looking for a strong 
opposition party to successfully challenge the dominant rule of the ANC. For instance, three 
out of nine COPE respondents indicated that they previously supported the ANC but were 
unhappy with the party’s poor performance in government. They decided to move their 
support to COPE in 2009 with the hope for a better future (in terms of leadership, service 
delivery, employment and so on). The other seven respondents that formerly supported COPE 
were mainly ‘first- time’ voters who were frustrated with the (poor) leadership of the ANC 
but saw no alternative in other parties prior to the 2009 election. On the question why they 
decided to give their first vote to COPE and not another opposition, all the seven participants 
responded that COPE positioned itself as a party that would ensure a government that is in 
touch with popular needs. COPE further portrayed itself as a party that would uphold a clean 
and accountable government. For example, one respondent stated:  
 
“I was unhappy with the ANC’s leadership and felt that COPE could make a 
difference. I saw COPE as a party that could be a viable opposition to the ANC 
(unlike other opposition parties). The fact that they broke away from the ANC and 
spoke out against corruption within the ANC government influenced me to vote for 
the party in 2009” (COPE respondent 1). 
 
These responses thus revealed that the 2011 vote-switching had very little to do with their 
evaluations about the ACDP and COPE, respectively. However, a key finding is that most 
participants realised that both parties were electorally too weak to change the government. 
With this realisation, these participants had very little, or no confidence in the ACDP or 
COPE to unseat the ANC in the 2011 election.  During the interviews it became more evident 
that most of the participants were pushing for a stronger opposition party for future elections. 
The 2011 election was therefore seen as an opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with the 
ANC government by voting for the ‘strongest’ opposition party, the DA. This supports the 
argument that suggests that although some voters regard local elections as being less 
important than national elections, national issues such as leadership and governance do have 
an impact on the voting behaviour at the local level.  
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4.3 Election campaigns 
 
As previously discussed, election campaigns are a vital and an integral component of 
democracy. The use of election campaigns creates opportunities for the exchange of 
information between parties and the electorate. Campaigns inform voters about parties, 
candidates and the electoral process. They also allow politicians to express their political 
opinions. Most significantly, campaigns can assist voters to discern which party would best 
represent their interests. Electoral campaigns are also a necessary platform to address the 
societal needs such as service delivery, education, employment, and infrastructure at all 
levels of government. Some scholars view election campaigns as a “social contract” between 
the party and the voters (Phago, 2012, p. 70).   
 
It is clear that election campaigns are meaningful vehicles for mobilising electoral support. 
However research has shown that election campaigns enjoy fairly limited levels of public 
visibility in South Africa (Scheimer and Mattes, 2011, p. 18). Many voters have either 
already decided who they will vote for, or already concluded that no party represents their 
interest, and will abstain from voting. Hence, election campaigns are not important to them.  
Nevertheless, political parties spend a big sum of their money on campaigns with the hope 
that it will attract significant support from the electorate. Given the fact that the campaigns 
are an important tool for electioneering; a question was posed to the participants about the 
effectiveness of the campaigns for the ACDP and COPE in the 2011 elections. More 
specifically, the question sought to find out whether the election campaigns influenced their 
movement (shift) from the parties they previously voted for to the DA. A general feeling 
among respondents was that the ACDP and COPE produced poor campaigns for the 2011 
elections. However, all the participants expressed the opinion that both parties’ election 
campaigns were unable to convince them to continue their support for these respective 
parties.  
 
4.3.1 The ACDP’s election campaign 
 
The ACDP’s theme for their 2011 election campaign was “Let’s Fix It” which emphasised 
that the ACDP is the best alternative to address poor government performance on key issues. 
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Their campaign focused on service delivery, poverty, unemployment, education and housing, 
to name a few.  In their campaign manifesto, the party also spoke about combating crime in 
local communities. The party also adopted a national election message that highlighted their 
commitment to the implementation of policies that will ensure better transportation and 
health services. The ACDP’s campaign was also a critique of the ANC; highlighting and 
exploiting the shortcomings of the ANC’s performance at all levels of government. A key 
message was that the ANC was faced with internal leadership squabbles and provincial 
factionalism. The ACDP further exploited issues such as the recall and forced resignation of 
former President Thabo Mbeki, the resignation of Ebrahim Rasool
56
, and the fact that 
prominent members of the ANC were involved in corruption scandals (ACDP 2011 Western 
Cape Campaign Assessment Document). In their campaigning, the ACDP also focused on 
highlighting and exploiting the shortcomings of the DA. They emphasised that the DA was a 
‘white dominated’ party and the party was misleading voters through ‘window dressing’.  
The overall aim of the ACDP’s 2011 election campaign was to establish the ACDP as the 
biggest and best alternative to other parties, especially the ANC and DA. Moreover, their 
campaign emphasised that the ACDP does have a credible (yet limited) track record in 
delivery at municipal level. Their campaign message noted that ACDP has co-governed 
municipalities with other parties and has also brought stability and credibility in those 
municipalities.
57
  
 
Other parties campaigned around the same topics. All the political parties that contested the 
2011 local election emphasised that they are the best political alternative; they knew best how 
to deal with service delivery problems; and that they were committed towards better 
education, employment and health services.  As a result of similar campaign strategies and 
messages, the ACDP’s election campaign did not stand out from the rest. Participants made 
an example that the ACDP’s campaign did not attract their attention as it focussed on the 
same issues as other parties contesting.  
 
Their responses were also based on the poor visibility of the campaign. The ACDP had an 
insufficient number of posters, pamphlets, and had a very limited distribution of the party’s 
                                                            
56 The then-ANC premier, Ebrahim Rasool, was fired from his position for allegedly having supported 
Mbeki’s failed bid for the ANC presidency (Ndletyana, 2010, p. 2).   
57 Information was obtained in the ACDP Western Cape 2011 Campaign Assessment Document.  
 
 
 
 
 97 
 
manifesto. All the participants who formally supported the ACDP mentioned that they had no 
knowledge about the ACDP’s election campaign because their campaign materials did not 
reach them as voters. One participant made an example to the effect that there was no 
engagement between voters and the party manifesto or other campaign material (ACDP 
respondent 4). Other respondents had similar experiences. For example, they all pointed out 
that they had neither interacted with the party’s representatives nor engagement with the 
party’s campaign materials. One of the respondents made the following statement: “I am 
unaware that the ACDP had an election campaign. I saw nothing” (ACDP respondent 3). 
Furthermore, all participants interviewed under this category argued that the DA was a better 
alternative because the party’s campaign material was more accessible than other opposition 
parties (ACDP respondent 1). Respondents who previously supported COPE shared the same 
view that the DA ousted all other parties’ election campaigns in 2011. They indicated that 
DA put out a much stronger presence and therefore managed to connect with more people on 
the local level. 
 
4.3.2 COPE’s election campaign  
 
COPE’s campaign focussed on addressing service delivery, crime, corruption and job 
creation. Additionally, the party’s manifesto also emphasized the importance of local 
economic growth and development, activist citizenship and community activism (Kotze, 
2012, pp. 178- 179).  The party launched their election manifesto at a spectacular event, but 
like other parties, the manifesto received little attention during the election campaign (Kotze, 
2012, p. 178). Other aspects such as factions within the party (and the party’s constant failure 
to hold a national conference) received more attention than the proposals in their election 
manifesto. Hence COPE’s campaign manifesto and messages had little impact on the minds 
of voters.  
 
Furthermore, participants in the study observed that COPE, like other small opposition 
parties, had poor visibility during the 2011 election. The party had limited posters and in 
some areas, posters were non-existent. The party also had limited distribution of their 
campaign manifesto and other party materials. Several participants mentioned that all parties 
have the duty to educate the electorates about their policies and political programmes. 
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However, this was something COPE was lacking. For example, one respondent stated that he 
was approached by COPE representatives a few days before the election, and to his 
disappointment, these representatives could not explain the party’s election aims and 
strategies. The respondent thus felt that COPE campaigners lacked knowledge about the party 
and also did not have enough experience to engage with voters. This respondent further stated 
that due to their (campaigners) lack of information “one could not differentiate between 
COPE’s message to that of the ANC or other parties. It therefore seemed like every 
representative of COPE had their own idea of what COPE stood for and had to offer” (COPE 
respondent 5).  
 
Another respondent expressed the opinion that COPE produced an incoherent campaign 
strategy; campaign material was poorly managed and, more importantly, the campaign lacked 
substance. Interestingly, a few months after the interviews were conducted, Kotze (2012, p. 
179) wrote that COPE’s 2011 election campaign was not efficiently managed. The party also 
neglected to efficiently use public media to introduce their manifesto to the electorate. As a 
result, COPE’s campaign messages never reached voters.  
 
Furthermore, other participants felt that COPE’s leadership battles overshadowed the party’s 
election campaign. For instance, two respondents indicated that they had lost interest in the 
party and “paid no attention to their 2011 campaign” (COPE respondents 4 and 8).  In 
contrast, the participants indicated that the DA had an effective campaign compared to those 
of the ACDP and COPE. The DA’s campaign focused on the reduction of poverty through 
economic growth and job creation. It also emphasised the delivery of basic municipal 
services for all. The DA’s manifesto attempted to address a range of issues that were seen as 
relevant for growth, job creation and service delivery. Some of the focus areas included: 
efficient and transparent government; sustainability in resource usage; clean water; 
electricity; primary health care; and social development.  
 
Looking back at the election campaigns and manifestos it was interesting that all three parties 
(ACDP, COPE and DA) campaigned around the same issues in the 2011 local elections. 
Although different strategies were used, the content and the messages were almost identical. 
The DA’s campaign messages were however better articulated due to the party’s efficient use 
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of public media to promote the party’s manifesto. The DA also had better financial resources 
to make use of paid media to reach a broader audience. There is little doubt that the DA’s 
election campaign out-performed most opposition parties in the 2011 election. As earlier 
pointed out, the DA produced an effective campaign and had enough “foot soldiers” to 
communicate the party’s campaign messages to the local communities. However, election 
campaigns are not the sole reason for the success or failure of parties at the polls. Although 
election campaigns are important vehicles for voter mobilisation, they do not determine the 
electoral growth of parties. Parties with the best election campaigns are not necessarily seen 
as the best political alternative. Responses showed that those who formally supported the 
ACDP and COPE were less worried about party campaigns and felt more apprehensive about 
the leadership and political direction of the country.  
 
Some participants indicated that their decision to leave the ACDP and COPE had little to do 
with the effectiveness of their 2011 campaigns. They argued that most of them had already 
decided to move their support to the DA long before the 2011 campaign period started. While 
they acknowledged that the DA had the most consistent and positive campaign out of all the 
parties, their main motivation was to find a viable opposition party that had the ability to 
effectively challenge, and hopefully unseat the ANC in elections. Thus, the DA’s quality 
campaign almost served as a “confirmation” or “validation” that they had made the right 
choice by switching their vote to another party in 2011.  
 
Importantly, the above findings are in consonance with Popkin’s theory which highlights the 
importance of campaigns in elections. Popkin’s view is that voters use campaigns as shortcuts 
to discern which party or candidate would best represent their interests and concerns. In 
Popkin’s analysis, he argues that campaign communications increase the accuracy of voters’ 
perceptions and evaluations of parties and candidates. While campaigns are critically 
important, Popkin also sees campaigns not being the ultimate factor in the voters’ decision-
making process. As the above findings suggest, party campaigns were not the most important 
reason for the migration to the DA in 2011. However voters used campaigns as rational 
shortcuts to evaluate parties, candidates and issues.  
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4.4 The role of the media in vote-switching   
 
Elections are all about individuals making political choices. In order for the electorate to be 
assisted in this regard, they must have access to an effective, critical, reliable and independent 
print and electronic media. In recent years, political parties have increasingly used the media 
as a communication tool. Parties use the media to inform particularly the public about their 
policies, political programmes and other related political issues. More importantly, parties use 
the media to bring their election campaign messages across with the aim to increase their 
support among voters. The media is therefore a critical communication platform that supplies 
information about the different political parties and candidates contesting the election. It also 
acts as a medium for educating the potential voters about the electoral process. In this regard, 
the media plays an intermediary role between the government, politicians, parties, and the 
electorate. The media also reports on election speeches, rallies and other political 
developments in order to ensure that the electorate stay informed. In this way, the media 
strengthens the electoral process and democratic experience of citizens. Consequently, the 
media plays a powerful role in shaping the perceptions of voters about parties and their 
leaders. These perceptions often influence the electoral support of individuals and their 
behaviour at the polls.  
 
When it comes to voting and elections, the media provide most of the information used by the 
electorate. Another determining factor of voting behaviour then, is the media and the role it 
plays in forming opinions about the parties contesting the election. This is the view of the 
dominant ideology theory (as discussed in Chapter Two) that explains that most often the 
media portrays certain images of parties and their candidates in the mind of voters. By 
exposing the electorate to certain political statements and messages about political leaders 
and government performance, certain images are mentally constructed in the mind of the 
recipients, who in this case are the electorate. This can lead to political opinions being formed 
and political support decided accordingly (Popkin, 1991).   
 
To date, the South African print and electronic media industry has often been criticized for 
favouring larger political parties while smaller parties do not receive the same amount of 
media coverage. For instance, the media would report on larger parties’ election speeches 
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while ignoring the statements of other political parties that are also contesting the election. 
The inequitable manner of media reporting has been cited as one of the core reasons why 
most opposition parties have become ‘silent’ and to some extent ‘irrelevant’ in multiparty 
politics. If we look at the media coverage of the 2011 elections, the ANC received 46 percent 
followed by the DA with 25 percent (Krüger, 2012, p. 235).  This is why other parties had to 
compete for media coverage. Parties like the ACDP and COPE were affected by a lack of 
coverage during the election period; ACDP received two percent while COPE scored a bit 
higher with eight percent (Krüger, 2012, p. 235). Indeed, the fact that the ANC and DA 
receive the most media attention is worrisome for smaller parties although it may be argued 
that certain political parties and their political messages are not deemed newsworthy by all 
journalists and/or news outlets. Whether this is through their own inability to “generate news” 
or because they are “crowded out”, smaller parties seldom get noticed by the media and 
hence their status and relevance in party politics may suffer. Given this, a question was posed 
to participants whether the media contributed to the voter exodus from the ACDP and COPE 
during the 2011 elections.  
 
It is often assumed that voters come into each election with an open mind ready to hear 
parties’ campaigns and decide accordingly who to vote for. However, not every ACDP and 
COPE respondent that were interviewed felt that the media influenced their decision to 
migrate to the DA. For example, three participants who previously supported COPE indicated 
that media coverage (or the lack thereof) played a minimal role in their voting behaviour 
during the 2011 elections. It was further established that in fact, these three respondents 
decided to migrate to the DA long before the 2011 election campaigns started. Hence, the 
respondents revealed that they had little interest in following the 2011 election campaigns on 
television, radio or newspapers. Two of the eight ACDP respondents indicated that media 
coverage of party campaigns had a minimal effect on their voting choices. They stated that 
sometimes they would remove themselves from the political environment and ignore party 
campaigns because parties campaign around the same issues. See the extracts from the 
interviews with ACDP and COPE respondents below: 
  
“The media did not really factor into my voting choice. I have only ever voted  for the 
party that I believe would represent what I stand for, and the party that displays the 
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most commitment to upgrading and improving the lives of ordinary citizens, both in 
my community and in the city” (ACDP respondent 1). 
 
 “The media did not really factor into my voting choice” (COPE respondent 1).  
 
“My choice (to move vote to the DA in the 2011 local elections) was not influenced 
by the media but rather through personal engagement with the DA and party 
representatives” (COPE respondent 5).  
 
In addition, these respondents argued that they preferred direct face-to-face campaigns as 
opposed to ‘virtual engagement’ with parties during elections. This is so because, they 
argued, face to face campaigning allows for better interaction with the party and its leaders.  
 
 
It is quite evident from the data that some voters were far less likely to follow election 
campaigns through the mass media. This is in line with Scheimer and Mattes (2011, p.  6), 
who argue that South Africa’s news consumers systematically “tune out” of election news 
during the run up to the polls. In this regard, one can argue that the ACDP and COPE’s 
campaigning to some extent ignored the personal engagement aspect of campaigns which 
might have affected them negatively. Both parties had few representatives at grassroots level 
to effectively engage with ordinary voters. Moreover, both parties campaigned with little 
campaign resources. The majority of respondents thus strongly advised both parties to focus 
on their level of interaction with voters, rather than complaining about unfair media coverage. 
At the end, each political party is responsible for their own campaign visibility. The media is 
only one of the many platforms to engage with the electorate.  
 
However, the effects of the media on the electorate were evident in some participants. For 
example, twelve of the research participants who followed party campaigns mentioned that 
the media portrayed the DA as more effective, efficient and a better alternative to other 
parties. The DA’s campaign messages were advertised on television, radio stations and print 
media. One respondent argued that the media showed that the DA was consistent in the 
public eye for exposing corruption of other parties and sometimes their own member too, 
which gave them an image of wanting to do what is right amidst the wrongdoings (ACDP 
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respondent 7). Other participants felt that the DA invested a lot of time and money into their 
2011 election campaign. See their responses below:  
 
“The media influenced my voting choice during the 2011 elections. The media made 
me aware of the positives and negatives of all the main parties contesting. The DA 
had more positive than negative media coverage” (COPE respondent 4).   
 
“I believe that the media played an influential role in my voter choice in 2011. 
Specifically in highlighting issues relating to corruption and “tenderpreneuring” 
which ought to name and shame those parties/individuals who abuse their power in 
government for personal benefit. This has been quite evident within the ANC. COPE 
also received negative media coverage. I therefore decided to change my vote in 2011 
to the DA” (COPE respondent 7).  
 
“The media did not influence my voting choice for the 2011 elections. I do not read 
newspapers. The reason being that there is too much bad news, and the constant 
bickering, fighting and arguments between political parties do not help much” (ACDP 
respondent 1) 
 
 “While the DA’s mayoral candidate (De Lille) received good coverage. The media 
reports on De Lille were more positive than negative. So, in that way, the media 
convinced me to change parties” (ACDP respondent 3). 
  
“Yes, the media influenced my vote in 2011. The media portrayed the DA as the 
strongest opponent against the ANC. I decided to add to the DA’s voting totals” 
(ACDP respondent 7).  
 
The twelve respondents argued that an important part of the DA’s campaign was direct 
contact between party and voters. In this vein, Weaver (1996, p. 241) notes that such contact 
is more effective per voter because it allows for a two-way communication and humanises the 
candidate. It would be wrong to assume that the voter migration to the DA in the 2011 
election was solely because of the party’s campaigning and media coverage. It has to be 
pointed out that a party’s electoral success is not solely dependent on the degree of media 
coverage it receives but rather that voters look at other aspects of the party such as leadership, 
image and general competence.  
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4.5 Party evaluations and responses from party representatives 
 
4.5.1 Lack of public finances  
 
The data received from the interviews with two party officials showed that a lack of party 
funding severely impacted the effectiveness of their election campaigns for 2011. As a result, 
both parties struggled to reproduce their electoral support they once enjoyed during this 
election. The literature studied in this dissertation has revealed that party funding can 
determine the success or failure of parties at elections. Subsequently, a lack of party funding 
is considered to be one of the key factors that hinder political participation of the opposition. 
Parties that have limited funding also struggle to establish and run party offices. With regards 
to elections, some parties are unable to produce effective campaigns and do not have the 
necessary resources for advertisements. Funding thus allows parties to interact with the 
electorate on a broader scale. However, if funding is scarce as previously mentioned, 
interaction with the electorate might be limited.  
 
Generally, both party officials were of the opinion that poor performance of opposition 
parties is due to a lack of financial resources. As indicated in the literature (see Chapter 
Three), political funding in South Africa is based on principle of proportionality (90 percent) 
and the principle of equity (10 percent). Due to the heavier weighting of proportionality (than 
equity), most opposition parties struggle to survive. This is so because not all parties have a 
high level of proportional representation in legislatures and hence, do not receive an adequate 
sum of money from the state. In contrast, the ANC (because of the party’s large number of 
members in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures) is currently the only party 
benefiting from the allocation formula. In this respect, the ANC may have a considerable 
advantage over other parties contesting elections.    
 
Many opposition parties are not able to compete with the governing party. Although, public 
funding is made available to parties, the amount (in most cases) is less than the amounts spent 
on the election.  Accordingly, the ACDP official argued that the political playing field is 
unequal in the sense that the governing party (ANC) receives the largest part of public funds. 
Additionally, the ANC has access to state resources (property, vehicles and media etc.) which 
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are not accessible to opposition parties. The ACDP official also revealed that while members 
of the incumbent government enjoy unlimited access of state resources to travel around for 
meetings, officials of smaller opposition parties have to rely on private funds or even their 
own personal funds to attend meetings. For him, there is unfair competition between the 
governing party and opposition parties. His reason holds that because of the “exclusionary” 
use of state resources by the governing party, the governing party are more visible in terms of 
election campaigns and mass media. In contrast, opposition parties struggle financially and 
do not have the means to effectively communicate their campaign messages to voters which 
in turn affect them negatively.  
 
However, the DA is perhaps the exception to the argument above. As earlier noted, the DA’s 
electoral support has increased and as a result, the party has a higher representation in terms 
of both proportionality and equity. Accordingly, funding from the state has steadily increased 
for the party.  Therefore, the DA was in a financially better position to carry out a well-
planned election campaign and was able to reach a broader audience during the 2011 
elections compared to COPE and ACDP. In line with this, the ACDP respondent 
contextualised it as follows:  
 
 
“The ANC has far more financial resources. Therefore the governing party has the 
means to be more visible; locally, provincially and nationally. The DA has become 
stronger. The party has grown electorally which brings more public funding and, as a 
result, more office bearers that can go out and visit constituencies. In contrast, 
opposition parties (with the exception of the DA) do not have the necessary funds to 
visit communities across the country; hence they tend to be less visible in terms of 
campaigning. For example, a small party like the ACDP does not have enough 
financial resources and senior office bearers to attend community meetings on a large 
scale. Opposition voters thus get disillusioned.”  
 
 
For the ACDP in particular, a lack of funding has made it difficult for the party to sustain a 
provincial wide campaign during the 2011 elections. According to the ACDP official, their 
campaigning was very poor in comparison with other opposition parties due to poor financial 
resources. As such, the ACDP could not produce enough marketing material such as t-shirts, 
posters, pamphlets, banners and adverts and so on. This had a serious impact on the party’s 
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campaign visibility, and to some extent, the campaign’s accessibility.   In addition, the ACDP 
official stated that the party is not present in every community, town or campus due to 
financial constraints.  Thus, with no funds, citizens either become detached from the party or 
more seriously, are not aware of its existence. In this vein, the ACDP campaign message was 
not received by all, not understood by all, and was not a priority to all.  
 
As for the COPE, the official interviewed did not elaborate on how funding influenced their 
election campaign for 2011. However, she admitted that insufficient financial resources 
limited the party from achieving their electoral goals. For example, she made reference to 
how funding has impacted the level of interaction between the party and the electorate during 
the 2011 campaign. She further stated that the party’s communication machinery is largely 
affected by funding and that although communication mechanisms were in place, it was not 
optimally used to engage with the public.  
 
It is evident that although the COPE official did not elaborate on the impact of funding on 
their campaigns for 2011 election, both party officials (ACDP and COPE) made it clear that 
public funding is not enough to cover all party related activities. Worse still, it is not enough 
to produce effective campaigns to generate more electoral support. In order to compliment 
public funds, funding from other private sources is thus needed. The ACDP official was of 
the opinion that a “public funding reform” was necessary in order to address the financial 
challenges that opposition parties go through. He proposed that an allocation of 50 percent 
proportionality and 50 percent equitability would be of immense benefit for parties, 
especially the smaller ones who have low representation in parliament. For him, a public 
funding reform will ensure that the playing field among parties (especially during elections) 
is equal. The ACDP official added the following:  
 
“Adequate funding, whether from the state or private donors, ensures better party 
structures, more personnel and a higher level of visibility in communities. Funding 
also enables the party interact with a larger segment of voters.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
4.5.1.1 Private funding  
 
As earlier pointed out, political parties are free to raise money from private donors to run 
election campaigns or other party activities. Unlike public funding, this form of funding is not 
subject to any regulation. An interesting finding was that private funding was an element of 
concern for both party officials. According to the ACDP official, private funding is skewed 
towards the governing party, the ANC, and the DA. Smaller opposition parties are not seen 
worthy of private donations. This is due to the fact that private donations might be 
misconstrued to be a fight against the party in government. This finding was reinforced by the 
COPE official who mentioned that private donors might feel that they would be labelled “pro 
or against democracy” depending on which political party the donor funds.  She was of the 
opinion that private funding can have an impact on the “clients of the businesses” and the 
“public at large”.  Based on this response, it could be assumed that the bottom line of 
businesses may be negatively or positively impacted depending on their customers’ 
awareness of their political stance. The same could be said about parties; either they could 
gain or lose electoral support depending on the businesses that associate themselves with the 
party.  Hence, private funding is a controversial subject for most parties.  
 
The ACDP respondent further explained that the ACDP is known for its Christian principles 
and family values. Private funding from businesses that are not aligned with those principles 
and values can become problematic. For example, prior to the 2011 elections, the party was 
faced with an ethical dilemma whether or not to accept funding from organizations whose 
businesses seemed to be in conflict with the party’s ideologies. As a result, they had to 
decline the donations to protect the party’s name and image. Henceforth, he agreed with the 
COPE official that private funding could have strong effect on the image of the party and (in 
this regard) could influence the perceptions of voters.  
 
4.5.1.2 Membership fees 
 
With regards to internal funding, both parties rely on membership fees to cover some of the 
party’s expenses. The membership fees are used for administration purposes and are seldom 
enough to finance other party related activities such as election campaigns.  Most of its 
members cannot pay the R10 annual fee due to poverty and unemployment. According to the 
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ACDP official, this amount has not changed since 1994. The ACDP respondent explained 
that internal financing is also limited because not all party officials can make financial 
contributions to the party.   
 
 
Although COPE’s membership fees58 are slightly higher than that of the ACDP, both parties 
have tried to keep membership fees as low as possible. Hence, a lack of financial 
contributions from party members could be related to poverty.  This is another cause of 
weakness within the opposition. Due to poverty (and unemployment of members), opposition 
parties lack resources to improve the party’s position in elections. Under such circumstances 
it is difficult for opposition parties to get support from the masses. From the responses 
gathered, it was established that a lack of financial resources limited the parties’ ability to 
interact with the electorate during the 2011 elections. In this regard, both the ACDP and 
COPE were unable to market themselves better due to financial constraints at all 
organisational levels. Financial stability is thus important for parties to gain and sustain 
electoral support.  
 
 
4.5.2 Structural limitations  
 
Financial constraints cannot be the sole reason for poor electoral performance of the 
opposition. The ACDP official, on one hand, focussed more on the external (such as 
public/private funding) problems the party faced but was unenthusiastic to provide 
information on the internal problems within the party, and how that influenced their voter 
support for 2011. On the other hand, the COPE representative highlighted that internal 
problems also played a key role in the 2011 election outcome. Despite lack of funding, COPE 
faced challenges such as lack of good administration and logistical plans.  Additionally, the 
party failed to plan in advance for the 2011 elections. This is evident in the statement below: 
 
                                                            
58 The COPE representative indicated that COPE charges different rates for membership fees, 
depending on your social status in the community.  R30.00 per year for an ordinary member; R10.00 
per year per student; R10.00 per year per young person; R10.00 per year per women; R500.00 per 
year per business and professional member 
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In the run-up to the 2011 elections, candidate posters were only displayed a week 
before the elections; many service providers for pamphlets and t-shirts were already 
with orders from other political parties. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown that party fortunes in the 2011 elections were heavily tied to 
perceptions of party leadership and image. Although, leadership and image were the primary 
determinants for voters to look for an alternative opposition party in 2011, other secondary 
factors such as party campaigns, the role of the media, and the party’s track record in 
government also impacted their voting choice at the polls. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and reflection of key findings  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis aimed to answer a central research question, namely “Why did voters who 
previously voted for the ACDP and COPE decide to move their support from these parties in 
the 2011 local government election?” This chapter thus explains the research findings with an 
implicit logic toward answering the central research question and sub-questions which were 
outlined in Chapter One.  
 
 
Chapter One indicated that most South African opposition parties have been struggling to 
maintain or increase their support at the polls. Additionally, the chapter illustrated that there 
was a definite movement from smaller opposition parties to the DA in the 2011 local election 
and consequently, this voter exodus to the DA weakened small opposition parties. Two 
parties that were significantly affected by the voter exodus were the ACDP and COPE. The 
main objective of the study was to explore the motivations embedded in voters’ decision to 
move from smaller opposition parties like the ACDP and COPE to the DA. This chapter 
presents concluding comments about the key findings regarding the motivations of voters 
interviewed in this study. As previously indicated, the theoretical approach used by Popkin is 
most suitable for understanding the choice that respondents made to move their support from 
the ACDP and COPE. Hence Popkin’s integrated approach has been adopted to make sense 
of the behaviour and movement of voters during the 2011 election.  
 
As previously noted, weak and fragmented opposition parties are a common phenomenon in 
democracies around the world. The literature has shown that weak opposition parties are 
particularly common in democracies that are characterised by one-party dominance. In a 
dominant party system, a single political party is consistently elected and gains an absolute 
majority of the legislative seats. It was argued that one-party dominance has many negative 
implications for a democracy; a lack of public accountability, abuse of state resources, less 
opportunity for meaningful electoral competition between parties, and this could lead to voter 
apathy. Opposition parties are therefore regarded to be critical for a democracy to function 
properly.  
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On the other hand, it was discovered that the weak and fragmented opposition cannot be 
solely blamed on the political dominance of one political party. Reviewing the literature it 
was discovered that there are several reasons that account for opposition parties’ failure to 
broaden their appeal among the South African electorate. These reasons included their 
leadership style, party image, lack of financial resources, their inability to produce alternative 
policies, and failure to carve election messages and manifestoes that are distinct from the 
ruling party, the ANC. 
 
5.2 Research findings  
 
As aforementioned, a substantial number of voters who supported the ACDP and COPE in 
the 2009 general elections decided to withdraw their electoral support from the ACDP and 
COPE in the 2011 local election. The findings indicate that the key motivations for their 
movement to the DA were influenced by the following factors:  
 
 Party leadership 
 
 Party images  
 
 Election campaigns  
 
  Media coverage   
 
 
It is important to note that the primary motivation for the movement away from the ACDP 
and COPE was leadership and party image. The quality and effectiveness of the party’s 
election campaigns and media coverage were seen as secondary factors. The findings will 
thus be discussed in that order. 
 
5.2.1 Leadership of ACDP, COPE and DA 
 
A key theme that emerged from the interviews was the quality of leadership of the parties 
selected for this study, the ACDP, COPE and the DA. Seemingly, incompetent leadership by 
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the ACDP and COPE (at the national level) was the primary motivation for the voter 
migration to the DA. Interestingly, the majority of the research participants evaluated the 
national leaders of the parties. This substantiates the argument made in previous chapters; the 
success of parties is linked to the voter perceptions and evaluations of the party leaders, their 
visibility and engagement with the electorate. As Africa (2008, p. 47) suggests, perceptions 
about the party are more likely to revolve entirely around the national leader.  Only a few of 
the participants had evaluated the quality and competence of the mayoral candidates in this 
election. 
 
 
Participants who previously supported the ACDP revealed that the party leadership lacks the 
ability to make the party a strong alternative voice in party politics. Although the majority 
had positive comments about the national leader, Rev. Meshoe, they expressed concerns 
about the poor electoral growth of the party under his leadership. A suggestion was made that 
a new national leader should be elected so that he or she could broaden the party’s appeal 
among the electorate. There was a general consensus that the current ACDP leader’s strong 
Christian morals are good for a public image but becoming less relevant in a society that is 
characterised by diverse religious views. 
 
The ACDP mayoral candidate for the City of Cape Town
59
 (Ferlon Christians) received a 
negative rating in terms of leadership. Participants claimed that Christians was a weak 
candidate in comparison to other mayoral candidates of other parties that contested the 
election. The majority of the participants proposed that the ACDP should have recruited a 
stronger candidate who could have effectively challenged the mayoral candidates of other 
parties. They made reference to mayoral candidates like Patricia De Lille (DA) and Tony 
Ehrenreich (ANC) that came out much stronger in political debates in the 2011 election. The 
perception that De Lille would be a good mayor thus motivated the participants to give their 
vote to the DA. The participants that were interviewed had little opinions and insights of 
Ehrenreich. 
 
                                                            
59 In chapter one, I indicated that most participants reside in the City Of Cape Town and could thus 
only form political opinions about the mayoral candidates contesting in this area.  The same applies 
for COPE.  
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In a similar manner, those who previously supported COPE revealed that COPE’s leadership 
looked relatively incompetent to make the party a strong, political voice that will adequately 
represent their interest. Their perception was based on the internal leadership conflict among 
the party leadership and members soon after the 2009 elections. Participants felt that COPE 
was too preoccupied with their court cases and lacked the necessary discipline to resolve the 
issue internally. Ultimately, a perception was created among voters that COPE has no 
political direction. Thus, the level of confidence and trust that they had in COPE in the 2009 
elections dramatically declined after the party’s leadership problems became public. 
Participants were unable to give an opinion about the mayoral candidates of COPE because 
they did not know who the candidates were in the different metropolitan areas. This indicates 
that visibility, engagement and communication between the party and voters were limited in 
the 2011 election.  
 
So why was leadership so important in this election? The findings revealed that opposition 
voters were looking for a party that displayed a strong leadership ability to bring an end to the 
leadership of the ANC. As stated earlier in the foregoing chapters, the 2011 election came at 
the time of high levels of dissatisfaction with the ruling party. Issues such as the corruption 
allegations made against prominent public officials that belong to the ANC, the abuse of state 
resources, and scandals that surround the party leader, Jacob Zuma, led to the negative 
perception that the ANC is no longer fit to govern the country. Participants argued that the 
ANC allowed individuals within their own ranks to misuse their political position to further 
personal interests. In addition, participants expressed their concerns about the manner in 
which the governing party dealt with local issues such as the lack of basic services in poor 
communities. Their frustrations and anger in relation to the performance of the ANC had an 
impact on their voting behaviour and movement in the 2011 election. They saw the 2011 
election as an opportunity to make the DA a stronger opposition and to punish the governing 
party for its shortcomings.  
 
The DA, on the other hand, appeared to have a strong leadership orientation. The party also 
seemed more competent in terms of governance and providing adequate basic services such 
as water, sanitation and electricity to local communities. The DA’s leadership and governing 
track record in the City of Cape Town incited some hope and inspiration among voters. 
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Consequently, participants interviewed for this study chose to switch to the DA as they could 
see engagement between a stronger opposition party as an asset rather than a liability. This 
finding is in consonance with Popkin’s theory that when voters make their choices at the 
ballot box they are primarily motivated by their insight and assessment of the party 
candidates or incumbents. Voters are thus inclined to vote for a party that they feel has a 
leader or candidate that have the ability to represent and govern effectively. 
 
 
Moreover, negative perceptions about the leadership of the ACDP and COPE were linked to 
the poor presence and visibility of the parties during the 2011 election. Participants felt that 
that party leaders, candidates and campaigners should have been more visible in 
communities. The majority of the participants said the ACDP and their leader only emerge 
during the election period and then disappear when the election is over. This negative 
perception about the ACDP was the basis of much disillusionment among the participants 
who were previously loyal supporters of the party. In addition, the distribution of election 
manifestoes and pamphlets were also limited, if not, non-existent in some communities. In 
contrast, the DA’s presence and visibility was stronger than other parties contesting the 
election. There was engagement between the national leader, mayoral candidate and party 
representatives with the electorate. Indeed, opposition voters felt that the positive engagement 
with the DA motivated them to change their vote to the DA in the 2011 election. This point is 
further explored in the section related to the perceptions about the election campaigns.  
 
 
5.2.2 Party images 
 
Both parties (ACDP and COPE) received a negative rating in terms of public image. The 
findings showed that the ACDP’s conservative and ‘churchy’ image has become less 
important to some opposition voters who previously supported the party. It was argued that 
the image of the party was, and to an extent, still excludes other social groups. This finding is 
in agreement with Popkin’s integrated theory which argues that voters do reason about party 
images by assessing whether the party is inclusive to the needs and concerns of all 
individuals. As previously indicated, an ‘exclusive’ party image could prevent parties to grow 
electorally because not all voters can identify with the party’s ideologies and policies. The 
findings thus indicated that leadership and party images are equally important in vote choices 
and unfortunately, the ACDP fared very poorly in both aspects in the 2011 election.  
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The findings further indicated that COPE’s leadership disputes tarnished their public image. 
Voters that previously supported COPE in the 2009 elections said that they are not convinced 
that COPE is ready to govern any public office. As with their perception on leadership, 
participants noted that COPE has failed to present a positive public image, as the party 
appears ‘untrustworthy and incompetent’.  
 
The findings revealed that all participants had a positive perception and evaluation of the DA 
in terms of its public image. Overall, the DA was seen as competent, trustworthy and 
inclusive to the majority of participants. Participants felt that based on the DA’s positive 
party image, the party will do a good job in government.  
 
The above findings about party images are in agreement with Popkin’s theory that in the 
absence of sufficient information, voters use party images as reasoning “short cuts” to help 
them to decide which party to vote or not to vote for.  
 
 
5.2.3 Evaluations of election campaigns  
 
With regards to election campaigns, the majority of the participants felt that both the ACDP 
and COPE had poorly developed campaigns for the 2011 election. Their negative perception 
about party campaigns was another reason for their migration to the DA in this election.  
 
The findings revealed that both parties were unable to develop campaigns that attracted the 
attention of the voter. Both parties campaigned around the same issues. For example, both 
parties chose to focus on the poor government performance on important issues such as 
unemployment, crime, and service delivery, to name a few. These two parties thought that 
they would secure more support if they capitalize on the shortcomings of the ANC and the 
DA. However, voters were less interested in hearing problems but were more interested in 
solutions to these problems. Unfortunately, the ACDP and COPE (like other opposition 
parties) failed to provide campaigns that are unique and that are distinct from other parties 
contesting the election. In that sense, voters were presented with the same campaign 
messages which did not motivate them to support the parties.  
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It was further revealed that the majority of participants did not read the campaign manifestoes 
of the two parties. This was due to a limited distribution of manifestoes and pamphlets by the 
ACDP and COPE. On the other hand, campaign material of the DA was easily accessible by 
participants. In sum, the DA managed to develop positive campaigns and was able to reach a 
broad spectrum of voters in the election.   
 
The above findings are in consonance with Popkin’s theory that campaigns matter to voters. 
Voters may turn to party campaigns for help with the evaluation of the party, the leader and 
candidates, and policy positions. In this vein, voters may assess the overall competence and 
ability to deliver of the party based on the party’s campaign behaviour. Election campaigns, 
to some extent then, are information shortcuts for voters to help them to reason about political 
parties.   
 
5.2.4 Media coverage  
 
The findings revealed that the media played an important role in the migration away from 
small parties to the DA. Most media reporting portrayed the DA as a strong political 
opponent while other parties like the ACDP and COPE had to compete for the media’s 
attention. As seen in Chapter Four, the DA managed to attract a sizeable portion of media 
coverage giving the party a platform to canvass for votes. Indeed, participants that were 
exposed to media reports on the DA, and other parties contesting the 2011 local election, 
were more likely to change their political views and voting choices during the 2011 election.   
Media reports and communication highlighted the leadership problems of COPE and created 
an image that COPE lacked competence and integrity to deal with critical issues relating to 
leadership and governance. Participants indicated that COPE’s internal problems were all 
over the media and therefore it was hard to ignore. Additionally, the ACDP had a weak media 
presence in the run-up to the 2011 election. Most of the ACDP’s media statements focused on 
the ANC while limited attention was given to their plans and policy proposals.  
 
Ultimately, a considerable amount of media coverage was related to the ‘two-horse’ race 
between the ANC and the DA. This strengthened the DA’s position compared to other 
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opposition parties. Participants noted that the media was biased towards particular parties in 
the 2011 elections and hence perceptions of, and support for, parties were constructed 
accordingly. As previously indicated, these findings support the assertions of Popkin that the 
media has an effect on voting choices; the media affects how voters reason about the 
government, parties and public issues.  
 
5.2.5 Voting determinants  
 
Contrary to the assumptions that voting choices would be determined by traditional 
determinants, the 2011 local election pointed out that voting behaviour is much more 
complex in South Africa. As seen in Chapter Four, research findings showed that voters, 
especially those who previously supported the ACDP and COPE, were more mobile and 
flexible in terms of their vote choices. The findings indicate that electoral choices were not 
determined by historical loyalties, race or social or religious identity in the 2011 election. 
Those who previously supported the ACDP and COPE in the 2009 elections found 
themselves switching off their traditional partisan predispositions - they were more focussed 
on serious issues of concern in their communities, as well as the (ANC) government’s 
performance in dealing with those issues. These voters paid careful attention to leadership, 
party images, party campaigns and media reporting. More specifically, those who supported 
the ACDP in 2009 felt that their vote choices in 2011 were not informed by their religious 
identity, as in previous elections. Those who formally voted for COPE moved away from the 
perception that the DA is a party only for ‘white interest’. These participants moved away 
from their perception that only a break-away party that comes from the ANC could 
adequately represent political preferences.  
 
When considering their inputs in this study, one could observe a rational form of reasoning 
when it comes to the participants’ political opinions and decisions about the ACDP, COPE 
and the DA. The responses given by participants appeared to be more in line with the 
integrated theoretical approach adopted by Popkin that holds that voters has strong opinions 
about the government and political parties. Voters also have a strong awareness of serious 
issues in their communities and the mistakes made by government regarding these issues. 
Findings indicated that participants paid attention to negative or positive feelings about the 
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ACDP and COPE’s leadership, party images, election campaigns and the media coverage, 
which led to them switching their vote.   
 
5.3 Conclusion  
 
The study has illustrated the complexity involved in voter decision-making processes. Voters 
use different elements of reason to help them decide which party to vote for. The findings 
suggest that voters do have strong political opinions about national party leaders. My findings 
also suggest that voters do reason about their character, competence and visibility, and that 
voters also reason about party images, campaigns and media communication.  
 
A key problem was that party leaders should be more visible during and between elections. 
The findings revealed that in most instances voters has no engagement with the leaders of the 
parties contesting the election. Party leaders should make themselves available to their 
constituencies on a regular basis. It will help them to establish public trust and improve the 
relationship between the party, existing members, and potential voters.  
 
 
Opposition parties like the ACDP and COPE should keep in mind that party campaigning 
does not stop after the election results have been announced. However, their campaign should 
continue until the next election. Permanent campaigns, mentioned by Africa (2012), could 
improve perceptions about the party and better their changes at the polls. A permanent 
campaign could improve their visibility and improve their party profile in the election.  
 
Currently, opposition parties blame the biased reporting of the media for their poor 
performance at the polls. However parties could use free media opportunities more 
effectively to bring their campaign messages across. The radio is a widely accessible medium 
to improve their communication and engagement with voters. Parties could also consider the 
use of online media as this communication platform is untapped by most parties.  
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Most opposition parties seldom offer alternative policies to voters, but rather emphasize their 
ability to run the government ‘better’ than the incumbent party. Both the ACDP and COPE 
focused on the shortcomings of the ANC and DA in the 2011 election rather than presenting 
viable solutions to the social and economic problems the country is facing. This trend was 
also outlined in the run-up to the 2014 general elections; many smaller parties have sought to 
capitalise on the weaknesses of the ANC, rather than showcasing their own strengths 
(Marrian, 2014).  
 
 
Moreover, small parties should therefore seek to change their election strategies in order to 
meet the needs of the electorate whose confidence in their ability to win is dwindling. Clear 
and well-articulated election messages will definitely improve smaller opposition parties’ 
electoral performance to the extent that they can effectively challenge parties such as the 
ANC and DA.  
 
 
 
In the research conducted, I observed that only one opposition party, the DA, has been able to 
grow its support among the electorate. This was mainly due to positive perceptions and 
evaluations of the party in terms of leadership, party image, well-articulated election 
campaigns and positive media coverage. At the same time, smaller opposition parties like the 
ACDP and COPE lost support to the DA because of negative perceptions in terms of the 
above mentioned factors. At the end, the ACDP and COPE were seen as too weak to compete 
for municipal seats.  
 
Moreover, it should be emphasized that voters saw the migration to the DA as the ‘only’ 
viable option to create a stronger opposition against the ANC. Given that the DA was the 
only opposition party growing electorally it made sense for these respondents to support the 
party in the 2011 local elections.  Initially, they hoped that the ACDP and COPE would fulfil 
this strong opposition role, but the party’s dwindling support meant that this will never be the 
case.  
 
There has been a perception that South Africa might be moving towards a two party system 
in the future. This perception is based on the DA electoral gains in the 2011 election while 
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other opposition parties have fared relatively poor. The DA’s primary potential for growth 
lies in its ability to attract a significant number of black voters in forthcoming elections. 
Some analysts believe that the party has reached a ceiling with regard to white voters. It 
would thus be important to investigate the electoral performance of the DA among black 
voters.  
 
The research has highlighted that weak opposition parties raise serious challenges for the 
future of multiparty democracy. Not only do they strengthen the dominance of the ruling 
party, but they also pose a serious threat to the survival of the very idea of a political 
opposition and of electoral choice. The need for a stronger opposition has thus taken centre 
stage in the political discourse.  
 
It is generally accepted that for democratic governance in any country to function effectively, 
governing parties need to be held accountable during their tenure. It is important for a 
governing party to know that there is a real possibility that they can be voted out and replaced 
by viable alternative parties. This is the reason why there is a need for strong opposition 
parties in democracy. Unfortunately, most opposition parties have struggled to maintain or 
increase their support base. More specifically, it would appear that opposition parties like the 
ACDP and COPE are faced with a serious electoral crisis. Should the ACDP and COPE wish 
to succeed in future elections, both parties need to come up with alternative political ideas (to 
the ruling party and the DA) that would attract and convince voters to vote for them. 
However, if the DA manages to capitalise on its electoral gains and to prove to be a more 
formidable political opponent at the national level, South Africa might be moving towards a 
two party system. The implications of a move to a two-party system remain to be seen. 
 
In conclusion then, the answer to the central research question of “Why did voters who 
previously voted for the ACDP and COPE decide to move their support from these parties in 
the 2011 local government election”, are as follows: leadership and party image have been 
found to be primary determinants of voter movement. Lesser, but not irrelevant issues such as 
party campaigns and media coverage were also found to be voter determinants. Given the 
uncertain future, opposition parties in South Africa such as the ACDP and COPE will need to 
be cognisant of these issues if they are to survive.   
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Appendix A: Dates of interviews  
 
 
Participants  Date of interview  
ACDP MPL 29 October 2012 
ACDP participant 1 4 January 2013 
ACDP participant 2 10 January 2013 
ACDP participant 3 15 January 2013 
ACDP participant 4 20 January 2013 
ACDP participant 5  19 June 2013 
ACDP Participant 6  09 February 2013 
ACDP participant 7 28 June 2013 
ACDP participant 8  29 July 2013 
COPE MP  20 November 2012 
COPE participant 1 27 November 2012 
COPE participant 2 05 December 2012 
COPE participant 3 09 January 2013 
COPE participant 4 06 December 2012 
COPE participant 5 27 November 2012 
COPE participant 6 27 November 2012 
COPE participant 7 23 January 2013  
COPE participant 8 5 June 2013 
COPE participant 9  14 June 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 
 
Appendix B: Informed consent form  
 
 
With your signature at the bottom of this page, this form has the power to protect your 
autonomy. Please read it in full, and if you understand and agree, sign below. 
 The purpose of this research is to investigate the declining voter support for opposition 
parties namely: ACDP and COPE.  
 More specifically, this study will examine the underlying reasons that voters decided to 
move their vote from the ACDP and COPE (or to abstain from voting) in 2011 local 
government elections.  
All that is required from you is participation in this interview as you may have valuable 
insights for this research. This interview should last no longer than sixty minutes. 
Please be advised you will receive no rewards, gifts or compensation for participating in this 
research. Participation is voluntary and all responses will be treated confidentially and only 
used for references purposes. Hence, anonymity will be ensured where appropriate and there 
are no limits to confidentiality, unless you are willing to be named. The findings of the 
research will also be reported back to participants. You are at liberty to withdraw from the 
research at any time without negative or undesirable consequences for yourself.  
If you agree, I will record this conversation, in order to keep accurate notes.  
Yours faithfully 
Meshay Lee Moses 
Tel: 0838739843  
Email: meshayleemoses@gmail.com or 2756089@uwc.ac.za 
 
I……………………………………………………………………………… (Full names of 
participant) herby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the 
nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire. 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT ……………………………………………..         
                     
DATE ………………………………………………… 
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Appendix C: Ethical considerations for study  
 
 
The essential purpose of research ethics is to protect the welfare and rights of research 
participants. Thus, to avoid unethical research practice, the researcher paid careful attention 
to ethical guiding principles for research. Two common key principles of research are that of 
autonomy and consent. These two principles requires the researcher to respect the autonomy 
of all persons participating in the research work, requiring the researcher to address issues 
such as the voluntary and informed consent of  research participants (Durrheim, 1999, p. 66). 
Having this in mind, it was vital that the researcher clarify exactly what the researcher’s 
intentions where when setting up the interviews. The researcher therefore provided all 
participants with an informed consent form that explained the purpose of the research in 
detail. As Durrheim states that the consent form ensures that participants receive a full, non-
technical and clear explanation of the tasks expected of them, and allowing that they can 
make an informed choice to participate voluntarily in the research (1999, p. 66).  
 
Additionally, the consent form was designed to ensure that the researcher will respect the 
participants’ wishes to remain anonymous, unless requested otherwise by the participant. The 
consent form also explained that information obtained from the respondents is confidential. 
This means that no one has access to the individual data or the names of the participants 
except the researcher. All the participants were informed that they have the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time without any consequences. The researcher only commenced with 
the interview once the participants understood the purpose of the research and the informed 
consent form was signed.  The consent form is included in appendix A. 
 
Moreover, ethical clearance and approval was obtained from the University of the Western 
Cape’s (UWC) Senate Research Grants before the study commencement. All interviews 
conducted by the researcher strictly conformed to the university’s Code of Ethics in 
Research. All work and information gathered that is not the researcher’s own will be 
acknowledged according to UWC’s approved referencing conventions. A final copy will be 
submitted to the institution and to the research participants. 
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Appendix D:  Interview protocol and data collection procedures notes  
 
In order to ensure good qualitative interview questions, the interview guide field testing was 
conducted with two participants sharing the same characteristics with the study participants, 
but who were not included in the main study.  The main objective of piloting was to ensure 
that the interviews were capable of eliciting information that could answer the study 
questions. During the piloting stage, the researcher took detailed notes on how the 
participants were reacting to both the phrasing and the content of the specific questions. The 
researcher was very attentive to see if the respondents could show any confusion or surprise 
at a particular question. Therefore, she inspected the interview questions to ensure that 
question was valid enough to elicit a specific piece of information. In order to achieve this 
goal, she looked at the phrasing of the questions to ensure that respondents were able to 
understand the meaning and implication of each question in the same way. 
 
Qualitative data collection process generally occurs in three phases that are planning, 
beginning data collection, and basic data collection (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006, p. 322). 
In the scope of this study, the researcher strictly followed these three phases. In the first 
phase, the researcher analysed the research aim and objectives as well as the research 
questions in order to identify the respondents who would be logically informative. During 
this phase, the researcher also located her respondents and searched and gained permission to 
conduct the interview with the respondents. In the second phase (beginning data collection), 
the researcher established rapport, trust and reciprocal relations with the respondents. During 
this phase, the researcher gave each participant an overview of the study and emailed each of 
them the interview guide with the key questions. The researcher also made telephonic contact 
with the participants that served as reminder for the scheduled interview.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher also adjusted her interviewing and recording procedures to the 
persons involved. For instance, she allowed each participant to respond in his/her preferred 
language. Participants thus responded in either English or Afrikaans or both. None of the 
respondents were Xhosa, Zulu, and Sotho etc. In the last phase, the researcher administered 
the interviews with the participants. In this phase, the researcher had a casual conversation to 
put the participants at ease. The researcher allowed each participant to talk about themselves 
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and how they feel about voting in particular and elections in general. After this brief 
discussion, the researcher moved to the interview questions and the consent form.  
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Appendix E: Interview schedule for voters  
 
1. Are elections still important in South Africa? Why? 
 
2. Which parties did you vote for in the different elections since 1994? 
 
 General 
Elections  
 
1994 1999 2004 2009  
National      
Provincial      
 
 
Local 
Government 
Elections  
1995 2000 2006 2011 
PR (Metro)     
Ward 
Councillor 
    
 
 
3. What were the reasons that you decided to change to the DA in 2011? 
 
4. The media has a duty to inform citizens about the electoral process and enable them to 
make informed choices, how did the media influence your 2011 voting choice? 
 
5. Thinking about the party (parties) that you voted for in 2009: 
 
5.1 What was the main reason that you voted for this party in 2009? 
5.2 What was the main reason that you withdrew your vote from this party in 2011?  
5.3 Do you think that the party’s 2011 election campaign was effective? Why do you say so? 
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5.4 Do you think this party received enough fair coverage from the media in the 2011 
election?  
5.5 Would you give a positive or negative rating of the party’s leadership? Why would you 
give it this rating? 
5.6 Do you still feel a sense of loyalty to that party? 
5.7 What do you think is the fundamental reason that this party lost support in the 2011 
election?  
5.8 How do you think this party can improve its chances in the 2014 election?  
 
6. Thinking about your voting choice in the 2011 election: 
 
6.1 Was it difficult to move your vote to the DA?  
6.2 What do you think are the main reasons that the DA managed to increase its support?  
6.3 What is the most effective campaign strategy of the DA compared to smaller opposition 
parties? 
6.4 How likely are you to vote for the DA in the 2014 elections? Why?  
 
7. Do you think South Africa is moving towards a two-party state? Do you think it would be 
beneficial for South Africa’s Democracy?  
 
8. Do you have any other comments you would like to add? 
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Appendix F: Interview schedule for party representatives  
 
The topics of the interviews were selected in advance and the researcher decided on the 
sequencing and wording of the questions.  
 
The following are the main interview questions for the party representatives:  
 
1. How in a few words does your party describe itself? 
2. Looking back to local government election in May 2011:   
a. Since the election, how much has the party’s membership increased or declined, in 
percentage or total numbers?  
b. How much does you party charge for membership per annum? 
c. What were the key reasons that your party was unable to increase its electoral support 
among South African voters during the 2011 local elections?   
d. Voters tend to move away from parties. This has influenced electoral outcomes. What 
were the most important reasons for change in party support, in your opinion? 
e. What constraints did your party face during the 2011 local election?  
3. In a few words, please describe your election campaign of 2011 
a. Do you think your campaign strategy was effective and please motivate your answer?   
b. In your opinion what could you have done better in your campaign?  
4. Political mobilising is a key component of gaining support. How does your party seek to 
recruit new members and/ or voters during and between elections?  
5. Communication between parties and voters are important. Does your party have the 
necessary mechanisms in place to communicate with the public on policy issues?   
a. If yes, what are these mechanisms? If no, what will be done to develop these?  
6. Some parties promote internal democracy. How does your party promote internal 
democracy?  
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7. Briefly explain the media environment 
a. Parties have access to free media coverage. Please indicate whether the free media 
coverage given to your party was sufficient?   
b. In your opinion, how was your party covered by the media during the 2011 local 
government election? 
c. Did the party make use of paid media in preparation for the election?   
8. There has been a call for political party funding reform  
a. How would you describe public funding from the state?  
b. What are your thoughts on private funding?  
9.  What are your perceptions of the ANC and the DA? 
a. Public protests have been a sign of anger towards the governing party. Why was the 
ANC able to convince voters to vote for them in the 2011 election regardless of poor 
services?  
b. Looking at the image of the DA, why was this party more successful than other 
opposition parties to convince voters to vote for them in 2011?  
10. Do you think South Africa is moving towards a two-party state?  
a. What are your views around a two-party system? Would it be beneficial for South 
Africa’s democracy?   
b. How would it affect parties?  
11. Many analysts have criticized small opposition parties saying that they do not appeal to 
the needs of electorate. What do you think is the fundamental reason that smaller 
opposition parties are not gaining support?  
12. How can your party improve their chances in the next election? 
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